LAPD Final Report

An Examination of May Day 2007
MacArthur Park

(Presented to the LAPD Board of Police Commissioners, Oct 9, 2007)

EDITOR'S NOTE: On October 9, 2007, the LAPD presented its Final Report regarding the much publicized May Day "crowd control" incident at MacArthur Park to the Police Commission. The Department places principal blame for what occurred in MacArthur Park on the commanding officers who were on scene that day, and further makes the point that the line officers deployed to assist the event had not received crowd control training in the previous 18 months.

At least 26 officers participating in the incident are under internal investigation and could face discipline for using excessive force. But their individual actions are not a part of the report because California law prohibits the release of this type of information.

In the hopes of making it more accessible, LACP is providing the following 10 page Executive Summary below as an easy to read web page, just a portion of the full 124 page pdf format report entitled "An Examination of May Day 2007; MacArthur Park."

We've also provided the full pdf version for those who wish to download the entire document:

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Download the full 124 page report here
(pdf file format):

An Examination of May Day 2007
MacArthur Park

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LAPD Final Report

An Examination of May Day 2007
MacArthur Park

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 1, 2007, what began as a peaceful march, rally and expression of First Amendment rights, ended in confrontation - seemingly the result of a small group of individuals attempting to incite a disturbance, coupled with decisions made by Department personnel. The images of helmeted officers, using batons to push and strike members of the public and the media and firing less-lethal impact munitions at people in the park, were disconcerting. These actions raised questions regarding how this occurred; particularly in light of the extensive efforts on the part of the Department to implement change over the last five years.

The Department has been confronted with large-scale marches, rallies, demonstrations and events over the years, and, with few exceptions, has handled them without disruption to the events and without needing to use force. The events on May 1, 2007 at MacArthur Park stand in stark contrast to the marches and assemblies managed by the Department over the years that occurred without incident. Thus, the events of May 1, 2007 are of great concern.

As a result of what occurred on May 1, 2007, Chief of Police, William J. Bratton took immediate action and ordered a comprehensive examination of not only the events of that day, but also an inquiry into the planning and training leading up to May Day 2007. The Los Angeles Police Department has been the subject of many reports, internal and external. Many may speculate that this report will be put on a shelf with the others that came before it, and that life in the Department will go on unchanged and unaffected, eventually leading to another similar incident. The intention is the opposite. The Department acknowledges that identifying lessons learned is but the first step in bringing about change; what is key, is that the resulting changes be institutionalized.

In preparation for this report, the events of May 1, 2007 were examined from the early planning stages to the eventual dispersal of those in MacArthur Park. Additionally, a thorough review of Department training relating to crowd management and control was conducted, including Department use of force policies, and in particular, the training of those Metropolitan officers who were involved in the events at MacArthur Park.

This report includes a chronology of the day’s events and an analysis, which seeks to describe how the actions of the Department and its employees ultimately contributed to the events of the day. This examination encompasses issues relating to planning, tactics, command and control, situational awareness, training and the individual responsibility of officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. This report was approached with the intent to extract specific lessons from the analysis that will lead to meaningful, institutionalized changes that seek to ensure that the events of May 1, 2007 do not happen again. Therefore, this report not only includes recommendations, but also includes deadlines for implementation and audit provisions to ensure that each and every lesson learned is implemented and institutionalized.

This report does not address the issue of discipline to be imposed, if any, on individual officers for any use of force that occurred that day. California law, and a recent court decision interpreting that law, prohibits the dissemination of any personnel information and/or any disciplinary decisions that may result from these investigations (California Government Code Section 3304 and Penal Code Section 832, as interpreted by Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (County of San Diego), (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, prohibits the release of this type of information.). Therefore, as personnel investigations are deemed confidential, this report does not include information obtained from any interview of any officer whose use of force is being reviewed or any civilian who may have witnessed the events of May Day 2007.

The investigation of the uses of force in MacArthur Park, and every claim or lawsuit arising from the same, will be thorough and extensive. When the investigation is complete, the results will be submitted to a panel comprised of Metropolitan Division Captains Kroeber and Greer and Commander Stephen R. Jacobs, who was previously the Commanding Officer of Metropolitan Division. This panel was appointed by Chief Bratton to specifically review each of the uses of force that occurred in MacArthur Park and make a recommendation to the Chief of Police as to whether misconduct occurred, and if so, the appropriate discipline to be imposed. The Chief of Police will review the recommendations and make the final determination as to the appropriate disposition, and where applicable, discipline. (Pursuant to the Charter of the City of Los Angeles, an officer who has discipline imposed upon him or her by the Chief of Police has the right to a hearing before an administrative board, the Board of Rights. This board is composed of two officers of the rank of Captain or above and an individual who is not a member of the department (civilian member). This board holds a hearing and then determines if misconduct has occurred and what the punishment will be. If the board holds that the officer did not engage in misconduct, the decision is final and no discipline may be imposed. If the board holds that the officer committed misconduct, the Chief of Police may then leave the discipline imposed as it stands, or reduce it. He cannot, however, increase the discipline imposed.)

This examination of the events of May Day 2007 in MacArthur Park ultimately pointed to six primary factors that influenced the events that day.

This report examined the events of May Day 2007 with the benefit of hindsight, in an attempt to determine how Department personnel allowed a small group of individuals attempting to disrupt the events of the day, to succeed in that mission. While this report does not delineate the many examples of professionalism and restraint exhibited by the officers of the Los Angeles Police Department that day, it is important that the actions of these officers are not lost in the critical review presented in this report.

A. The Significance of May Day / May Day 2006

Historically, the topic of immigration has been of concern to the people of Los Angeles. Moreover, the history of policing in MacArthur Park on May Day is significant, in that for over two decades the park served as a rallying point for many demonstrations and community activities.

During the spring of 2006, immigrants’ rights groups across the nation called for protests to take place on May 1, 2006, as a day of action against House Resolution 4437. Individuals were encouraged to strike by refusing to conduct business, go to work or attend school, in an effort to show how a “day without an immigrant” would affect this nation. Thus, recognizing its duty to protect the civil rights of all individuals, while also providing for the safety of those individuals, the Department began planning for May Day 2006.

On May 1, 2006, approximately 500,000 individuals took part in one of the largest single days of protest in the United States. Participants marched and rallied in Central Area during the first half of the day, and then marched into Rampart Area for the final rally at MacArthur Park. The Department successfully managed the event and enabled participants to express their First Amendment rights.

In the late evening of May Day 2006, however, a significant confrontation between police and a small group attempting to incite a disturbance occurred. Individuals in the crowd blocked Alvarado Street and threw rocks, bottles and other debris at police officers and people passing by who were not engaging in unlawful behavior. For nearly an hour the police officers did not take action against the unruly group, and the number of disruptive individuals in the crowd steadily grew to nearly 1,000 as the unlawful behavior continued. Finally, Mobile Field Forces and Metropolitan Division personnel were called to the park to gain control of the situation. An unlawful assembly was called, and in a short period of time, the crowd dispersed. Chief Bratton arrived on scene during the incident and was concerned about the slow response of personnel to manage the situation. The delay caused injury to officers and created an unsafe situation for the majority of law abiding individuals who had come to the park to exercise their First Amendment rights.

Subsequent to May Day 2006, Chief Bratton recognized that many of his command staff had little experience with crowd control situations. Therefore, he directed Special Operations Bureau to conduct a one-day crowd control course for command officers, to expose them to basic crowd control tactics. In September 2006, Special Operations Bureau, in conjunction with other Department experts, provided training for all command and staff officers. The course included a brief overview of basic planning strategies for pre-planned events, Mobile Field Force capabilities and crowd control tactics, which was followed by field demonstrations regarding the capabilities of the following: Bicycle Teams, the Mounted Platoon, non-target and target specific less-lethal impact munitions and Tactical Support Elements. The course included demonstrations but did not adequately allow for practical application exercises. This may be why some of the problems identified in 2006 repeated themselves on May Day 2007.

B. May Day 2007

The May 1, 2007 immigration marches and rallies were expected to be similar to those of the prior year; a morning march and rally in Central Area, and a final rally at MacArthur Park. This year, the crowds were expected to be somewhat smaller in number.

The May Day 2007 morning events in Central Area were properly planned for and occurred without incident. Timely information was channeled through the Central Area Incident Command Post on a regular basis, and, at all times, it was clear that Deputy Chief Carter was the Incident Commander in charge of the event. The crowd, estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 people, was peaceful. While a small group of individuals described by officers as “anarchists” were spotted at the rally and march that morning, they were contacted by officers during the event to ensure they understood the police were aware of their presence, and the May Day events in Central Area occurred without incident. The well-executed police presence and activity allowed all in attendance the opportunity to express their First Amendment rights and permitted the media to record and report on the events as they occurred.

As the crowd dwindled, Assistant Chief Paysinger, Deputy Chief Roupoli and Deputy Chief Carter, comfortable with the success of the morning events, decided to redeploy three of the four Metropolitan Division Platoons, that had been on stand by for the Central Area event, to perform other duties, just before 3:00 p.m. Metropolitan Division B-Platoon, comprised of 40 personnel, was deployed to MacArthur Park to be available for the afternoon rally in MacArthur Park and support the 149 Department personnel already on site.

Beginning at approximately 3:30 p.m., a crowd, that included Cardinal Roger Mahoney, marched from 3rd Street and Vermont Avenue to MacArthur Park. Rampart Area Captain John Egan served as the Incident Commander and took an active role in ensuring the crowd of marchers made their way safely along the designated route. Notwithstanding one help-call broadcast at 8th Street and Alvarado that resulted in an arrest, the march to MacArthur Park was peaceful and controlled. Even though this march was not permitted, Captain Egan accommodated the growing crowd, allowing the marchers to spill into the street, while providing for their safety.

By 5:00 p.m., the majority of the demonstrators, estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 individuals, had reached MacArthur Park and were entering the north side of the park. With no officers or sound truck in place to guide the marchers into the entrance of the park, many individuals marched westbound onto Wilshire Boulevard, rather than entering the park at the corner of Wilshire Boulevard and Alvarado Street. The crowd that gathered on Wilshire Boulevard soon grew to approximately 200 to 300 people, and officers were faced with an impromptu march, heading westbound toward Park View Street.

As a result, several strategies were employed to encourage the crowd to move into the north side of the park. First, a skirmish line of officers was deployed to stop the crowd from crossing Park View and direct people into a park entrance at Park View and Wilshire. Then, event organizers were asked to use the Department sound truck to ask the crowd, in Spanish, to move into the park. Finally, a team of Motorcycle officers drove the crowd eastbound on Wilshire, compressing the crowd. This, from all accounts, raised the tension of both the crowd and the officers. In fact, several individuals who were interviewed after May Day 2007 referred to this single instance as the proverbial “tipping point” of the day.

During this move eastbound, a Sergeant with the Motorcycle Team was grabbed by the arms, as three individuals from the crowd attempted to pull the Sergeant from his bike. The Sergeant was forced to allow his bike to fall to the ground. In the end, after discussion with Metropolitan Division supervisors, the crowd was permitted to remain on Wilshire, and the suspect, positively identified as the man who pulled the Motorcycle Sergeant from his bike, was not arrested, pursuant to the order of Deputy Chief Carter.

During the events described in the paragraph above, Captain Egan’s role as Incident Commander gradually diminished, as Central Bureau Commander Louis Gray and Central Bureau Deputy Chief Lee Carter began to make operational decisions and provide direction to officers in the park. Soon, the majority of Department employees present that day became confused as to who was in command.

As events unfolded in the park, a group of 20 to 30 individuals, whose intent appeared to be to provoke a confrontation and cause a disturbance, threw objects at police, including wooden sticks, water bottles filled with water, ice and gravel, and pieces of cement. This group of disruptive individuals appeared to move from Wilshire and Park View to the south side of the park near 7th and Alvarado.

As officers in the vicinity of 7th and Alvarado experienced, and reported via the radio, objects being thrown at them, two distinct groups of supervisors discussed plans to disperse the crowd, independent of each other. The first discussion took place between Hollywood Lieutenant Guillermo Rosales and officers and supervisors from the Bicycle Unit at 7th and Alvarado. The second discussion took place between Incident Commander Captain Egan, Commander Gray, Deputy Chief Carter and Metropolitan Division supervisors gathered at the opposite end of the park at Park View and Wilshire. Neither group had full situational awareness. While both discussions resulted in a decision to declare an unlawful assembly and disperse the crowd, the plan that was ultimately utilized was formulated by Egan, Gray and Carter and was not communicated to Lieutenant Rosales. This plan involved the use of Metropolitan Division resources to move the crowd from the south side of the park northbound from 7th and Alvarado toward the north side of the park.

At 6:17 p.m., Metropolitan Division B-Platoon formed a skirmish line on 7th Street, and without a dispersal order being given, moved the crowd northbound, pushing and striking some individuals in the crowd, including some members of the media, and firing less-lethal impact munitions. As officers continued to report objects being thrown by individuals in the crowd, the skirmish line continued north across Wilshire, driving the small group of disruptive individuals from the south side of the park into the thousands of peaceful demonstrators gathered in the north side of the park for a rally.

The line of B-Platoon resources was eventually joined by Metropolitan Division C and D Platoons. The line of officers, spanning across the entire north side of the park from Wilshire to 6th Street, proceeded to move the crowd westbound toward Park View, clearing the entire park of participants, whether peaceful or not. During this move westbound, as the line moved past a Spanish-language media tent, some individuals in the crowd, including members of the media, were pushed and struck by officers with batons. Officers also continued to fire less-lethal impact munitions until they reached the sidewalk at Park View at the west end of the park. During this move to clear the park, no complete dispersal order was given in either English or Spanish.

Deputy Chief Carter followed behind the line of Metropolitan Division officers for the entirety of the move westbound through the north side of the park. Captain Egan and Commander Gray remained at Wilshire and Park View for the duration of the move to clear the park, which lasted approximately 24 minutes.

In the end, as seen on video, officers had driven thousands of people from the park, knocked over and struck some individuals - including media and non-media, peaceful or not – and deployed a total of 146 less-lethal impact munitions and over 100 uses of the baton. As a result, 246 individuals claimed injury (from two broken bones to bruises and numerous claims of emotional distress) and 18 officers were treated for various abrasions and contusions by Emergency Medical Technicians at MacArthur Park, or later at hospitals, and released.

C. Analysis of May Day 2007

The six primary factors that influenced the events that day included: (1) planning; (2) tactics, including the use of force; (3) command and control; (4) situational awareness; (5) training; and (6) individual responsibility.

There were several factors that contributed to the inadequate planning for the afternoon march and rally in MacArthur Park. The first was Deputy Chief Carter’s underestimation of the size and significance of the afternoon rally at MacArthur Park. Recognizing the historical significance of the May Day rally, the Rampart Area command staff requested additional resources and asked that further attention be paid to planning for the MacArthur Park rally. Deputy Chief Carter, however, believed that the “non-permitted” march in Rampart would be much smaller than the “permitted” march in the morning in Central Area, and, as such, focused the planning efforts on Central Area. In fact, as Rampart Area Captain McDonald pushed for further planning meetings in preparation for the Rampart event, he was verbally reprimanded by Deputy Chief Carter.

The fact that Rampart Command assigned the drafting of the Rampart Incident Action Plan (IAP) – the blue print for the management of the event - to several individuals also contributed to the issues in planning for MacArthur Park. These drafters attempted to plan for an ever-changing event, as Deputy Chief Carter modified the number of external resources to be committed to Rampart and the placement of key personnel during the event, up until the morning of May Day. While a Rampart IAP was produced and disseminated, it was missing several key details essential to proper event management.

Further, various entities, integral to the management of the crowd on May Day, were absent from the planning process altogether. Entities, such as Air Support Division and Metropolitan Division, were not involved in the planning phase. Ultimately, different versions of the IAP were distributed, some entities did not receive or review the plan, and the final version of the IAP was not communicated to all entities involved. Additionally, a viewing area was not provided for the media - contrary to a settlement agreement entered into by the Department - which resulted in the media unknowingly encircling themselves in and around MacArthur Park, placing members of the media directly in the path of the move to clear the park.

A number of tactical deficiencies arose on May Day, ultimately resulting in the movement of a small group of unruly individuals into a large group of peaceful participants. Tactical issues included:

Failure to Guide Marchers

One of the first tactical deficiencies identified during this review was the failure of the Incident Commander to properly prepare for the arrival of the marchers into MacArthur Park. During past events, officers were pre-deployed to assist with this process. This tactic was not utilized on May Day. This failure caused officers to hastily react to a crowd unexpectedly moving toward them on Park View Street. The decision to deploy a squad of motor officers to push the crowd east on Wilshire resulted in a compression of the crowd, causing tension in the crowd to rise and encouraging others to participate in disruptive behavior.

Use of Force

By the time the events ended in MacArthur Park, more than 100 uses of the baton and 146 less-lethal impact munitions had been deployed. It appeared that some of the officers and supervisors in MacArthur Park believed that, contrary to Department policy, baton strikes could be used to compel a person to disperse, even if they were merely standing in front of the officers, failing to respond to direction. Further, non-target and target specific less-lethal impact munitions, were deployed absent the intent to affect an arrest - in contrast to the law which states that use of force should be deployed as a precursor to an arrest.

Treatment of the Media

The treatment of some members of the media raised questions about the training, discipline and understanding of the role of the media on the part of some of the officers in MacArthur Park that day. Some officers did not adhere to the guidelines required pursuant to agreements between the Department and the media, including those outlined in the Crespo v. City of Los Angeles settlement, arising out of the 2000 Democratic National Convention. For example, in the move to clear the park, some officers pushed and struck some members of the media to move them from the area, rather than allowing the media to move safely into a designated media viewing area.

Crowd Dispersal Strategies

The declaration of an unlawful assembly should be resorted to only when there are no other reasonable alternatives. The decision to declare an unlawful assembly and disperse the crowd on May Day 2007 appeared to be made quickly, without consideration of the impact a dispersal order would have on those exercising their First Amendment rights. As a result, errors were made, including the fact that Captain Egan, Commander Gray, and/or Deputy Chief Carter, apparently did not consider isolating and arresting those engaging in unlawful conduct; a complete dispersal order was not given in either English or Spanish; the dispersal order was not specific to the location of the unlawful conduct; and the tactics employed to move the unlawful individuals were flawed, in that a small group of unlawful individuals were ultimately pushed into a large group of peaceful, law-abiding individuals.

Arrest posture

It appeared that the Department leaders for this event did not consider adopting a posture of isolating and arresting those who were engaging in unlawful activity or disrupting the rally. Instead, they decided to declare an unlawful assembly and clear the entire area. While there is no official Department policy on when an arrest shall or shall not be made in a crowd control situation, as each instance is unique, the crowd may have reacted differently if they had seen people committing unlawful acts being isolated from the crowd and arrested. Moreover, arresting and removing those violating the law may have reduced the need to declare an unlawful assembly, offering a greater level of protection of First Amendment rights.

Utilization of Available Resources

Although, ultimately, there were nearly 450 officers deployed to the MacArthur Park event who were available to assist Metropolitan Division in crowd movement, Metropolitan Division performed the movement of the crowd almost completely on its own. Proper coordination with the available resources may have provided the ability for officers to pass people, who were either unable or unwilling to leave, through the skirmish line to awaiting officers who could either redirect or arrest the individuals as appropriate.

Use of Sound Truck

The sound truck was used minimally throughout the event to encourage the cooperation of the crowd, provide direction and/or attempt to separate the individuals who were being disruptive. While the sound truck was requested by field supervisors to provide a dispersal order at 7th and Alvarado, the sound truck never appeared.

Knowing who is in command during an incident is of utmost importance. There must be one person who understands the objectives of the plans, receives tactical information and makes decisions with a complete understanding of all that is occurring. The Rampart Area IAP identified Captain Egan as the Incident Commander – the person in charge of the events in MacArthur Park. Both Commander Gray and Deputy Chief Carter, however, began to make decisions and give orders very early into the afternoon. Though Commander Gray and Deputy Chief Carter made operational decisions and directed action at various times throughout the afternoon, neither individual exercised the requisite “transfer of command” process.

As a result, subordinate officers witnessed conflicting direction and obvious tension between the three command officers. As subordinates from various positions in the field made numerous requests over the radio that went unacknowledged and unanswered - including requests for the sound truck and repeated requests for action as officers were being struck with objects thrown by people in the crowd - officers began to make independent decisions in efforts to control the crowd. In fact, during critical tactical engagements in and around MacArthur Park, not one order was provided over the radio by Captain Egan, Commander Gray, Deputy Chief Carter, or Captain Tom McDonald, who was in the Rampart Incident Command Post monitoring the radio frequencies. This seemed to result in various forms of miscommunication.

Deputy Chief Carter, Commander Gray and Captain Egan failed to maintain communication with those in the field in order to obtain a full picture of the unfolding events. As a result, these men were unable to fully understand the situation before them. While many individuals had varying degrees of situational awareness that day, none knew of the scope of the tactical movements and action of officers in MacArthur Park.

The Incident Command Post, had limited situational awareness due to several factors including the lack of an aerial image from the Air Unit and limited resources to monitor the radio. Moreover, Deputy Chief Roupoli, in the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), which was responsible for oversight of all events in the city on May Day 2007 and the coordination of all resources, received little to no information from the Incident Command Post or the command staff in the park. Consequently, May Day saw an Incident Commander, an Incident Command Post and the MACC all lacking the situational awareness required to manage such an event.

Research conducted in the preparation of this report revealed that Metropolitan Division received no training in crowd control in the 18 months leading up to May Day 2007, as the Metropolitan Division Basic Course was cut sometime in 2005. Further, when Metropolitan Division personnel were receiving regular crowd control training, prior to 2005, the content of that training may have been incomplete, or even inaccurate. These issues were not caught, however, as at that time Training Group was not tasked with providing oversight of the training of specialized units such as Metropolitan Division.

Issues that may have arisen out of inadequate or inconsistent training included the fact that some officers and supervisors in MacArthur Park appeared to believe that baton strikes could be used to compel a person, not engaging in aggressive and/or combative behavior, but merely standing in place, to disperse. Further, as previously discussed, proper training in regard to the treatment of media was apparently lacking.

Every Department employee has an individual duty to act appropriately and every officer is responsible for his or her own actions. Additionally, every Department employee, whether officer or supervisor, has a duty to stop a fellow officer who is engaging in misconduct. Therefore, the events of May Day 2007 raised two significant questions: Why did some officers appear to have performed inappropriately? And, why didn’t other officers present make an attempt to intervene? In the end, any individual who either engaged in misconduct or witnessed unacceptable behavior, yet did nothing to stop it, must be held accountable.

D. Action Taken Since May Day 2007

Immediately upon being notified of the events at MacArthur Park, Chief Bratton responded to the park and met with Deputy Chief Carter and others. Later that night, he called a meeting with his top executive staff to discuss his concerns. Soon thereafter, Chief Bratton launched four investigations: a personnel complaint investigation; a use of force investigation; a criminal investigation as to those who threw objects at officers; and an investigation by the Office of Operations, which included orders to produce an internal After Action Report. Moreover, Chief Bratton ordered the examination of events and this report to the Board of Police Commissioners by Deputy Chief Michael Hillmann and Police Administrator Gerald Chaleff.

Approximately one week after May Day 2007, Chief Bratton made personnel changes to his leadership team to ensure the Department’s ability to manage such events in the future would not be compromised. As such, Deputy Chief Carter was removed from his position of Commanding Officer of Operations-Central Bureau and Commander Louis Gray, Assistant Commanding Officer of Operations-Central Bureau was reassigned to the Office of Operations. Chief Bratton also made an unprecedented move by relieving Metropolitan Division officers from their field duties until they completed mandatory training.

Chief Bratton subsequently directed Deputy Chief Hillmann, the Commanding Officer of Operations-West Bureau, to prepare training for Metropolitan Division and all command staff within the organization. Chief Hillmann immediately convened a team of Department experts to review and identify points of failure in regard to command and overall operations of the May Day incident.

Additionally, beginning July 2007, Training Group and Metropolitan Division launched the Department-wide training course on Mobile Field Force and crowd control tactics and use of force policy for all personnel assigned to the Office of Operations. As of October 1, 2007, approximately 2,000 field officers and supervisors have been trained and more than 6,500 members of the Department will be trained by March 2008. The Department has also provided training for officers from the Department of General Services Office of Public Safety and the Los Angeles Unified School District Police. Additionally, members of the Los Angeles Human Relations Commission, the media and the ACLU have been provided the opportunity to view the training.

In the weeks after May Day, Chief Bratton held meetings with representatives of the media, the Hispanic community, organizers of May Day, the ACLU and other interested parties. Additionally, at Chief Bratton’s direction, in response to a request by the City Council, the Department issued a report to City Council on May 29, 2007.

Chief Bratton further recognized the need to appoint a single entity to be responsible for institutionalizing lessons learned and to help establish policies and procedures for the management of a variety of large-scale incidents (e.g., earthquakes, floods, terrorist activity and demonstrations). He believed having this responsibility divided among several entities in the past may have led to inconsistencies in the planning, operations and after action review of incidents throughout the City. Chief Bratton was also concerned that, as in the past, lessons learned might be lost without a single entity to institutionalize the necessary changes. Thus, on July 1, 2007, the Incident Management and Training Bureau (IMTB) was established.

E. Crowd Management After May Day 2007

Following May Day 2007, it was recommended to Chief Bratton that the Department utilize the Incident Management Team (IMT) concept. An IMT is comprised of specialists who are experienced leaders, decision makers and strategic thinkers familiar with all aspects of emergency management, to be responsible for managing large, complex incidents. Recognizing the benefits of this concept, Chief Bratton directed the IMT to be incorporated into the practices and policies of the Incident Management and Training Bureau.

The Department utilized the IMT concept to successfully manage several large-scale events after May Day 2007, including the May 8, 2007 Griffith Park Fire, the May 17, 2007 Procession For Justice March and Rally, the June 15, 2007 Justice for Janitors March and Rally and the June 24, 2007 Full Rights for Immigrants March and Rally. Therefore, the Department has now adopted the IMT concept as its standard.

F. Recommendations and Conclusion

The recommendations of this report differ from the recommendations of reports and commissions that have preceded it, in that they will be followed by a clear plan for implementation and institutionalization via the Incident Management and Training Bureau. The efforts of the Department, to date, indicate its commitment to ensuring that these recommendations will be ingrained in Department policies and procedures that will remain long after those in command today have moved on. To this end, it is expected that all of the recommendations will be implemented within one year of the publication of this report.

The recommendations are detailed in the body of this report and are divided into five distinct areas: (1) policy; (2) planning; (3) command; (4) training; and (5) auditing.

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Download the full 124 page report here
(pdf file format):

An Examination of May Day 2007
MacArthur Park

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