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From the Los Angeles Times

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Fine-tuning the Patriot Act

'Tea party' Republicans have blocked an extension, concerned about personal privacy. Some of their concerns are valid, but the U.S. still needs the law to fight terrorism.

February 11, 2011

An important message was sent Tuesday when the House failed to extend three provisions of the Patriot Act. It's not that the extension won't ultimately be approved; it was brought up Tuesday under special rules requiring a two-thirds majority, but will most likely be approved next week by a simple majority. Much of the opposition to the extension, notably from freshman Republicans associated with the "tea party" movement, signaled a recognition that the law infringes on personal privacy.

Not all of the provisions to be extended are objectionable. In fact, this page has already endorsed two of them: the use of roving wiretaps to keep track of suspected terrorists who change telephones, and the "lone wolf" provision allowing the surveillance of a suspected terrorist even if he or she is not connected with any specific terrorist group. But the third, which allows investigators to obtain business records with a court order, gives the government too much leeway.

Current law requires judges to presume that the material being sought is relevant to a terrorist organization. In 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted a different standard, requiring investigators to convince a court that the material sought is reasonably likely to be relevant to an intelligence investigation. That still gives the government too much discretion, but it would have been an improvement over current law. We would prefer a standard that is closer to probable cause.

The business records section should be changed when the House and Senate versions of the extension are reconciled. But if that doesn't happen, Congress should act separately to prevent FBI agents and other investigators from engaging in fishing expeditions.

While Congress is at it, lawmakers should reform a part of the Patriot Act that did not require reauthorization. That section allows investigators to seek documents from businesses by presenting national security letters — subpoenas that do not require judicial approval. At present, an investigator must merely certify that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation. The law should be amended to require that the use of a national security letter must be related to a suspected foreign agent or terrorist or a confederate.

The Patriot Act has become a symbol of overreaching by government in the war on terror. In fact, the law doesn't even include practices that some critics associate with it, such as the Bush administration's wiretapping without a court order or the mistreatment of prisoners at Guantanamo. Nevertheless, the law permits unjustifiable invasions of privacy. It needs to be changed.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-patriot-20110211,0,3426492,print.story

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Free Pollard? Never

Jonathan Jay Pollard was a spy who got caught stealing U.S. secrets. It doesn't matter that he spied for Israel, an ally. His life sentence is appropriate.

by Frank Anderson

February 11, 2011

In January, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent a letter to President Obama asking for the early release of Jonathan Jay Pollard, who was convicted of spying for Israel and sentenced to life in prison in 1987. The United States has steadfastly refused? requests for Pollard's release; it has every reason to continue that policy.

The Pollard clemency pleas are partly based on the close relationship between Israel and the United States. Under this theory, spying for Israel was not serious because it was on behalf of an ally and a friendly government, rather than an enemy of America.

But espionage on behalf of any foreign power is a serious crime for which there are severe punishments. It is a deed that should "shock the conscience" and evoke strong condemnation.

Although spying for another country might sometimes fall short of the legal definition of treason, it is always a betrayal of the spy's duty to his country and countrymen.

The "tradecraft" of the intelligence business takes this into consideration. Because persuading someone entrusted with his or her nation's secrets to betray that trust is extremely difficult, intelligence operatives are trained to use "false flag" recruitments to lower the barrier of conscience to such betrayal.

The Soviets successfully penetrated the British defense establishment during the Cold War by having a Soviet military intelligence officer pass himself off as a Canadian who was seeking secrets as part of a NATO "quality assurance" program.

If we were to accept that providing secrets to, say, the friendly South Korean government is somehow a lesser betrayal, we'd provide a field day to our North Korean enemies who would need only a phony ID to pass as our friends. Chinese Communists would have no trouble passing themselves off as Nationalist Chinese. Cubans could easily disguise themselves as Argentines, Mexicans or Puerto Rican Americans.

The essential point is that any nation that steals American defense or intelligence secrets does serious damage to our nation. It might be our friend in many other important ways. In this, it is the enemy. Pollard's crime would not be less heinous had he committed it on behalf of Canada or Ireland. His betrayal would not be more serious had he acted for Russia or North Korea.

The judge who sentenced Pollard did not choose the punishment because of the country Pollard spied for but because disclosure of the secrets Pollard peddled did such damage to our country.

In addition, Pollard violated a plea agreement that might otherwise have led to a lesser sentence. He launched a media campaign to portray himself as a valiant defender of Israel rather than a venal traitor of America. It was Pollard who broke the deal and brought maximum punishment upon himself.

A legal argument has been advanced that, once that plea agreement was broken, a new trial or new sentencing procedure should have followed, rather than the judge's immediate imposition of a life sentence. Pollard and his attorneys have, so far, failed to succeed in pressing that case. Pollard also has chosen not to apply for parole, expecting (probably correctly) that his application would not succeed.

The judicial system, however, is in fact the arena in which Pollard should seek to reduce his time in prison. Despite his violation of the oath he swore, as a U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States from all enemies, foreign and domestic," it's that Constitution, not diplomatic efforts by another nation, that provides Pollard a means to get his sentenced vacated or reduced.

The bottom line for Jonathan Pollard and those who bought his secrets is one I learned early in my youth: "If you can't do the time, don't do the crime."

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-anderson-pollard-20110211,0,2574423,print.story

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From the New York Times

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Trafficking Investigations Put Surgeon in Spotlight

ISTANBUL — For a surgeon wanted by Interpol and suspected of harvesting human organs for an international black-market trafficking ring, Dr. Yusuf Sonmez was remarkably relaxed as he sipped Turkish red wine in a bustling kebab restaurant facing the wind-whipped Sea of Marmara.

Dr. Sonmez, refreshed from a ski trip to Austria, spoke last month while on a break from business trips to Israel and operations on cancer patients here.

He boasts about the results of his kidney transplant operations, more than 2,400 by his count. He keeps friends (and, incidentally, investigators) up to date on his life via a blog and Web site.

And in his seaside villa on the Asian side of Istanbul, he treasures a framed copy of a signed letter in 2003 from the Ministry of Health in Israel commending him for his life-saving aid to “hundreds of Israeli patients who are suffering from kidney diseases and awaiting transplants.”

Yet Interpol is circulating an international red-alert notice for the Turkish surgeon's arrest, with a mug shot of him in a surgical scrub cap. The Turkish authorities have shut down his private hospital. And an expert who monitors the lurid and lucrative global trade in human organs says Dr. Sonmez has been arrested at least six times in Turkey.

“There are two Yusufs: one my family and friends know, and the one created in the press who is a monster — this is a drama, a tragedy,” said Dr. Sonmez, 53, a trim, angular man with intense gray-green eyes and a graying goatee. “Up to now, I didn't kill anybody. I didn't harm anybody, counting donors or recipients. This is the main thing that I am proud of.”

Of his surgical skills, he added, wryly, “I am the best in the world as long as my fingers aren't broken.”

The illicit trade in human organs is a multimillion-dollar business built on paying desperately poor people to extract their organs — mostly kidneys. These organs are then sold and transplanted to wealthier people facing long waits on government-approved lists for legal transplants.

Dr. Sonmez is wanted in regard to one of the most troubling prosecutions to emerge recently: a European Union investigation into organ-trafficking in Kosovo in which seven people, mostly prominent local doctors, have been charged with illegal kidney transplants in a private clinic. Dr. Sonmez has not been charged in Kosovo, but the prosecution contends that he played a central role in the ring.

That case has become intertwined with a volatile two-year Council of Europe inquiry that made links between Kosovo's prime minister, Hashim Thaci, and a criminal enterprise of some former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters accused of executing Serbian prisoners in 1999 and 2000 for their organs.

Dr. Sonmez has denied wrongdoing in either situation. Investigators have focused on his role in 2008 as a surgeon for the Medicus private clinic in a rundown neighborhood in Pristina, Kosovo's capital, where they said kidneys were removed from impoverished immigrants recruited on false promises of payment that they never received. The organs were transplanted into wealthy patients from Canada, Germany, Poland and Israel who paid up to $122,000.

Dr. Sonmez has been detained and released repeatedly in Istanbul during investigations of illegal transplants and money exchanges between donors and recipients.

The son of an English teacher and a dentist, he said he trained at an Istanbul medical school and studied transplant surgery in Paris. He said the five-year survival rate for his kidney transplant patients was 84.7 percent, above Western standards, though it was not clear how many of the donors he had seen again.

By his estimate, most of the thousands of transplants he has performed since 1992 involved live, unrelated donors. He said his survival rate was high because he presided over the removal and transplant of kidneys, monitoring donor and recipient side by side for 48 hours.

“This is amazing,” Dr. Sonmez said of the transplant process. “I love it — to watch the changes with the new organ, the changes in the body, to move with the changes, to make changes in the medication.”

Typically, he said, he requires donors and recipients to submit signed, notarized statements to declare that money has not been exchanged.

How does he know that desperately poor kidney donors are not being exploited by a murky world of brokers and wealthy donors with lavish insurance?

“I don't need to ask these questions,” he said, “because I do believe that people have their own authority over their own body. They are not stealing, they are not cheating. So this is the shame of the system. Not their shame.”

Given his legal problems, he said he had not performed a kidney transplant in two months, since an operation in a country he declined to identify.

The surgeon's travails in Kosovo began after Yilman Altun, 23, a Turkish man, collapsed while waiting for a flight out of Kosovo in November 2008. Customs officials found a fresh scar in an arc across his abdomen, and both Mr. Altun and a 74-year-old Israeli, Bezalel Shafron — who paid $122,000 for a kidney transplant — identified Dr. Sonmez as taking part in the surgery.

Unable to operate his own hospital — shut after the Turkish authorities accused it of illegal transplant operations in 2007, an action he is appealing — Dr. Sonmez said he was invited by a Kosovo urology professor to work at Medicus. A document from the Kosovo Ministry of Health gave him a temporary appointment in 2008 as a general surgeon, with the condition that the clinic obtain a license, which it lacked.

According to the charges, at least 20 kidney operations were performed at the clinic, including those involving Mr. Altun and Mr. Shafron. Dr. Sonmez said he took part simply as an adviser for the men's transplant surgery.

“I was standing there among the other physicians,” he said, adding that he left the clinic after two days. He argued that he would have stayed until the patients were discharged if they had been his responsibility.

But in a district court in Pristina in December, a European Union prosecutor, Jonathan Ratel, contended that Dr. Sonmez had played a central role in transplants that took place in 2008, along with 11 other suspects.

The court is expected to decide soon on whether to press forward with a trial against the seven people charged so far in the case, in which investigators say foreigners were lured to Pristina with false promises of payments for their kidneys.

In recent weeks, the Medicus clinic case has become linked with the much more explosive organ-trafficking case.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe — an organization of almost 50 nations that investigates human rights issues — adopted the report of a two-year inquiry that alleges that during Kosovo's war of independence from Serbia in the late 1990s some members of the Kosovo Liberation Army held Serb prisoners in detention centers in Albania and executed them with gunshots to the head to extract organs for shipment to Istanbul.

The report, based on intelligence reports and witness interviews, contends that there is a link between that ring and Medicus, with the same international channels and people doing surgical operations. The report, prepared by a Swiss senator, Dick Marty, contends that the earlier case is tied to the Pristina clinic “through prominent Kosovar Albanian and international personalities who feature as co-conspirators in both.”

Dr. Sonmez denied being in Kosovo during the earlier period and said he would never transplant a kidney he had not removed himself.

Others contend that Dr. Sonmez has played a major part in the globalization of trade in human kidneys, particularly for matching paid donors with patients from Israel, where for religious reasons there is a shortage of kidney donors and where health insurance plans pay for transplants abroad.

“I have covered his tracks,” said Nancy Scheper-Hughes, a professor of medical anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley and director of Organs Watch, which researches the organ trade. “He is a transplant surgeon who has worked for years in many parts of the world with brokers who bring together donors with recipients. He is wanted in many countries, and he knows what he is doing is illegal.”

In the next few weeks, Dr. Sonmez and his lawyer are poised to head to Kosovo to give his statements.

“They want information about bigger fish,” said Murat Sofuoglu, an old friend and lawyer for Dr. Sonmez.

“Not me,” Dr. Sonmez said, picking at a honey-drenched piece of baklava. “I am not the big fish.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/world/europe/11organ.html?_r=1&ref=world

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Murder Trial in Tucson Shows Rift in Minuteman Border Movement

TUCSON — In the weeks since Tucson buried Christina-Taylor Green, the 9-year-old victim of the shooting rampage outside a Safeway supermarket, a trial under way in the county courthouse here has struggled to account for the earlier murder of yet another child of the same age.

Brisenia Flores, along with her father, Raul Flores, 29, were murdered in 2009 when robbers broke into the family's home in Arivaca, a tiny, remote town just north of the border. The person accused of being the ringleader of the robbery crew, Shawna Forde, a 43-year-old ex-beautician who traveled in the Minuteman movement, had hoped to rob enough people in Arivaca to finance a paramilitary organization that would seal off the border to immigrants, prosecutors and witnesses said.

“She did mention she was gonna change America,” Ron Wedow, an acquaintance and a Colorado Minuteman who testified last week, said in court papers. “And raise, raise this to a whole different level, is what she said.”

The two weeks of testimony, which ended Thursday, opened a window into the Minuteman world, and focused the jurors' attention on divisions between participants who watch the border from lawn chairs with binoculars around their necks, and those whom Mr. Wedow described to investigators as “a bunch of drunken idiots, um, running around with M4” rifles.

A friend of Mr. Wedow's described the “cowboy” mentality of some in their Minuteman circle, relaying to investigators an anecdote about a friend whose “dumb idea was to set the prairie on fire and expose” the trails that border-crossers used, according to court filings.

Ms. Forde, who has sat through her trial with her lips pursed in a small, placid smile, had flitted among Minuteman groups in recent years, finding plenty of supporters. By 2009, she was trying to find recruits to her own group, which she told Mr. Wedow and others would rob houses in Arivaca that she believed were used to hide drugs smuggled across the border.

“This makes us drug dealers,” Robert Copley, Mr. Wedow's friend and the former head of a Minuteman group in Colorado, recalled thinking when he heard Ms. Forde describe her plan at a Flying J truck stop in Colorado. Mr. Copley bowed out, and testified that he informed the F.B.I. of what Ms. Forde had in mind.

Prosecutors claim that, just weeks later, Ms. Forde did go through with the plan.

“I suspect there is not a lot of money to be made sitting on a lawn chair in the desert and calling the Border Patrol if you see an illegal alien,” a deputy county attorney, Rick Unklesbay, told a jury. “Shawna Forde, though, was going to finance her Blackwater, finance her crew.”

Mr. Unklesbay added, “This woman might be full of hot air, this woman might be a braggart, but this woman is a murderer.”

At about 1 a.m. on May 30, 2009, Ms. Forde and an accomplice, Jason Bush, burst into the Flores family home, prosecutors say. First introducing themselves as law enforcement, and then quickly dropping the act, Mr. Bush is believed to have shot Mr. Flores, and then his wife, Gina Gonzalez, and their daughter, Brisenia, investigators say.

As the two intruders rummaged through the home, Ms. Gonzalez retrieved a handgun that belonged to her husband and began to fire, hitting Mr. Bush in the leg, prosecutors say. The two intruders then fled.

Ms. Forde faces the death penalty if convicted of first degree murder, as does Mr. Bush, who will be tried separately.

Ms. Forde's defense focused on the fact that Ms. Gonzalez could not identify Ms. Forde as the female intruder during a six-photo lineup, although Ms. Gonzalez's description of the woman present that night is mostly consistent with Ms. Forde's appearance.

“Was Shawna Forde in that house on May 30th, or was it someone else?” Ms. Forde's lawyer, Eric Larsen, asked the jury. Mr. Larsen argued that Mr. Flores and his family were shot by local rival drug dealers who wanted to eliminate competition.

The prosecution agrees with the rival drug-dealer theory up to a point. Prosecutors say Ms. Forde probably set her sights on the Flores house on the advice of a local dealer, whom prosecutors also charged with capital murder.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/us/11minutemen.html?ref=us&pagewanted=print

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From Google News

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Ariz. countersues over immigration law

PHOENIX, Feb. 11 (UPI) -- Arizona wants $760 million from Washington to pay for jailing illegal immigrants due to alleged lax federal immigration law enforcement, Gov. Jan Brewer said.

Brewer and state Attorney General Tom Horne said in a U.S. District Court filing in Phoenix the Obama administration has failed to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing the border in huge numbers, leaving the state stuck with the tab for the failed federal policies, Brewer said.

The lawsuit -- which will seek more than $760 million to cover the cost of jailing illegal immigrants and about $240 million for other security measures -- claims Arizona is being "invaded" by illegal Mexican immigrants and the U.S. Justice Department's 2010 challenge to Arizona's "enforcement obligations" to root them out violated the U.S. Constitution's 10th Amendment, which says, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution ... are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

The enforcement obligations were contained in Arizona's tough law on illegal immigration, part of which was struck down July 28 by U.S. District Judge Susan R. Bolton, who asserted the primary authority of the federal government over state lawmakers in immigration matters.

"While control of the border is a federal responsibility, illegal aliens who successfully cross the border and commit crime in Arizona become an Arizona responsibility," KPHO-TV, Phoenix, quoted Horne as saying.

He and Brewer said they believed the lawsuit would ultimately be settled by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Brewer said the legal action would be paid with private funds so it would cost taxpayers nothing.

In response, Homeland Security spokesman Matthew Chandler called the Arizona litigation "a meritless court claim" that "does nothing to secure the border."

About 40 percent of illegal aliens enter the United States through Arizona, Brewer said in the filing, citing federal estimates.

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/02/11/Ariz-countersues-over-immigration-law/UPI-17951297416600/

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Jared Loughner's lawyers try to halt release of mug shots

Lawyers for Tucson shooting suspect Jared Loughner filed an emergency motion Thursday to stop the U.S. Marshals Service from releasing Loughner's official mug shots to the media.

Loughner has so far been charged with the attempted assassination of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., and the attempted murder of two of her staffers.

He is expected to be re-indicted in federal court on charges tied to two of the six murders Jan. 8 near Tucson, Ariz. Eventually, he likely will be charged with numerous state crimes.

Defense lawyer Reuben Camper Cahn, a federal public defender from San Diego, wrote in his motion that "mug shots are powerfully associated with criminality." To publish them is tantamount to trying the case in the media, he wrote.

Under federal law, mug shots are not released except in the 6th U.S. Circuit, which includes Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan and Tennessee. There, case law dictates that they be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

The photo of Loughner that has been displayed around the world is not an official mug shot, but a photograph taken by the Pima County Sheriff's Office after Loughner's arrest.

Official mug shots, or booking photos, were taken in Phoenix, when Loughner was booked into custody. Those are the photos that Cahn is trying to block.

http://www.freep.com/article/20110211/NEWS07/110211007/Jared-Loughner-s-lawyers-try-halt-release-mug-shots

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Air traffic control error numbers double

WASHINGTON — In a time of unparalleled aviation safety in the United States, reports of mistakes by air traffic controllers have nearly doubled — a seeming contradiction that has safety experts puzzled.

The latest incident — the near midair collision of an American Airlines jet with 259 people aboard and two Air Force transport planes southeast of New York City, has raised eyebrows in Congress and led to questions about a nonpunitive culture of error reporting in air-traffic control facilities.

A US Airways plane carrying 95 people crossed paths with a small cargo plane in September, coming within 50 to 100 feet of each other while taking off from Minneapolis. A few months earlier a US Airways Airbus 319 intersected the path of another cargo plane during an aborted landing in Anchorage, Alaska.

In fact, an air traffic controller at the Ronkonkoma, N.Y., radar facility that handled the American plane says he complained about a lax atmosphere at the facility — the second busiest of its kind in the nation.

Controller Evan Seeley, 26, said he ran afoul of the local union when he tried to prevent sick leave and scheduling abuses aimed at increasing overtime pay. Even more disturbing were Seeley's charges that controllers sometimes watch movies and play with electronic devices during nighttime shifts when traffic is slower. He said he has sent his complaints to the Transportation Department's inspector general and to the Office of Special Counsel, which investigates whistleblower charges. He claims his recent demotion from his position as a frontline manager was related to the complaints.

In the 12 months ending on Sept. 30, 2010, there were 1,889 operation errors — which usually means aircraft coming too close together, according to the Federal Aviation Administration's official tally. During the same period a year earlier, there were 947 errors. And the year before that there 1008 errors. Before 2008 the FAA used a different counting method, so a more historical pattern isn't available.

The FAA administrator says the higher number of reported errors is due to better reporting and better technology that can determine more precisely how close planes are in the air.

Very few of the errors fall into the most serious category, which could result in pilots taking evasive action to prevent an accident. But those instances have also increased. In the year ending Sept. 30, there were 44 such events; 37 in the prior year and 28 in the year before that.

The situation has sparked concern in Congress. FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt was repeatedly asked about the error increase and Seeley's claims at a hearing before the House aviation subcommittee earlier this week.

"We don't want to play 'gotcha.' We do want, though, to have people know that we're concerned and we're watching," Rep. Thomas Petri, R-Wis., the panel's chairman, told Babbitt. Petri said he may hold a hearing on the issue.

The FAA chief noted the dearth of major accidents. This Saturday will mark 24 months in a row in which there have been no fatal airline accidents. The last was the crash of a regional airliner on Feb. 12, 2009, near Buffalo, N.Y., that killed 50 people.

"That record is hard bought and we're very proud of it," Babbitt said.

Babbitt said the rise in the number of errors is because of a new safety program that protects controllers from punishment for errors they voluntarily report The program is aimed at increasing error reporting so trends can be spotted and new training methods, changes in procedures or other actions can be taken. It is modeled after a successful error-reporting program for airline pilots.

The program, which started in 2008 and was fully phased in last year, is receiving about 250 reports a week. But safety experts note that those reports generally aren't counted in FAA's official error tally and thus don't explain the surge.

Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation in Alexandria, Va., and a former controller, said there is reason to be concerned, but "how much to be concerned is difficult to determine because there are so many changes going on to sort out."

"I know the FAA is paying close attention to controller errors right now," Voss said. "The public face may be that they are ascribing it to the reporting system, but privately they are working very hard to improve the error rate at every level."

Asked about this inconsistency, Babbitt said he has tried in general to create a collaborative climate where controllers and other employees feel freer to acknowledge mistakes.

The controllers' union has called Seeley's allegations "wild" and "baseless." The FAA sent a special team to New York this week to investigate his claims, which were first reported by the New York Post.

http://online.wsj.com/article/AP0f121d6d474f4a77b8de6b66b33dd266.html

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Lawmakers Discuss Expanding Amber Alert Guidelines

by Blake Hanson

JEFFERSON CITY - Missouri lawmakers discussed a bill Thursday that would expand the Amber Alert System to include missing people from all ages. It would also change the name of the system to the "Amber Alert and Silver Alert System".

The Missouri House Committee on Crime Prevention and Public Safety heard testimony that would broaden the system of alerts in Missouri.

In its current form, House Bill 41 would expand Amber Alert guidelines to include people of all ages. Representative Sara Lampe (D-Greene), the bill's sponsor, said although the target is elderly people, she would like for the alert system to protect people of all ages.

"When we talk about people with a mental disability and a physical disability, anybody over the age of 18 is an adult, so I think we need to expand this to include those people," said Lampe.

Capt. Kim Hull, Missouri Amber Alert Coordinator, testified at Thursday's hearing. Hull argued the amber alert guidelines are too narrow as they stand right now. 

"The Amber Alert criteria is very specific for what you have to meet to do an amber alert and those types of situations don't meet the criteria for the Amber Alert," said Hull.

Critics of the bill said they were concerned too many alerts might cause people to quit paying attention.

Other states such as Kansas have added similar systems. In Kansas, the "Silver Alert" applies to those 65 and older. 

Hull said the Missouri Highway Patrol currently has an Endangered Silver Advisory, but it does not carry the power an Amber Alert would. Hull said authorities have yet to use that advisory.

As it works right now, authorities can send two electronic codes to newsrooms to indicate that there is an emergency. One of those codes is for the Amber Alert, and the other is for a Civil Emergency. If the bill passes in its current form, lawmakers may have to seek approval from the FCC for another electronic code. Lampe said the last time lawmakers did so, it took more than two years.

The committee hearing was the first public hearing for the bill.

In general session Thursday, the House approved a bill that will expand the state's worker compensation laws. It would include diseases picked up on the job as part of Worker Compensation System coverage. Representatives passed the bill with a vote of 102-55.

Legislators also passed the Fire Sprinkler System bill, which extends a current law. The law prevents local government from requiring residents to install fire sprinklers in their homes. The bill passed 149-9.

http://www.komu.com/KOMU/d7e2017e-80ce-18b5-00fa-0004d8d229cb/10637f39-80ce-18b5-01d4-02b7f3de8355.html

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From the Department of Homeland Security

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Testimony of Transportation Security Administrator John S. Pistole Before the House Committee on Homeland Security

Subcommittee on Transportation Security, "Terrorism and Transportation Security: TSA Oversight"

February 10, 2011

Cannon House Office Building
(Remarks as Prepared)

Introduction

Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and this Subcommittee today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA's mission is to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's transportation system to terrorism. In meeting this mission, TSA's goal at all times is to maximize transportation protection and security in response to the evolving terrorist threat while protecting passengers' privacy and facilitating the flow of legal commerce.

In the aviation domain, TSA has implemented an effective and dynamic security system consisting of multiple layers of risk-based measures, working in concert with our international, federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners. Our security approach begins well before a traveler arrives at an airport, with our intelligence and law enforcement partners working to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist plots before they happen, and continues all the way through the flight, providing security throughout a passenger's trip—not just at screening checkpoints.

In the surface arena, we continue to work with our partners to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen resilience against a terrorist attack. We are working to direct grants to the most at-risk transit properties. Our Surface Security Inspectors are assisting with the development of specific security programs. And our Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams are being deployed in thousands of mass transit, maritime and highway security initiatives.

Despite all our efforts and advances in intelligence, technology, and screening processes, the threat to the U.S. transportation sector remains high. We face a committed enemy who continues to collect its own intelligence against our security measures, seeking to exploit vulnerabilities in the system. As a result, we must continue to work to stay ahead of this constantly evolving threat.

A Persistent Threat To Civil Aviation

For more than two decades, al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have sought to do harm to this country, and many of their plots against the United States have focused on the aviation system. It is clear that terrorist intent to strike at American targets has not diminished. We have continued to watch the threat evolve from checked baggage to hand baggage to non-metallic devices hidden on the body to air cargo. Non-metallic explosive devices are now the foremost threat to passenger airlines and it is imperative we maintain and enhance our capability to detect these threats.

One of the most salient public examples of the ongoing terrorist threat is the bombing plot by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which resulted in the December 25, 2009, alleged attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to blow up an American airplane over the United States using a non-metallic explosive device that was not and could not have been discovered by a metal detector. Also, in October 2010, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to destroy two airplanes in flight using artfully concealed explosive devices hidden in cargo that highlighted the need to strengthen security across the international supply chain.

I firmly believe our best defense against these and other terrorist threats remains a risk-based, layered security approach that utilizes a range of measures both seen and unseen. This approach includes using Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and pat-downs to enhance and supplement the efforts of law enforcement, intelligence, and terrorist watch list checks, strengthening supply chain security, and increasing international collaboration.

Deploying Advanced Imaging Technology

After analyzing the latest intelligence and studying available technologies and other processes, TSA determined that AIT is the most effective method to detect both metallic and non-metallic threat items concealed on passengers while maintaining efficient checkpoint screening operations. Our work with AIT began over three years ago, and has included testing and evaluation in both the laboratory and in airports. AIT represents the very latest in passenger screening technological advancement and addresses a broad range of threats. TSA tested and piloted the use of AIT at several airports around the country prior to the December 2009 attempted attack, and as a consequence, the agency was able to accelerate deployment of AIT following the incident to enable us to quickly and effectively detect metallic and non-metallic threats. Our extensive experience with AIT has made us the world leader in its implementation in the transportation environment.

According to TSA statistics, approximately one percent of passengers selected for AIT screening have opted out of AIT screening. Moreover, independent polls reflect that the traveling public supports these measures – for example, a recent CBS poll found four in five people approve of the use of AIT for screening, and a recent Gallup poll reported 78 percent of air travelers approve of the use of AIT at U.S. airports.

AIT is a Safe and Reliable Screening Technology

AIT machines are safe, efficient, and have built-in safeguards to protect passenger privacy. TSA requires its technology to comply with consensus-based scientific safety standards administered by the Health Physics Society and accredited by the American National Standards Institute.

The radiation dose from backscatter AIT machines has been independently evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, all of which have affirmed that the systems comply with established standards for safety. Public versions of our safety testing reports are available on TSA's website at www.tsa.gov.

A single screening using backscatter technology produces a radiation dose equivalent to approximately two minutes of flying on an airplane at altitude. Millimeter wave technology does not emit ionizing radiation and instead uses radio frequency energy. The energy projected by these units is a fraction of other commercially approved radio frequency devices, such as cell phones, two-way radios, and blue tooth devices.

TSA is Committed to Protecting Passenger Privacy

TSA has strict safeguards to protect passenger privacy and ensure anonymity. TSA's AIT machines deployed at airports do not store or print passenger images, and images are maintained on the monitor only for as long as it takes to resolve any anomalies. Images from TSA screening operations have not been and are not retained for any purpose. Additionally, the officer reviewing the image is unable to see the individual undergoing screening, and the officer screening the passenger cannot see the image – the image is completely disassociated with the passenger. Furthermore, AIT machines do not produce photographic quality images that would permit recognition of the person screened. TSA also applies facial blurs to both the millimeter wave and backscatter technologies.

The Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has conducted a Privacy Impact Assessment of the AIT machines and updated those assessments as the program has developed. The full results of that assessment are available to the public on the Privacy Office's website at www.dhs.gov/privacy. TSA's screening protocols ensure that such screening does not unreasonably intrude on a passenger's reasonable expectation of privacy in the airport environment and that the public's privacy concerns related to AIT screening are adequately addressed.

Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) To Further Address Privacy Concerns

While we are rapidly deploying AIT machines to U.S. airports, we also are exploring enhancements to this technology to further address privacy issues. To that end, we are field testing auto-detection software, referred to as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), which enhances passenger privacy by eliminating passenger-specific images and instead highlights the area with a detected anomaly on a generic outline of a person. Pat downs used to resolve such anomalies will be limited to the areas of the body displaying an alarm unless the number of anomalies is sufficient to require a full-body pat down. If no anomalies are detected, the screen displays the word "OK" with no icon.

As with current AIT software, ATR-enabled units deployed at airports are not capable of storing or printing the generic image. This software eliminates the need for a remotely located TSO to view passenger images in a separate room because no actual image of the passenger is produced, reducing associated staffing and construction costs. ATR software represents a substantial step forward in addressing passenger privacy concerns, while maintaining TSA established standards for detection. TSA plans to continually update and test enhanced versions of the software in order to ensure technology with the highest detection standards is in use.

Employing Effective Pat Downs

TSA operates in a high-threat environment. Terrorists look for gaps or exceptions to exploit. They are studying our security measures and will exploit our social norms to their advantage. The device used in the December 25, 2009, bombing attempt illustrates this fact; it was cleverly constructed and intentionally hidden on a very sensitive part of the individual's body to avert detection by officials in Amsterdam. As a result, the lives of almost 300 passengers and crew were put at risk. My responsibility as TSA Administrator is to put in place reasonable security measures to counteract this and other types of threats.

Upon joining TSA in July 2010, I looked at the agency's efforts to address the threat posed by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's bombing attempt on December 25, 2009. I also considered several reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DHS's Office of Inspector General (IG), and TSA's Office of Inspection, all of whom have performed a significant amount of covert testing of TSA's operations. One of the most significant findings of the covert testing was that pat downs were not thorough enough. The results of this repeated covert testing taken with the latest intelligence led to the conclusion that TSA needed to modify its pat-down procedures.

TSA will continue to work with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office to ensure that TSA's pat-down procedures do not unduly impinge upon passengers' rights and liberties, and we will regularly reassess screening procedures to ensure they are set at an appropriate level to mitigate threats while protecting the passengers' privacy.

Implementing Secure Flight

As of November 23, 2010, TSA's Secure Flight program became fully operational for all covered flights operating to, from, and within the United States, fulfilling a key 9/11 Commission recommendation and increasing security by having TSA, rather than airlines, screen every passenger against the latest intelligence before a boarding pass is issued. Since its implementation, Secure Flight has demonstrated the value of uniform, consistent watch list matching through improved identification of matches. Continuous Secure Flight vetting begins 72 hours in advance of flight and continues until the flight departs, consistently providing insight into potential threats and enabling TSA to plan field efforts to counter any threat accordingly.

Collectively, there are 202 aircraft operators using Secure Flight, representing 100 percent of all aircraft operators covered by the Secure Flight Final Rule.

Advancing Air Cargo Security

TSA also continues to take aggressive action to improve the security of air cargo throughout the global air cargo network. In response to the October 2010 attempted bombings of cargo aircraft bound for the United States, TSA has issued security requirements restricting the transport of printer and toner cartridges, prohibiting elevated risk cargo from transport on passenger aircraft, requiring other cargo to undergo screening, and establishing requirements for handling international mail. In January 2011, TSA issued a proposed air carrier security program change to increase security measures for air cargo, most notably, to require 100 percent screening of inbound international cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 31, 2011. TSA expects to finalize the programs in Spring 2011 after evaluating industry comments.

Additionally, as part of the DHS Air Cargo Security Working Group established by Secretary Napolitano, TSA is taking a leadership role in partnering with industry and other federal government partners to develop strategies to strengthen air cargo security while facilitating the flow of commerce. TSA is also working closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the air cargo industry to receive and process pre-departure, advanced air cargo information from shippers earlier than is currently required so that we can increase the focus of our screening resources on high-threat cargo.

Reducing Surface Transportation Vulnerabilities

The Transportation Security Administration works with its partners in securing the surface transportation networks of the United States, working closely with transit agencies and state and local officials to assist them in defining and meeting their security requirements. The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is a vital tool by which we enable and empower transit agency security providers to improve their practices. TSA works closely with the FEMA Grants Program Division to apply funding to projects with the most effective risk mitigation to the most at-risk transit properties. In 2010, the TSGP provided $273.4M to the transit industry and a total of $1.6B since 2006. Similar, but smaller grant programs have supported freight rail, over-the-road bus, and trucking programs.

TSA Surface Inspectors engage in all surface modes with activities ranging from inspecting rail yards and hazmat conveyances for regulatory compliance to assisting in the development of security and incident management plans. In the transit mode, the Surface Security Inspector program improves security by conducting field visits to assess the base line of security and subsequently developing action plans and assisting properties and agencies to improve their specific security programs. One such security program is the deployment of explosives detection canines, which are provided both through TSGP grant funding and appropriated TSA funds. TSA and the Department's Science and Technology Directorate are also partnering with Auburn University's well-regarded canine program to enhance the effectiveness of explosives detection canine teams used by TSA in protecting aviation and surface transportation by developing additional detection techniques and we welcome the opportunity to further brief the Subcommittee on these efforts.

TSA's VIPR teams are designed to enhance security by working in mass transit, aviation, rail and other transportation modes alongside local law enforcement agencies during specific times or events. VIPR teams are comprised of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior detection, security screening, and law enforcement, and enhance TSA's ability to leverage a variety of resources quickly to increase security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the country. A component of TSA's nimble, unpredictable approach to security, TSA enhanced surface transportation security by conducting over 3,750 VIPR operations in 2010 in the various modes of surface transportation. VIPR operational plans are developed with a risk-based methodology, in conjunction with local transportation security stakeholders, and conducted jointly by TSA, local law enforcement, and transportation security resources.

TWIC Program Advancements

In the last two years, over 1.6 million workers have enrolled in the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The TWIC program includes a comprehensive security threat assessment, and the issuance of biometric credentials, which are now required to enter maritime facilities. TSA has processed 50,000 appeals and waiver requests, and continues to improve the adjudication process to shorten the time it takes to complete the security threat assessment process. After working through many challenges, TSA is concluding the TWIC Reader Pilot Program, wrapping up formal data collection, and working on the report to Congress. We continue to coordinate these efforts with the U.S. Coast Guard to ensure a high level of security and operational effectiveness.

Enhancing International Cooperation

The U.S. Government fully recognizes that it takes a concerted, global effort to protect the world's interconnected transportation networks. The security of U.S. civil aviation is intimately connected to the security of international civil aviation system writ large, and is directly affected by efforts that extend beyond our borders. For that reason, Secretary Napolitano and I have embarked on an aggressive outreach initiative to enhance civil aviation security standards and practices worldwide.

Immediately following the attempted bombing of a U.S.-bound Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009, Secretary Napolitano began working with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on an unprecedented global initiative to strengthen the international aviation system against the evolving threats posed by terrorists, working in multilateral and bilateral contexts with governments as well as industry. Secretary Napolitano has participated in regional aviation security summits in Europe, South America, the Caribbean, Asia, and the Middle East, bringing about historic consensus with her international colleagues to strengthen the civil aviation system through improved information sharing, cooperation on technological development and enhanced aviation security standards.

These efforts culminated at the ICAO Triennial Assembly in October 2010, where the Assembly adopted the Declaration on Aviation Security, which highlights the commitment of the international community to collaborate in the effort to enhance aviation security at the international level. The extraordinary global collaboration demonstrated by the nearly 190 ICAO countries during the ICAO General Assembly in Montreal has helped to advance international security standards, broaden existing cooperation mechanisms and information exchange, and encourage the use of technology in the aviation security environment.

Specifically, following the Assembly, the ICAO Council adopted Amendment 12 to Annex 17 to the International Convention on Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention), which governs international civil aviation security. These amendments will tighten the existing international standards to account for new and emerging threats, and also establish enhanced standards for air cargo security. TSA will continue its work to further enhance international security standards vis-à-vis evolving threats and risk of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

Further, throughout 2010, DHS and TSA played a significant role in developing the ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy, also adopted at the ICAO Assembly in October 2010, which sets the course for ICAO's aviation security efforts over the next six years. This strategy establishes seven key focus areas, which are built upon DHS/TSA's strategic goals for the enhancement of international aviation. These include addressing new and emerging threats; promoting innovative, effective and efficient security approaches; promoting the sharing of information amongst member states to raise awareness of threats and security trends relevant to civil aviation operations; promoting global compliance and establishing sustainable aviation security oversight; improving human factors and security culture; promoting the development of mutual recognition for aviation security processes; and emphasizing the importance of security.

Lastly, senior DHS leadership from the Private Sector Office, TSA and CBP began collaboratively engaging with the aviation industry in a dialogue about security changes, a practice that we will continue regularly this year.

Continuing Engagement

TSA is actively involved in various bilateral Transportation and Aviation Security Working Groups, and is an active participant in regional and multilateral organizations such as the G8, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Quadrilateral Group on Transportation Security, and the ICAO Regional Offices. Furthermore, TSA has been actively reaching out to other regional organizations such as the Latin American Civil Aviation Conference, the Arab Civil Aviation Conference, the Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services, and the African Civil Aviation Conference and the African Union. Through these forums, TSA is able to encourage and assist in the enhancement of international aviation security standards and practices, and to better understand the legal, political, cultural, geographic, and operational issues that may affect our foreign partners' ability to address certain aviation security. Finally, this past November, TSA hosted an international policy summit on AIT at TSA's Systems Integration Facility, which brought together key policy makers and experts from over 30 countries and 11 industry associations to discuss and exchange views on AIT. Discussions centered on legal, policy, privacy, operational, and health, safety and science aspects of AIT and the deployment of such screening capability at airports in different locations around the world.

TSA, in conjunction with the Department of State, is also working with foreign governments to gain their acceptance of Federal Air Marshals on international flights to and from more countries. This expansion of covered flights will further enhance aviation security for passengers and aircraft.

Conclusion

I want to thank the subcommittee for its continued assistance to TSA and for the opportunity to discuss these important issues of transportation security. I am pleased to answer any questions you might have.

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