U.S., Russia agree to slash nuclear arsenals

The last 5% of the negotiations 'was the doozie,' one source says. Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are expected next month to sign the accord, which would replace the 1991 START treaty.

By Paul Richter

March 25, 2010

Reporting from Washington

American and Russian officials have reached a deal to slash their nuclear arsenals after eight months of unexpectedly tough negotiations, sources close to the talks said Wednesday.

President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who ordered the negotiations begun last July, still must sign off on details of the agreement, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said.

The two leaders are expected to sign a treaty next month in Prague, Czech Republic.

The accord will replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, and will set limits on the number of long-range deployed nuclear warheads, as well as the number of nuclear-capable bombers and missiles.

The two final obstacles were agreement on how to verify the size of the nuclear arsenals and the issue of missile defense. Neither government would explain how it solved those disagreements.

The two sides had previously agreed to reduce the number of long-range nuclear warheads deployed by each nation from a ceiling of 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675.

The deal would also require each side to downsize its stock of strategic bombers and land- and sea-based missiles to 800, from 1,600.

The deal is the biggest step so far in Obama's effort to scale back the world's nuclear arsenals, and it is to be followed by other reductions from the United States and Russia.

The two nations' arsenals represent 90% of the world's nuclear weapons.

The difficulty of the negotiations was sobering for Obama administration officials, who had approached them with optimism.

Some officials who had expected the talks to be smooth said privately during the process that they had misjudged the Russian eagerness to craft a replacement treaty.

U.S. officials had thought the negotiations would be relatively simple because both countries seemed to agree that the current arsenals were bigger than necessary.

But as the talks went on, the Americans found their counterparts more demanding than expected on deal terms and more suspicious of U.S. intentions. The Russians seemed to believe the Americans wanted the deal more than they did, and they sought to use that fact in the negotiations, U.S. officials have said.

Differences among the Russians also appeared to be a factor. In recent months, Russian leaders have expressed differing views on American missile defense plans.

Moscow has been deeply concerned for years about U.S. plans for an antimissile umbrella, fearing such a program could, if expanded, neutralize Russia's huge arsenal of offensive missiles.

Russian officials were angry about the George W. Bush administration's plans for a missile defense system that was to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. said the shield was intended to counter Iran's missile program, but the Russians feared that stationing an antimissile system in former Soviet bloc countries would encroach on Moscow's influence near its borders.

Obama agreed last year to cancel the program.

One knowledgeable source said that "95% of the agreement has been done for a long time. It was that last 5% that was the doozie."

"All the documents for the signing of the strategic arms treaty have been coordinated and agreed upon," a Kremlin spokesman who spoke on condition of anonymity said Wednesday night. "It's now up to the presidents of Russia and the United States to define the time and place for the signing."

The Russian government has not officially responded to a Czech announcement that the new START document would be signed in Prague. But the Kremlin source acknowledged that it probably would take place in the Czech capital.

In one hint that the signing was near, Obama met Wednesday with Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), the committee's ranking minority member.

To go into effect, the treaty will have to be ratified by both the Senate and the Russian legislature.

Conservatives are likely to closely study the language on provisions for verifying that the Russians are scaling back their arsenal. The provisions are far briefer than they were during the Cold War, when the countries had far bigger arsenals and greater fears of each other.

But the provisions remain complex enough that they consumed much of the time involved in crafting the deal, the sources said.

John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said he was optimistic that the treaty would clear the Senate.

But the next round of negotiations with the Russians will be more challenging, he said.

Russian negotiators sought to force the United States to abandon a modified missile defense plan but ended up settling for language saying that the size of offensive arsenals must be tied to the size of antimissile defenses.

Success on the treaty is likely to boost Obama's broader nonproliferation effort.

The administration hopes to convince smaller nonnuclear states that they do not need nuclear arms, and this deal would strengthen U.S. arguments that the nuclear states are doing their part to reduce the world's nuclear inventory.

The signing ceremony will come in the days before Obama convenes an international conference on nuclear security in Washington.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-russia25-2010mar25,0,2468781,print.story

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Vandalism reported by Democrats who voted for health bill

Internet posts may have sparked threats against members of Congress who backed the overhaul. The FBI is investigating at least one incident.

By Kim Geiger

March 25, 2010

Reporting from Washington

As anger has built in some quarters over the Democrats' passage of healthcare legislation Sunday, Internet posts urging opponents to take action may have sparked a viral spate of vandalism and other threats against members of Congress and their families.

On Tuesday, the brother of Rep. Tom Perriello (D-Va.) discovered that the gas line connecting a propane tank to an outdoor grill at his home near Charlottesville, Va., had been severed.

Days earlier, members of conservative "tea party" groups in the area had posted his address online, urging people to "drop by" what they mistakenly believed was the congressman's home.

The brother, Bo Perriello, has four children at home under the age of 8, according to the congressman's office.

The incident is being investigated by the FBI, according to the congressman's press secretary, Jessica Barba.

Rep. Perriello said in a statement that it was "too early to say anything definitive regarding political motivations behind this act," but he urged members of Congress to "condemn threats of violence, particularly as threats to other members of Congress and their children escalate."

Tea party officials said they did not encourage or condone attacks on Perriello's family or property.

"We wanted people to go by and talk to their congressman," said Nigel Coleman, who heads the Danville Tea Party. Coleman posted the address on his Facebook page after a member of the nearby Lynchburg Tea Party had posted the address on a blog.

Mark Lloyd, who heads the Lynchburg Tea Party, said the group, "condemn[s] violence," and that the posting never appeared on the group's official site.

"Part of the thing we try to preach and teach is obey the law, honor the Constitution," Lloyd said.

"We'd be going against our own principles if we had people doing something outside of what's right."

Other acts of vandalism have occurred at Democratic offices throughout the country.

In recent days, bricks were hurled through windows of Democratic offices in three states, and some members of Congress have reported receiving death threats.

"We've had very serious incidents that have occurred over the last 48, 72 hours," House Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.) told reporters Wednesday.

"Anyone who feels at risk is getting attention from the proper authorities."

Alabama blogger Mike Vanderboegh published a post Friday that railed against Congress for taking up the healthcare bill and urged readers to "break their windows."

A brick with the words "No to Obama" and "No to Obomycare" was thrown through the window of the Sedgwick County Democratic Party headquarters in Wichita, Kan., late Friday or early Saturday.

Glass doors at the Monroe County Democratic Committee in Rochester, N.Y., were also broken by a brick. An attached note read, "Extremism in defense of liberty is not a vice," a quote by the late Barry Goldwater, a former U.S. senator known for his libertarian views.

Bricks were also thrown through district offices of Reps. Louise M. Slaughter (D-N.Y.) and Gabrielle Giffords (D-Ariz.).

Other Democratic legislators have reported receiving death threats, including Michigan Rep. Bart Stupak, who had originally opposed the healthcare bill on the grounds that it would provide federal funding for abortions before voting for it Sunday.

"There are millions of people across the country who wish you ill," a woman said in a voice mail to the congressman, "and all of those thoughts projected on you will materialize into something that's not very good for you."

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-health-backlash25-2010mar25,0,3644826,print.story

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Supreme Court stops execution of convicted killer in Texas

The justices want more time to study Hank Skinner's appeal for DNA testing of evidence from a triple homicide. The stay is issued an hour before he was to die.

By David G. Savage

March 25, 2010

Reporting from Washington

With just an hour to spare, the Supreme Court blocked the Wednesday evening execution in Texas of convicted murderer Hank Skinner, who maintains his innocence and who has sought DNA testing of key evidence for a decade.

The justices issued a stay of execution and said they wanted more time to consider Skinner's appeal. It will probably be several weeks before the court decides whether to hear his case.

Last year, the court ruled 5 to 4 that the Constitution does not give convicts the right to demand DNA testing of crime-scene evidence. The case, however, did not involve a prisoner facing execution.

Skinner had sued the county district attorney seeking DNA tests on semen and skin samples as well as two bloody knives and a man's windbreaker, all taken from the scene of a triple homicide in the north Texas town of Pampa 16 years ago.

Last week, a crime lab in Phoenix offered to conduct the testing for free.

Skinner was convicted and sentenced to die for killing Twila Busby, his girlfriend, and her two adult sons in their home on New Year's Eve 1993. Skinner had been drunk and sound asleep on the couch earlier in the evening when Busby left for a party. After midnight, he staggered away from the house with blood from two of the victims on his clothes.

Skinner has always maintained his innocence and contends that an uncle of Busby was the killer. Busby had left the party after her uncle, now deceased, made crude sexual advances. It appeared as though she had been raped and had struggled with her killer.

Police and prosecutors said that the blood on Skinner's clothes came from two of the victims and that he had left bloody palm prints in the house.

Skinner said he awoke in a stupor and cut his hand on a broken bottle.

His trial lawyer, a former county prosecutor, did not seek DNA testing of the crime-scene evidence.

Since then, state and federal judges have rejected Skinner's appeals, ruling that he had no right to test evidence that he could have tested at the time of his trial.

Ten years ago, the Medill Innocence Project at Northwestern University raised doubts about Skinner's guilt. Researchers found a neighbor who said the uncle had cleaned out his van and replaced its carpet the day after the killings.

They also found a former girlfriend who had seen Skinner shortly after the slayings. She said he was too drunk and disoriented to have killed three people, including one son who stood 6-foot-6 and weighed 225 pounds.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-court-death25-2010mar25,0,3056196,print.story

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OPINION

Calderon's dead-end war

Mexican President Felipe Calderon's militarized, politicized fight against Mexico's drug cartels has been ineffective

By Jorge Castañeda

March 25, 2010

In Ciudad Juarez this month, Mexican President Felipe Calderon insisted that appearances notwithstanding, drug violence had begun to recede thanks to the yearlong presence of 10,000 Mexican troops in the border city.

Yet according to his own government's figures, there have been 536 executions in Juarez since Jan. 1, which is 100 more than during the same period last year.

And the violence is not localized to a few border towns like Juarez. Over a holiday weekend in Acapulco this month, 34 people were assassinated in drug-related incidents; nearly 20 suffered the same fate in the drug-producing state of Sinaloa; and perhaps most poignant, two graduate students from Mexico's premier private university, Monterrey Tech, lost their lives March 19, victims of crossfire as the Mexican military pursued drug cartel members at the entrance to the campus.

All in all, Calderon's war on drugs -- unleashed in December 2006, barely 10 days after he took office -- has been not only ineffective but damaging to Mexico.

Since Calderon took office, overall levels of violence have increased, and the state's territorial control is, at best, about what it was in 2006.

No area of the country has been truly recovered by the state, and those few examples of partial success (Tijuana is perhaps the most notable one) last only as long as federal troops remain.

But the Mexican army is clearly overextended: Of its 100,000 combat and patrol troops, 96,000 are on constant duty, and desertions are increasing.

So what else can Mexico do? And, because this is increasingly as much President Obama's war as Calderon's, what can Washington do?

There are at least three options, none of which is perfect but all of which are certainly preferable to a deplorable and unsustainable status quo.

The first, and most minimalist, would be to continue employing the same strategy and policy, but more quietly.

Calderon on occasion gives the impression that he is as interested in trumpeting the war as in waging or winning it (remember President George W. Bush's "Mission Accomplished"?). Simply by toning down the rhetoric, lowering the priority assigned to the war and emphasizing other pressing issues such as economic growth, political reform and social policy, he might reassure the country and lessen the politicization of his confrontation with the cartels.

A second option would be to reset the entire affair and start over.

This would require creating a single national police force, a longtime goal on which scant progress has been made during this administration or the two previous ones. Creating such a force would allow the military to be brought back to the barracks where it belongs.

Such an overhaul also would facilitate a greater emphasis on intelligence and a greater focus on individual communities, along with a shift away from focusing primarily on the most high-profile targets. All of this might not make that much of a difference, but it would be a start.

A third, much more ambitious alternative would involve Mexico lobbying for decriminalization of at least marijuana in the United States.

There is a certain urgency to this. If, come November, California were to vote on -- and pass -- a popular initiative on cannabis legalization (and polls show this is possible), this could leave Mexico in an untenable and absurd situation in which troops and civilians were dying in Tijuana to stop Mexican marijuana from entering the U.S. -- where, once it entered, it could be consumed, transported and sold legally.

On Mexico's part, this would imply an about-face -- pulling the army out of the towns and off the highways and, up to a point, letting the cartels bleed themselves to death, while over a couple of years the above-mentioned national police force would be created and deployed.

It would, most controversially, require some sort of a tacit deal with some cartels, and "the full force of the law" against others. This is less scandalous than it may appear. It would be similar to the approach the Obama administration is taking with poppy growers and heroin producers in Afghanistan.

Most important, though, it would demand a totally different, "de-narcotized" U.S.-Mexican agenda. This would mean placing Mexican development at the top of the agenda, along with immigration, energy and infrastructure and social cohesion funds.

This last approach would make drug policy for both nations once again a law enforcement issue rather than one of national security.

Jorge Castañeda is a former Mexican foreign minister, a professor at New York University and a fellow at the New America Foundation. His latest book is "Narco: The Failed War," which he coauthored.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-castaneda25-2010mar25,0,408421,print.story

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From the New York Times

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Vatican Declined to Defrock U.S. Priest Who Abused Boys

By LAURIE GOODSTEIN

Top Vatican officials — including the future Pope Benedict XVI — did not defrock a priest who molested as many as 200 deaf boys, even though several American bishops repeatedly warned them that failure to act on the matter could embarrass the church, according to church files newly unearthed as part of a lawsuit.

The internal correspondence from bishops in Wisconsin directly to Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future pope, shows that while church officials tussled over whether the priest should be dismissed, their highest priority was protecting the church from scandal.

The documents emerge as Pope Benedict is facing other accusations that he and direct subordinates often did not alert civilian authorities or discipline priests involved in sexual abuse when he served as an archbishop in Germany and as the Vatican 's chief doctrinal enforcer.

The Wisconsin case involved an American priest, the Rev. Lawrence C. Murphy, who worked at a renowned school for deaf children from 1950 to 1974. But it is only one of thousands of cases forwarded over decades by bishops to the Vatican office called the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, led from 1981 to 2005 by Cardinal Ratzinger. It is still the office that decides whether accused priests should be given full canonical trials and defrocked.

In 1996, Cardinal Ratzinger failed to respond to two letters about the case from Rembert G. Weakland , Milwaukee's archbishop at the time. After eight months, the second in command at the doctrinal office, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, now the Vatican's secretary of state, instructed the Wisconsin bishops to begin a secret canonical trial that could lead to Father Murphy's dismissal.

But Cardinal Bertone halted the process after Father Murphy personally wrote to Cardinal Ratzinger protesting that he should not be put on trial because he had already repented and was in poor health and that the case was beyond the church's own statute of limitations.

“I simply want to live out the time that I have left in the dignity of my priesthood,” Father Murphy wrote near the end of his life to Cardinal Ratzinger. “I ask your kind assistance in this matter.” The files contain no response from Cardinal Ratzinger.

The New York Times obtained the documents, which the church fought to keep secret, from Jeff Anderson and Mike Finnegan, the lawyers for five men who have brought four lawsuits against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. The documents include letters between bishops and the Vatican, victims' affidavits, the handwritten notes of an expert on sexual disorders who interviewed Father Murphy and minutes of a final meeting on the case at the Vatican.

Father Murphy not only was never tried or disciplined by the church's own justice system, but also got a pass from the police and prosecutors who ignored reports from his victims, according to the documents and interviews with victims. Three successive archbishops in Wisconsin were told that Father Murphy was sexually abusing children, the documents show, but never reported it to criminal or civil authorities.

Instead of being disciplined, Father Murphy was quietly moved by Archbishop William E. Cousins of Milwaukee to the Diocese of Superior in northern Wisconsin in 1974, where he spent his last 24 years working freely with children in parishes, schools and, as one lawsuit charges, a juvenile detention center. He died in 1998, still a priest.

Even as the pope himself in a recent letter to Irish Catholics has emphasized the need to cooperate with civil justice in abuse cases, the correspondence seems to indicate that the Vatican's insistence on secrecy has often impeded such cooperation. At the same time, the officials' reluctance to defrock a sex abuser shows that on a doctrinal level, the Vatican has tended to view the matter in terms of sin and repentance more than crime and punishment.

The Vatican spokesman, the Rev. Federico Lombardi, was shown the documents and was asked to respond to questions about the case. He provided a statement saying that Father Murphy had certainly violated “particularly vulnerable” children and the law, and that it was a “tragic case.” But he pointed out that the Vatican was not forwarded the case until 1996, years after civil authorities had investigated the case and dropped it.

Father Lombardi emphasized that neither the Code of Canon Law nor the Vatican norms issued in 1962, which instruct bishops to conduct canonical investigations and trials in secret, prohibited church officials from reporting child abuse to civil authorities. He did not address why that had never happened in this case.

As to why Father Murphy was never defrocked, he said that “the Code of Canon Law does not envision automatic penalties.” He said that Father Murphy's poor health and the lack of more recent accusations against him were factors in the decision.

The Vatican's inaction is not unusual. Only 20 percent of the 3,000 accused priests whose cases went to the church's doctrinal office between 2001 and 2010 were given full church trials, and only some of those were defrocked, according to a recent interview in an Italian newspaper with Msgr. Charles J. Scicluna, the chief internal prosecutor at that office. An additional 10 percent were defrocked immediately. Ten percent left voluntarily. But a majority — 60 percent — faced other “administrative and disciplinary provisions,” Monsignor Scicluna said, like being prohibited from celebrating Mass.

To many, Father Murphy appeared to be a saint: a hearing man gifted at communicating in American Sign Language and an effective fund-raiser for deaf causes. A priest of the Milwaukee Archdiocese, he started as a teacher at St. John's School for the Deaf, in St. Francis, in 1950. He was promoted to run the school in 1963 even though students had disclosed to church officials in the 1950s that he was a predator.

Victims give similar accounts of Father Murphy's pulling down their pants and touching them in his office, his car, his mother's country house, on class excursions and fund-raising trips and in their dormitory beds at night. Arthur Budzinski said he was first molested when he went to Father Murphy for confession when he was about 12, in 1960.

“If he was a real mean guy, I would have stayed away,” said Mr. Budzinski, now 61, who worked for years as a journeyman printer. “But he was so friendly, and so nice and understanding. I knew he was wrong, but I couldn't really believe it.”

Mr. Budzinski and a group of other deaf former students spent more than 30 years trying to raise the alarm, including passing out leaflets outside the Milwaukee cathedral. Mr. Budzinski's friend Gary Smith said in an interview that Father Murphy molested him 50 or 60 times, starting at age 12. By the time he graduated from high school at St. John's, Mr. Smith said, “I was a very, very angry man.”

In 1993, with complaints about Father Murphy landing on his desk, Archbishop Weakland hired a social worker specializing in treating sexual offenders to evaluate him. After four days of interviews, the social worker said that Father Murphy had admitted his acts, had probably molested about 200 boys and felt no remorse.

However, it was not until 1996 that Archbishop Weakland tried to have Father Murphy defrocked. The reason, he wrote to Cardinal Ratzinger, was to defuse the anger among the deaf and restore their trust in the church. He wrote that since he had become aware that “solicitation in the confessional might be part of the situation,” the case belonged at the doctrinal office.

With no response from Cardinal Ratzinger, Archbishop Weakland wrote a different Vatican office in March 1997 saying the matter was urgent because a lawyer was preparing to sue, the case could become public and “true scandal in the future seems very possible.”

Recently some bishops have argued that the 1962 norms dictating secret disciplinary procedures have long fallen out of use. But it is clear from these documents that in 1997, they were still in force.

But the effort to dismiss Father Murphy came to a sudden halt after the priest appealed to Cardinal Ratzinger for leniency.

In an interview, Archbishop Weakland said that he recalled a final meeting at the Vatican in May 1998 in which he failed to persuade Cardinal Bertone and other doctrinal officials to grant a canonical trial to defrock Father Murphy. (In 2002, Archbishop Weakland resigned after it became public that he had an affair with a man and used church money to pay him a settlement.)

Archbishop Weakland said this week in an interview, “The evidence was so complete, and so extensive that I thought he should be reduced to the lay state, and also that that would bring a certain amount of peace in the deaf community.”

Father Murphy died four months later at age 72 and was buried in his priestly vestments. Archbishop Weakland wrote a last letter to Cardinal Bertone explaining his regret that Father Murphy's family had disobeyed the archbishop's instructions that the funeral be small and private, and the coffin kept closed.

“In spite of these difficulties,” Archbishop Weakland wrote, “we are still hoping we can avoid undue publicity that would be negative toward the church.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/europe/25vatican.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

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Mobs Are Born as Word Grows by Text Message

By IAN URBINA

PHILADELPHIA — It started innocently enough seven years ago as an act of performance art where people linked through social-networking Web sites and text messaging suddenly gathered on the streets for impromptu pillow fights in New York, group disco routines in London, and even a huge snowball fight in Washington.

But these so-called flash mobs have taken a more aggressive and raucous turn here as hundreds of teenagers have been converging downtown for a ritual that is part bullying, part running of the bulls: sprinting down the block, the teenagers sometimes pause to brawl with one another, assault pedestrians or vandalize property.

On Wednesday, the police here said that they had had enough. They announced plans to step up enforcement of a curfew already on the books, and to tighten it if there is another incident.

They added that they planned to hold parents legally responsible for their children's actions. They are also considering making free transit passes for students invalid after 4 p.m., instead of 7 p.m., to limit teenagers' ability to ride downtown.

“This is bad decision making by a small group of young people who are doing silly but dangerous stuff,” Mayor Michael A. Nutter said in an interview Wednesday. “We intend to do something about it immediately.”

Flash mobs are not unique to Philadelphia, but they have been more frequent here than elsewhere. Others that resulted in arrests and injuries have been reported over the past year in Boston, South Orange, N.J., and Brooklyn.

Philadelphia officials added that they had also begun getting help from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor social-media networks. And television and radio stations are helping to recruit hip-hop artists to make public service announcements imploring teenagers to end the practice.

In the past year, at least four of the flash mobs have broken out in the city, including one on Saturday in which roving teenagers broke into fights, several onlookers were injured and at least three people were arrested.

“It was like a tsunami of kids,” said Seth Kaufman, 20, a pizza deliveryman at Olympia II Pizza & Restaurant on South Street. He lifted his shirt to show gashes along his back and arm. He also had bruises on his forehead he said were from kicks and punches he suffered while trying to keep a rowdy crowd from entering the shop, where a fight was already under way.

“By the time you could hear them yelling, they were flooding the streets and the stores and the sidewalks,” Mr. Kaufman said.

The ad hoc gangs have scared many pedestrians off the streets.

City residents are also starting to complain about the number of unsupervised children, and child advocates are asking if there are enough activities to keep young people busy after school.

“We definitely need more jobs for kids, we need more summer jobs for kids, we need more after-school programming, and we need more parent support,” said Shelly Yanoff, executive director of Public Citizens for Children and Youth, a children's advocacy group in Philadelphia.

Ms. Yanoff added that libraries and after-school programs had been reduced and a program for youth offenders had been cut sharply. On Friday, officials said, two preteenagers assaulted a woman as part of a violent game called “Catch and Wreck,” in which children pick out people who appear homeless and then beat them and take any money they have.

The police, who say these assaults are unrelated to flash mobs, arrested an 11-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl in the attack. The police said they also planned to charge the boy in an attack on a 73-year-old man who was beaten and robbed in the same area on March 13.

The flash mobs have raised questions about race and class.

Most of the teenagers who have taken part in them are black and from poor neighborhoods. Most of the areas hit have been predominantly white business districts.

In the flash mob on Saturday, groups of teenagers were chanting “black boys” and “burn the city,” bystanders said.

In a Feb. 16 melee, 150 teenagers spilled out of the Gallery shopping mall east of City Hall during rush hour and rampaged through Macy's , knocking down customers and damaging displays.

The police arrested 15 of the teenagers and, according to one report, some had not been allowed to call their parents six hours after they were detained.

Clay Yeager, a juvenile justice consultant and former director of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in Pennsylvania, said he believed the flash mobs were partly a result of a decline in state money for youth violence prevention programs.

Financing for the programs has dropped 93 percent to $1.2 million in this year's budget compared with $16 million in 2002. City financing for such programs has dropped to $1.9 million in the past three years compared with $4.1 million from 1999 through 2002, a 53 percent drop.

Mayor Nutter, who is black, rejected the notion that race or the city cut in services was a factor.

“I don't think people should be finding excuses for inappropriate behavior,” Mr. Nutter said. “There is no racial component to stupid behavior, and parents should not be looking to the government to provide entertainment for their children.”

Violent crime in Philadelphia has dropped 12 percent and homicides have fallen 23 percent since 2008.

Bill Wasik, a senior editor at Harper's who is credited with introducing the notion of a flash mob in 2003, said he was surprised by the new focus of some of the gatherings.

Mr. Wasik said the mobs started as a kind of playful social experiment meant to encourage spontaneity and big gatherings to temporarily take over commercial and public areas simply to show that they could.

“It's terrible that these Philly mobs have turned violent,” he said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/us/25mobs.html?ref=us&pagewanted=print

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From the White House

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Summer Jobs for Recovery

Today the White House issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) supporting the inclusion of $600 million for summer employment programs for youth in the House passage of the Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act of 2010 , saying that in addition to essential help in keeping America prepared for natural disasters, “It also takes another important step forward in the ongoing effort to help put Americans back to work through the expansion of a youth summer jobs program and offers continued support to America's small businesses, which are the backbone of the American economy.” 

From the SAP:

Summer Employment Programs for Youth

The Administration supports the inclusion of $600 million for the Workforce Investment Act youth program for summer employment opportunities for disadvantaged youth. This funding will create hundreds of thousands of jobs and help young people open the door to future opportunities, while enabling them to generate additional income during these difficult economic times.

The Administration has long recognized the importance of putting youth to work as a way of developing the next generation and strengthening the nation's economy. The Recovery Act also aimed to create over a hundred thousand summer youth jobs to provide young people with meaningful work experience.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/24/summer-jobs-recovery

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From the Department of Homeland Security

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Readout of Secretary Napolitano's Remarks at the Women in Law Enforcement Ceremony

Release Date: March 24, 2010

For Immediate Release?
Office of the Press Secretary?
Contact: 202-282-8010

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano today delivered remarks to female law enforcement agents and officers from across the Department at the U.S. Secret Service's headquarters—honoring the service and sacrifices of women in law enforcement on our nation's frontlines every day as part of the Obama administration's commemoration of National Women's History Month.

During her remarks, Secretary Napolitano talked about her own career as a woman in law enforcement—including her tenure as the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona, the first female Attorney General of Arizona, Governor of Arizona and the first woman to serve as Secretary of Homeland Security—and highlighted the talent and leadership of more than 35,000 women in law enforcement positions across the Department.

During the ceremony, Secretary Napolitano honored the exemplary service of women from the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

The event included a presentation of the U.S. Secret Service Valor Award to the family of Special Agent Julie Y. Cross, the first female Secret Service agent to die in the line of duty, on June 4, 1980.

On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed an executive order establishing the White House Council on Women and Girls—comprised of 24 members of the President's executive office and Cabinet, including Secretary Napolitano—to ensure agencies across the federal government consider how their policies and programs impact women and families.

For more information, visit  www.dhs.gov  or www.whitehouse.gov/issues/women .

http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1269450872666.shtm

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From the Department of Justice

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A State Department employee was sentenced today to 12 months of probation for illegally accessing more than 60 confidential passport application files, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division announced. Debra Sue Brown, 47, of Oxon Hill, Md., was also ordered by U.S. Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola in the District of Columbia to perform 50 hours of community service. Brown pleaded guilty on Dec. 11, 2009, to a one-count criminal information charging her with unauthorized computer access.

According to court documents, Brown has worked full-time for the State Department since September 1995 as a file clerk and a file assistant in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. In pleading guilty, Brown admitted that she had access to official State Department computer databases in the regular course of her job, including the Passport Information Electronic Records System (PIERS), which contains all imaged passport applications dating back to 1994. The imaged passport applications on PIERS contain, among other things, a photograph of the passport applicant as well as certain personal information including the applicant's full name, date and place of birth, current address, telephone numbers, parent information, spouse's name and emergency contact information. These confidential files are protected by the Privacy Act of 1974, and access by State Department employees is strictly limited to official government duties.

Brown admitted that between March 25, 2005, and Feb. 7, 2008, she logged onto the PIERS database and repeatedly searched for and viewed the passport applications of more than 60 celebrities and their families, actors, comedians, professional athletes, musicians and other individuals identified in the press as well as personal friends and acquaintances. Brown admitted that she had no official government reason to access and view these passport applications, but that her sole purpose in accessing and viewing these passport applications was idle curiosity.

To date, nine current or former State Department employees or contractors , including Brown, have pleaded guilty in this continuing investigation. On Sept. 22, 2008, Lawrence C. Yontz, a former Foreign Service Officer and intelligence analyst, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing nearly 200 confidential passport files. Yontz was sentenced on Dec. 19, 2008, to 12 months of probation and ordered to perform 50 hours of community service. On Jan. 14, 2009, Dwayne F. Cross, a former administrative assistant and contract specialist, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing more than 150 confidential passport files. Cross was sentenced on March 23, 2009, to 12 months of probation and ordered to perform 100 hours of community service. On Jan. 27, 2009, Gerald R. Lueders, a former Foreign Service Officer, watch officer and recruitment coordinator, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing more than 50 confidential passport files. Lueders was sentenced on July 8, 2009, to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. On July 10, 2009, William A. Celey, a file assistant, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing more than 75 confidential passport files. Celey was sentenced on Oct. 23, 2009, to 12 months of probation and ordered to perform 50 hours of community service.

On Aug. 17, 2009, Kevin M. Young, a contact representative, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing more than 125 confidential passport files. Young was sentenced on Dec. 9, 2009, to 12 months of probation and ordered to perform 100 hours of community service. On Aug. 26, 2009, Karal Busch, a former citizens services specialist, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing more than 65 confidential passport files. Busch was sentenced on Dec. 15, 2009, to 24 months of probation and ordered to perform 25 hours of community service. On Oct. 27, 2009, Yvette M. Burrison, a passport specialist, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing nearly 100 confidential passport files. Burrison is scheduled to be sentenced on April 7, 2010. On Nov. 9, 2009, Susan Holloman, a file assistant, pleaded guilty to unlawfully accessing 70 confidential passport files. Holloman was sentenced on Jan. 21, 2010, to 12 months of probation and ordered to perform 75 hours of community service.

These cases are being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Armando O. Bonilla of the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section. The cases are being investigated by the State Department Office of Inspector General.

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-304.html

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U.S. District Judge Deborah K. Chasanow today sentenced Roberto Antonio Argueta, aka "Alex Antonio Cruz," aka "Buda," 29, of Hyattsville, Md., to life in prison, plus an additional 35 years, for ordering the murder of Nancy Diaz and the attempted murder of another juvenile girl.  A 12-person federal jury voted today to impose a sentence of life in prison without parole on Argueta.

The conviction and sentence were announced by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland Rod J. Rosenstein; Special Agent in Charge Theresa R. Stoop of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives - Baltimore Field Division; Chief Roberto L. Hylton of the Prince George's County Police Department; Special Agent in Charge Richard A. McFeely of the FBI; Special Agent in Charge William Winter of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Chief J. Thomas Manger of the Montgomery County Police Department; and Chief Darien L. Manley of the Maryland National Capital Park Police.

On March 4, 2010, the jury found Argueta guilty of conspiracy to commit murder in aid of a racketeering enterprise known as MS-13; conspiracy to participate in racketeering; murder in aid of racketeering; murder resulting from the use of a gun in a violent crime; two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering; and two counts of using a gun during a violent crime. 

According to testimony presented during the eight-week trial, Argueta was a leader of the Langley Park Salvatruchos (LPS) clique of La Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13. The gang is composed primarily of immigrants or descendants of immigrants from El Salvador, with members operating throughout Prince George's County and Montgomery County, Md., and elsewhere inside and outside of the United States.

Witnesses testified at trial that on Sept. 17, 2004, Argueta and other MS-13 gang members stabbed a rival gang member with broken bottles and knives outside a nightclub in Langley Park, Md.  Trial evidence established that in October 2004 Argueta led a gang meeting in Prince George's County in which he and other gang members discussed plans to kill Nancy Diaz. The jury found, based on the evidence presented at trial and during the penalty phase, that Argueta ordered the murder of Nancy Diaz. On Oct. 25, 2004, two other MS-13 members drove Diaz and another juvenile female to the George Washington Cemetery in Adelphi, Md.  According to testimony, another MS-13 member shot and killed Nancy Diaz, and shot the other girl in the face and stabbed her twice in the chest to attempt to make sure she was dead.  The victim survived and she later identified her assailants.

Israel Ernesto Palacios, aka "Homie," 32, of Silver Spring, Md., was sentenced on Nov. 10, 2008, to life in prison for his role in the murder and attempted murder.  James Guillen, aka "Toro," 23, of Hyattsville, Md., who drove the MS-13 members and victims to the cemetery, pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy and was sentenced on Jan. 11, 2008, to 262 months in prison.  Jeffrey Villatoro, one of the murderers of Nancy Diaz, was prosecuted in the Circuit Court of Prince George's County and received a life sentence for his crimes.  Another of the murderers, Jesus Canales, pleaded guilty in federal court to racketeering conspiracy, including the murder of Nancy Diaz.  A sentencing date for Canales has not yet been set by the court.

To date, 51 MS-13 members have been charged in the District of Maryland with various federal offenses. Twenty-five MS-13 members have been convicted at trial or have pleaded guilty to racketeering charges and 19 have pleaded guilty to other charges, primarily immigration or gun violations. Four of these defendants have been sentenced to life in prison for their crimes.  One remaining defendant faces a capital trial scheduled to begin in June 2010.

The case was prosecuted by Deputy Chief James M. Trusty and Trial Attorney Laura J. Gwinn of the Criminal Division's Gang Unit, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert K. Hur of the District of Maryland.

The case was investigated by members of the Regional Anti-Gang Enforcement (RAGE) Task Force. The Prince George's County State's Attorney Office and the Montgomery County State's Attorney Office also provided assistance in the case.

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-307.html

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From the FBI

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Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee

Timothy J. Healy
Director, Terrorist Screening Center
Federal Bureau of Investigation

March 24, 2010

Good morning Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and its role in the interagency watchlisting process.

The attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, highlights the ever-present terrorist threat to our homeland. Over the past seven years, the TSC has played a vital role in the fight against terrorism by integrating terrorist information from the law enforcement and intelligence communities into a single database known as the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which populates the various terrorist screening systems used by the Government. Following the Christmas Day attempted attack, intense scrutiny has been placed on the requirements to nominate individuals to the watchlist and particularly to the No Fly and Selectee lists, which are subsets of the TSDB. These requirements, or standards, have evolved over time based on the experience of the watchlisting community and the issuance of additional Presidential Directives.

Throughout this process, the TSC has remained committed to protecting the American public from terrorist threats while simultaneously protecting privacy and safeguarding civil liberties. As our efforts continue to evolve in response to new threats and intelligence, your support provides us with the tools necessary to continue our mission. Let me begin by telling you about the Terrorist Watchlisting process and how this process related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

Terrorist Nomination Process

The TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watchlist, contains both international and domestic terrorist information. The procedure for submitting information on individuals for inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist is referred to as the nomination process. The nomination process is the most fundamental and singularly important step in the watchlisting process. It is through this process that individuals are added to the Terrorist Watchlist. Nominations originate from credible information developed by our intelligence and law enforcement partners. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies are referred to as Originators in the watchlisting community because it is through their work that nominations are developed. Federal departments and agencies submit nominations of known or suspected international terrorists to the NCTC for inclusion in NCTC's Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, which is the source of all international terrorist identifier information in the TSDB. NCTC reviews TIDE entries and nominates entries to TSC that include sufficient biographical or biometric identifiers and supporting derogatory information that meet the watchlisting standard described below. Similarly, the FBI collects, stores, and forwards to the TSC information relating to domestic terrorists that may not have connections to international terrorism.

When submitting a nomination to NCTC, an Originator may, but is under no obligation to, submit recommendations regarding specific screening systems the nomination should be exported to (e.g., inclusion on either No Fly or Selectee list). If an Originator submits a nomination without a recommendation, NCTC may make an appropriate recommendation based on the totality of associated information. Recommendations made by NCTC will be passed to the TSC for final disposition.

TSC accepts nominations when they satisfy two requirements. First, the biographic information associated with a nomination must contain sufficient identifying data so that a person being screened can be matched to or disassociated from a watchlisted terrorist. Second, the facts and circumstances pertaining to the nomination must meet the reasonable suspicion standard of review established by terrorist screening Presidential Directives. Reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the determination that an individual “is known or suspected to be or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to terrorism and terrorist activities.” The reasonable suspicion standard is based on the totality of the circumstances in order to account for the sometimes fragmentary nature of terrorist information. Due weight must be given to the reasonable inferences that a person can draw from the available facts. Mere guesses or inarticulate “hunches” are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. A TSC interagency group composed of members from the intelligence and law enforcement communities issued clarifying guidance to the watchlisting community in February 2009.

TSC makes the final decision on whether a person meets the minimum requirements for inclusion into TSDB as a known or suspected terrorist and which screening systems will receive the information about that known or suspected terrorist. It is not uncommon for a nomination to have multiple recommendations throughout the watchlisting process. In the end, however, TSC works with NCTC and the Originators to ensure a nomination is exported to as many screening systems as the nomination information supports.

The watchlisting and nomination process can best be described as a watchlisting enterprise because it requires constant collaboration between the Originators, NCTC, and TSC. NCTC relies upon the information provided by the intelligence and law enforcement community, TSC relies upon NCTC to analyze and provide accurate and credible information, and the screening community relies upon TSC to manage that information and to efficiently export it to their screening systems.

Export to Supported Systems

Once a known or suspected terrorist is identified and included in the TSDB, TSC ensures the timely dissemination of the terrorist identity data to our screening partners. The utility of the watchlisting process is greatest when the information is efficiently disseminated to those who need it the most. The TSC's subject matter experts, who are composed of experienced analysts and designated agency representatives, review nominations to determine whether they meet the criteria for inclusion in the screening systems supported by the TSDB. The four major U.S. Government systems supported by the TSDB are: Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for passport and visa screening; Department of Homeland Security's TECS system for border and port of entry screening; the No Fly and Selectee lists used by the Transportation Security Administration for air passenger screening; and the FBI's National Crime and Information Center's Known or Suspected Terrorist File (formerly known as the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)) for domestic law enforcement screening. The criteria for inclusion in each of these systems are tailored to the mission, legal authorities, and information technology requirements of the department or agency that maintains the system. Accordingly, each of these systems contains a different subset of data from TSDB.

The TSDB exports most pertinent to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab–LASS, TECS, and the No Fly and Selectee lists–are discussed below.

CLASS

CLASS is a database administered by the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs and is used by consular officers abroad to screen visa applicants for travel to the United States. CLASS accepts nearly all records from the TSDB because minimal biographic information is necessary for visa screening. In other words, given where (overseas) and when (well in advance of travel to the U.S.), the Government has time to work through what can sometimes be less than complete biographical information–time that might not otherwise be feasible in other screening situations like a routine traffic stop or a busy overseas airport where the presence of U.S. officials is often minimal. The Department of State also uses a screening system known as CLASS-PASSPORT to screen applications for U.S. passports.

The TSC aids the Department of State in identifying known or suspected terrorists through two different processes. The first is the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process, whereby individuals that are watchlisted could be identified at the time of their visa application to visit the United States. When consular officers process visa applications, checks are run in CLASS to determine whether any derogatory information exists to warrant a visa denial. If it is determined that the visa applicant is a possible match to an individual on the Terrorist Watchlist, the consular officer requests an SAO. The SAO request is forwarded to the TSC, where the Department of State's subject matter experts at the TSC review the associated TSDB and TIDE records to determine whether the visa applicant is in fact the same watchlisted individual. The TSC's only role in this process is to determine if the individual applying for the visa is the same individual on the Terrorist Watchlist. In the case of a positive match, the TSC forwards the information to the Department of State's Visa Office, in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, to prepare an SAO in response to the request. The SAO is then forwarded to the consular officer adjudicating the visa, who has the authority to issue or deny visa applications. Individuals that are watchlisted at the time of their visa application could be identified through this process.

The second State Department process supported by the TSC is the Visa Revocation Program. The Visa Revocation Program was initiated after 9/11 and is designed to identify individuals who may have received visas prior to that person being identified as a known or suspected terrorist. Every day, the Department of State automatically generates a report that identifies all individuals with a valid visa that could potentially match a person in the TSDB. State officers compare information in CLASS (exported from TSDB), to existing records of visa holders in the Department of State's Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). This report is then evaluated by the State Department experts at the TSC who determine whether there is a positive match to a watchlisted individual. If there is a positive match, then the TIDE record and related derogatory information is made available to the Department of State for review. The Secretary of State holds broad discretionary authority to revoke a visa. Therefore, TSC forwards the information to the Department of State's Visa Office to determine whether to revoke the visa. Individuals that are watchlisted in TSDB after receiving their visas can be identified through this process.

TECS

TECS serves as the Department of Homeland Security's primary lookout system and receives daily exports of TSDB records from the TSC. Additionally, TECS receives non-terrorist related subject records from more than twenty federal agencies, including a wide spectrum of data, and provides alerts for a variety of law enforcement needs. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the principal owner and primary user of TECS and uses the system to screen individuals at air ports, land, and sea ports of entry. Through TECS, CBP screens against the Terrorist Watchlist at all 327 ports of entry and by all of the 15 pre-clearance offices located in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland. They also use the Terrorist Watchlist to conduct screening operations at international mail and cargo facilities. Similar to CLASS, TECS accepts nearly all records from the TSDB. For subjects in TSDB, CBP is alerted to their travel when a commercial airline forwards the passenger manifest to CBP using the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS enhances border security by providing officers with pre-arrival and departure manifest data on all passengers and crew members

No Fly and Selectee List

The No Fly and Selectee lists are unique among TSDB subsets in that they are the only subsets within the Terrorist Watchlist that have their own substantive minimum derogatory criteria requirements, which are considerably more stringent than the reasonable suspicion standard required for inclusion in TSDB itself. Following the creation of the TSC in 2003, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee established the initial terrorist screening nomination criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists in October 2004. At that time, the No Fly list consisted of substantive derogatory criteria that focused attention on individuals intending to commit acts of terrorism against civil aviation or the domestic homeland. Over time, that initial criteria proved to be too restrictive. Consequently, in February 2008, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee approved additional criteria that served to broaden the scope of terrorists eligible for the No Fly list. In other words, the criteria to place individuals on the No Fly list has broadened to make the No Fly list more inclusive to respond to additional terrorism threats. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General recognized the significance of the additional criteria when, in a May 2009 report, it stated, “Major security gaps have been addressed by adding No Fly criteria.”

For international terrorists, the process to be included on the No Fly list begins, as it does with every nomination, with a federal agency nominating an individual to NCTC for inclusion in TIDE. NCTC analysts review the nomination to ensure it meets nomination criteria and then forward the nomination to the TSC. Analysts at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of the nomination, which includes a review of the derogatory information contained in TIDE and the FBI's Automated Case System. During this process, if there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaging in terrorism or terrorist activity, the terrorist would be added to the TSDB. Placement on the No Fly list requires two components, sufficient biographical information and sufficient derogatory information. If additional information existed to satisfy any of the substantive derogatory criteria and the minimum biographic criteria for the No Fly list, the terrorist's name would be exported to the No Fly list as well. If the analyst reviewing the No Fly nomination determines that there is insufficient information to warrant inclusion on the No Fly list, the nomination is forwarded to the TSA (Office of Intelligence and/or the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)) subject matter experts at the TSC for further analysis and a final recommendation. The TSA subject matter expert will review the nomination and all accessible derogatory information associated with the individual and apply the No Fly and Selectee list criteria to that information. Based upon that review and analysis, the TSA/FAMS subject matter expert will then decide based upon that criteria whether the individual will be included on either the No Fly or Selectee list.

Inclusion on the No Fly list prohibits a potential terrorist from boarding a commercial aircraft that departs or arrives in the United States. It also prohibits an airplane carrying an individual on the No Fly list from transiting United States airspace. The Selectee list is used to provide the individual with a secondary screening. Currently, TSA provides the No Fly and Selectee list to commercial air carriers who are then responsible for passenger prescreening against the No Fly and Selectee lists. With the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security's Secure Flight Program, the U.S. Government will assume the responsibility of passenger prescreening against the No Fly and Selectee lists, which will improve the overall effectiveness of this process.

Actions Since December 25, 2009

Before December 25, 2009, TSC did not receive a nomination to watchlist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and, as a result, he was not watchlisted in TSDB. Following the attempted terrorist attack, the President of the United States initiated a review of the facts that permitted Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board Northwest Airlines Flight 253. In his January 7, 2010 memorandum, the President concluded that immediate actions must be taken to enhance the security of the American people. These corrective actions were also required to ensure that the standards, practices, and business processes that have been in place since the aftermath of 9/11 are appropriately robust to address the evolving terrorist threat facing our Nation in the coming years. As a result, the TSC was given two instructions. The first was to conduct a thorough review of the TSDB and ascertain the current visa status of all known and suspected terrorists, beginning with the No Fly list. That process has now been completed. The second was to develop recommendations on whether adjustments are needed to the watchlisting Nominations Guidance, including biographic and derogatory criteria for inclusion in TIDE and TSDB, as well as the No Fly and Selectee lists. To do so, TSC convened its Policy Board Working Group with representation from NCTC, DHS, CIA, NSA, DOD, DOJ, DOS, and NSC to achieve interagency consensus. That process is underway and TSC is working with its interagency partners to develop appropriate recommendations for consideration by the President.

As of yet, however, there have been no formal changes to watchlisting criteria, including the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly list, since February 2008 when those criteria were last expanded. At the direction of the White House and in conjunction with NCTC, the TSC has made some temporary and limited additions to the watchlist to counter the specific terrorist threat observed on December 25, 2009. As a result, a threat-related target group was identified and individuals from specific high-threat countries already residing in TIDE or TSDB were added to the No Fly and Selectee lists, or upgraded to TSDB if necessary, to prevent future attacks.

Conclusion

As the investigation into the events that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board Flight 253 continues, the TSC remains focused on fulfilling its Presidential and interagency mandates to share terrorist screening information with our domestic and foreign partners. We have a standing commitment to improve our operational processes, to enhance our human capital and technological capabilities, and to continue to protect Americans from terrorist threats while protecting privacy and safeguarding their civil liberties. Terrorist Watchlisting has been a vital tool in the counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and will continue to be so in the future. Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Smith and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this Committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress10/healy032410.htm

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