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From the Los Angeles Times

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Temporary Patriot Act extension gets final OK in Congress

The House passes a three-month extension of parts of the law, 279 to 143, and President Obama is expected to sign it. But the move only postpones debate on the issue, which has created unusual political allies.

by Lisa Mascaro, Washington Bureau

February 17, 2011

Reporting from Washington

Congress gave final approval Thursday to a temporary extension of parts of the Patriot Act, a step that merely postpones a burgeoning political debate over the controversial anti-terrorism law and its implications for civil liberties in the United States.

President Obama is expected to sign the legislation, forming an unusual coalition with Republican leaders to prevent three key surveillance provisions favored by intelligence officials from expiring at the end of the month.

But an equally unusual coalition opposes the extension. It's composed of congressional Democrats and conservatives — veteran Republicans as well as new lawmakers who won with support from the "tea party" movement. They dislike the expanded surveillance powers the law provides to government agents.

The three-month extension gives Republican leaders and administration officials time to forge a new political strategy and allows opponents room to propose changes before the measures expire again this spring.

"We cannot afford to leave our intelligence officials without the tools they need to keep America safe," said Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas), the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.

But civil liberties advocates said the provisions lacked proper privacy safeguards. Foreshadowing the coming debate, Republicans said they wanted to make the law permanent, while civil liberties groups will press for continued expiration dates to ensure congressional oversight.

"There's going to be a tension between those who want to put some very modest checks and balances in the law and those who might use this as an opportunity to seek more spying authority," said Michelle Richardson, legislative counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union.

The political obstacles facing the law, enacted after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, were not obvious until last week, when a vote in the Republican-led House that had been considered routine unexpectedly failed, exposing a substantial well of opposition to the act's intent and reach.

The vote showcased a surprising side effect of the political rise of the tea party: Conservatives chose to ally with liberal Democrats on privacy and civil liberties issues, forming a new congressional voting bloc.

Although the extension passed Thursday, the 279-143 vote again showcased the liberal-conservative alliance. "Intrusive provisions passed," tweeted Rep. John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, the top Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee. "Hope House GOP will join us in fixing this flawed law."

The expiring provisions authorize federal officials to use so-called roving wiretaps to track unidentified suspects as they move from place to place and device to device; to obtain library records and other personal information; and to follow foreigners who have no known terrorism connections. All such surveillance activities require court orders.

The Justice Department called the provisions essential and urged Congress not to let them expire, as would have happened at the end of the month had Congress not acted.

Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr. and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned in a letter to Congress last month that short-term extensions "increase the uncertainties borne by our intelligence and law enforcement agencies in carrying out their missions."

With the 2012 presidential election in sight, Democrats sought to avoid interjecting the national security issue squarely into the emerging campaign as Obama seeks a second term.

House Republican leaders initially tried to extend the bill through Dec. 8, a prospect rejected by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. His bill would extend the provisions through 2013, as the White House prefers.

The impasse was settled with Senate and House approval this week of the extension through May 27.

House GOP leaders want administration officials to come to Capitol Hill to make the case for renewing the law, putting the onus on the White House to build support for provisions that Obama's liberal base has long rejected as an intrusive overreach of government power.

House Republican leaders cleared the judiciary panel's schedule to conduct far-reaching hearings next month. And amid tea party opposition to the law, freshman Republicans have been invited to House staff briefings to provide another perspective.

Civil libertarians will consider it a victory if they are able to require additional oversight and fend off attempts to further enhance government surveillance authority.

As the bill was being voted on Thursday, a House subcommittee reviewed concerns from law enforcement that the legal authority to conduct surveillance under other laws may need to be updated to keep pace with social networking sites and emerging telecommunications technologies.

http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-patriot-act-20110218,0,1432729,print.story

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From the New York Times

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Canada Hit by Cyberattack From China

OTTAWA — A federal cabinet minister said Thursday that hackers, perhaps from China, compromised computers in two Canadian government departments in early January, leaving bureaucrats with little or no Internet access for nearly two months.

The minister, Stockwell Day, the president of the Treasury Board, told reporters that hackers had infiltrated computers in his department, which supervises the bureaucracy and government operations, as well as in the Department of Finance, which is responsible for the government's budget and fiscal policy.

“Every indication we have at this point is that our sensors and our cyberprotection systems got the alerts out in time, that the information doors were slammed shut,” Mr. Day said.

He added that the attack, the latest in a series of confirmed assaults on government computer systems, was more directly focused than were previous strikes against Canada.

“It was a significant one — significant that they were going after financial records,” he said.

After the attack was discovered in early January, the government largely isolated computers in the two departments from the Internet. The computers have, for the most part, remained disconnected while security officials searched individual computers for evidence in case of a criminal investigation and to remove the compromising software.

While the attack was not confirmed until late Wednesday, shortly before a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation report about it, signs that something was wrong have been evident for some time. For the past six weeks, thousands of public servants employed by the two departments have either been staying home to use Internet connections or slipping out of their offices to use wireless Internet connections at nearby cafes.

The employees were not told why they had been returned to the pre-Internet age, creating what one Treasury Board employee earlier called a “weird” situation in which it was difficult to complete work.

There are concerns that the hackers may have gained advance knowledge of the federal budget, to be released next month. Because Canadian budgets are generally not amended after being presented to Parliament, they are prepared in great secrecy to prevent advance knowledge of their contents from being used for financial gain.

Vic Toews, the minister of public safety, said in an e-mail that “we have no indication that budget security has been compromised.”

Mr. Toews and other officials have declined to publicly outline the nature of the attack. But a government computer specialist who was briefed about the attack confirmed the CBC's report on the condition that he not be identified because of the government's policy of not discussing computer security issues.

According to the CBC and other Canadian news organizations, the attackers adopted the same approach as the one used by a China-based computer espionage ring that stole information from the Indian Defense Ministry. That gang was exposed last year by a team of researchers from the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.

The hackers used a technique that is sometimes known as “executive spear phishing.” First they took control of computers used by senior officials in the affected departments. Once inside, the hackers generated messages that appeared to be from those officials to the departments' information technology section, which provided the hackers with passwords to various government computer systems.

At the same time, other employees in the departments received e-mails that falsely appeared to come from the senior officials that included Adobe PDF attachments. Once opened, those attachments started hidden programs that hunted for information on the government network to send back to the hackers.

While security scanning software is supposed to catch and block destructive software hidden in attachments, the hackers either developed programs that were unknown to software security companies or found a novel method of hiding their unwanted computer code.

The Canadian news reports said that the government had traced the hackers to an Internet address in China.

Rafal A. Rohozinski, one of the Munk School researchers who documented the earlier Chinese attack, said it should be possible for the Canadian government to determine if the attack originated in China or if the hackers had merely disguised their location by using Chinese servers.

Nevertheless, Mr. Rohozinski said that China was the most likely source of the attack, although that did not necessarily indicate that it was a government-sanctioned action.

“There are more people online in China than anywhere else,” he said. “Most of them are young, so you see a lot of digital promiscuity coming from China.”

Ma Zhaoxu, a spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry, rejected suggestions of a link to China, Reuters reported. “What you mentioned is purely fictitious and has an ulterior motive,” he said.

Meanwhile, Mr. Rohozinski was skeptical that Canadian government investigators could demonstrate that no information was stolen from the systems. The government adopted a new computer security plan last fall, but he said that very little of the plan had been put in effect, leaving security largely uncoordinated and varying in quality from department to department.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/americas/18canada.html?_r=1&ref=world&pagewanted=print

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Caught Unawares by an Anti-Immigrant Mood

FALLS CHURCH, Va. — When Mohamed Mejri, a Tunisian immigrant with a limousine business here, first learned that the State Department of Motor Vehicles had refused to issue him a new driver's license, he thought it was a mistake. After all, he had been a licensed driver in Virginia for years.

But last fall, the department stopped accepting his federally issued work permit, a document that was his main proof that he was in the country legally, because he does not have a green card.

Now, five months later, his business is collapsing, and bill collectors are calling.

Virginia changed its policy in September after an illegal immigrant from Bolivia was charged with hitting and killing a nun while driving drunk in Prince William County.

Her death hardened what was already a strong anti-immigrant mood in the state. Virginia's governor, Bob McDonnell, announced that work permits would no longer be accepted as proof of legal residence because they could be held by people who, like the Bolivian immigrant, are in deportation proceedings. The governor said other documents would still be accepted.

The permit, called the employment authorization document, allows foreign nationals to work in the United States. Asylum seekers, refugees and students are among those who have one.

For Mr. Mejri, who is 54, the permit is all he has. He fled Tunisia in 1992, and after living in Canada, where he had been granted political asylum, he came to the United States in 2000. American immigration authorities rejected his application for asylum, over an unpaid fine in Canada. By the time it was paid and processed, several years had passed, and he received notice that it was too late to reapply. He then received an administrative order to leave the country, but a federal judge ruled in his favor that he not be deported. Now he is in limbo, in the country legally but without any path to citizenship.

Melanie Stokes, a spokeswoman for Virginia's Department of Motor Vehicles, said she could not comment on Mr. Mejri's status because state law prevented her from discussing individual cases.

The precise number of people affected by the change is unknown. Jorge Figueredo of the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia said he was personally handling 38 cases, and estimated that the total number of stranded immigrants could be in the hundreds.

The authorities said the numbers were much smaller. In a letter to a group of lawyers and immigrant advocacy organizations in January, the commissioner of motor vehicles, Richard D. Holcomb, said that in the 11 weeks after the policy was implemented, about 4,000 applicants entered an “elevated review process,” a reference to people who used to rely on the employment card. Of those, only 819 did not immediately get a license, the letter said.

By early December, more than 60 percent of those people had received a license using other documents, he wrote, and an additional 3 percent were rejected, mostly because they were in deportation proceedings.

Mr. Figueredo, the state A.C.L.U.'s director of racial justice and immigrants' rights, said he was not satisfied with the response, adding that the letter did not explain what became of the more than 200 applicants who were neither rejected outright nor given licenses.

“What about the rest?” he said in his small office in Falls Church last week. A plea for help from a Kenyan man dropped into his e-mail inbox during the interview.

Ms. Stokes reiterated that only 3 percent had been rejected and said that the others had not returned to obtain a license by the time the records were checked in December. She said the department had no way of knowing what happened to them.

“We can only surmise that they moved to another state or decided not to get a credential,” she said.

After Mr. Mejri was first refused a new license, he went to five other Department of Motor Vehicles offices, hoping his documents would be accepted.

At one, a clerk requested the original court order granting his petition against deportation. It took eight weeks, but he produced it. A copy was faxed to Richmond, but it had no effect. He was never rejected outright, he said, and was asked repeatedly for additional proof of legal residence.

“This should not be happening,” Mr. Figueredo said. “This man is legally present. He has a decision by a federal judge. Why isn't that good enough?”

Mr. Mejri soon fell behind on his bills, and his insurance company canceled his liability coverage. That triggered the cancellation of his business license. Meanwhile, credit card companies continued to charge him for use of their services for his cars, souring his credit rating.

He felt particularly helpless when he discovered that he could not even buy the syringes he needed to treat his diabetes without presenting a valid driver's license and had to work through a social worker to get them.

“I am demoralized,” Mr. Mejri said, tears rolling under his glasses onto his sweater. “I see no door open in front of me. Nobody wants to listen.”

Ms. Stokes said there was a special center in Richmond to review such claims that could contact federal immigration authorities directly to ascertain an applicant's status.

She could not say whether this had been done in Mr. Mejri's case. She said there was a clearly defined list of documents, posted online, that are accepted. She said she did not know the number of applicants who failed to get licenses since December.

Mr. Figueredo said that clerks have not been consistent in accepting certain alternative documents.

Some immigrants have had success presenting a document called an I-797, essentially a receipt for a visa application, but others have not. To address that problem, a bill was presented in Virginia's House in January that would have required the department to spell out its procedure, Mr. Figueredo said, but it did not pass.

A month ago, Mr. Mejri rented a room in Rockville, Md., and got a driver's license in that state. But his monthly insurance payments have tripled, and for now, he has put his business aside. He lives off money he has borrowed from his friend Aziz Balaid, an American citizen, who is finding it more difficult to be optimistic about his friend's prospects.

“When he says, ‘What am I going to do?' I have no answer for him,” Mr. Balaid said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18license.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

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Life Sentence For Leader Of Terror Plot At Kennedy

A man described by prosecutors as the ringleader of a plot to blow up fuel tanks at Kennedy International Airport was sentenced Thursday to life in prison.

As he had at his trial, the man, Russell M. Defreitas, 67, sat silently through his sentencing as Judge Dora L. Irizarry of Federal District Court in Brooklyn said “the offenses that were contemplated here, that the jury found Mr. Defreitas guilty of, are extremely serious.”

Mr. Defreitas, a Guyanese immigrant and former cargo handler at the airport, was convicted in August of conspiracy to commit a terrorist attack after a trial in which prosecutors played secretly recorded conversations in which he planned the attack and described his hatred of the United States.

The recordings were made by a convicted drug dealer, Steven Francis, who worked as an informant and contributed some financial and logistical support to the plotters.

Four men were charged in the plot, including Mr. Defreitas and Abdul Kadir, who once served as mayor of Guyana's second largest city and as a member of the Guyanese Parliament.

Mr. Kadir was convicted of conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison. Another defendant, Abdel Nur, pleaded guilty to providing material support for terrorism and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The fourth man, Kareem Ibrahim, has yet to be tried.

Prosecutors said Mr. Defreitas came up with a sinister plan intended to cause a chain reaction of explosions along a pipeline that runs between the airport and other parts of New York City. The conspirators hoped to destroy the country's economy, prosecutors said, and tried to contact Adnan G. el-Shukrijumah, a Qaeda operative with explosives training.

Parts of the conspiracy, as conceived by Mr. Defreitas, had bizarre aspects. He declared that he wanted the attack to be “high-tech” and “ninja-style” in execution, according to the tapes. At one point, he suggested that the plotters could create a diversion by flooding the airport's main terminal with a horde of rats.

At the trial, Mr. Defreitas's lawyers portrayed him as more disagreeable than dangerous; one of his lawyers described him as “a man with a small mind, a big mouth and an ugly imagination.” On Thursday, that lawyer, Mildred Whalen, asked Judge Irizarry to sentence her client to no more than 15 years.

“This was a group of people who were aspirational rather than operational,” she said of the plotters. “Until the government got involved, this was talk.”

Prosecutors disagreed, presenting a wide array of evidence during the trial, including hours of recordings. They showed that Mr. Defreitas had traveled to Guyana and Trinidad to seek support for the plot and had pushed it forward on numerous occasions, sometimes speaking with evident relish about his desire to cause death and destruction.

A prosecutor, Marshall L. Miller, said that Mr. Defreitas had steered the conspiracy and that the informant, Mr. Francis, had merely followed.

“The group took significant steps toward committing this offense,” he said. “They were acting not at the suggestion of the government, not at the behest of the government.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/nyregion/18plot.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

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Body believed to be Ohio missing mom, Tiffany Brown, found in her mother's home

BELLEFONTAINE, Ohio -- In a very sad turn of events a body believed to be that of Tiffany Brown, a Logan County woman missing since last week, was discovered inside her mother's home, police said Thursday.

Investigators say the body of 26-year-old Tiffany Brown was found hidden in the home's basement after officers searched the house and found what appeared to be a piece of bloody clothing.

According to police a man was living in the basement and was previously identified as a person of interest in the case.

The man, police say, is identified as Samuel K. Littleton, 32, the boyfriend of Brown's mother. As of Thursday morning police say Littleton has not been taken into custody.

An autopsy was scheduled to positively identify Brown and to determine how she died, investigators said during a news release.

Brown dropped her two children off at a neighbor's house on Friday when she went to run a few errands. She never returned to pick up her children, police say. On Monday, her Honda Civic was found parked at a Bellefontaine apartment complex with the keys left inside, 10TV News reported.

Brown's mother was informed by police, she said, that her daughter's cell phone was turned on Saturday and a call was made to Chicago.

According to 10TV News, members of Brown's family have said that they feared her life was in danger. They offered a $5,000 reward for information about her whereabouts.

Anyone with information about Brown or Littleton was asked to contact Bellefontaine police at 937-599-8477 .

http://www.examiner.com/missing-persons-in-national/body-believed-to-be-ohio-missing-mom-tiffany-brown-found-her-mother-s-home

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From ICE

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ICE arrests 47 in operation targeting criminal aliens and immigration fugitives

COLUMBUS, Ohio - More than 40 criminal aliens, immigration fugitives and immigration violators are facing deportation and criminal charges following an enforcement effort spearheaded by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) in Columbus.

During the day of enforcement activity, ICE made a total of 47 arrests in Franklin, Hamilton and Butler counties.

Of those taken into custody, 18 were aliens with prior criminal convictions, seven had been previously deported who returned to the United States illegally after being removed, and four were immigration fugitives who failed to comply with a final order of deportation issued by an immigration judge. The remaining illegal aliens arrested were encountered by ERO officers during the course of the action.

One alien was encountered with the eight kilograms of cocaine and two garbage bags of marijuana. He had been previously removed from the United States and had an outstanding felony warrant from Franklin county for possession of dangerous drugs and narcotic equipment and was subsequently turned over to Franklin County.

The criminal histories of those arrested included prior arrests and convictions for a variety of violations; domestic violence, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, menacing, possession of drugs, possession of narcotics equipment, shoplifting, burglary and forgery. Since many of the individuals have outstanding orders of deportation or have been previously deported, they are subject to immediate removal from the country.

"A top priority for ICE ERO in Ohio is to locate and arrest criminal aliens and ultimately remove them from our country in a safe and humane manner," said Rebecca Adducci, field office director of ERO for Ohio and Michigan. "This operation is yet another example of the critical role that targeted immigration enforcement plays in protecting our communities."

The group arrested included 47 males and no females from six different countries: Mexico (26), Guatemala (14), El Salvador (3), Nicaragua (1), Honduras (2) and Paraguay (1).

Largely as a result of these initiatives, ICE set a record for overall removals of illegal aliens in fiscal year 2010, with more than 392,000 removals nationwide. Half of those removed - more than 195,000 - were convicted criminals. The fiscal year 2010 statistics represent increases of more than 23,000 removals overall and 81,000 criminal removals compared to fiscal year 2008 - a more than 70 percent increase in removal of criminal aliens.

ICE's Fugitive Operations Program is just one facet of the Department of Homeland Security's broader strategy to heighten the federal government's effectiveness at identifying and removing dangerous criminal aliens from the United States. Other initiatives that figure prominently in this effort are the Criminal Alien Program, Secure Communities and the agency's partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies under 287(g).

http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1102/110216columbus.htm

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From the FBI

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Human Trafficking Investigation Leads to Indictment and Arrest of 10 Individuals

HOUSTON—A three-year investigation into the trafficking of young and minor female Mexican nationals for the purpose of compelling their service as prostitutes at Houston area bars and restaurants through force, fraud, and coercion has lead to the indictment of 10 individuals, including the owner/operators of the La Costeñita Bar and El Club Restaurante, United States Attorney José Angel Moreno announced today.

U.S. Attorney Moreno was joined in making this announcement at a press conference today by FBI-Houston Assistant Special Agent in Charge Michael H. Bonner; Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI) Assistant Special Agent in Charge Sean McElroy; Harris County Sheriff Adrian Garcia; Major George Rhyne, Texas Department of Public Safety; and Lt. C.A. Vazquez of the Houston Police Department; whose agencies worked together as part of the Human Trafficking Rescue Alliance (HTRA) to conduct the investigation leading to the charges.

The three-count indictment returned by a Houston grand jury under seal on Tuesday, Feb. 15, 2011, was unsealed today. All 10 defendants charged were taken into custody as a result of coordinated enforcement actions undertaken by teams of investigating agents last evening. All those in custody made initial appearances before a United States Magistrate Judge earlier this morning. All will appear for a detention hearing tomorrow, Friday, Feb. 18, 2011, before United States Frances H. Stacy at 1:00 p.m.

"I applaud the bravery of the young lady who made the 911 call for help in this case," said Moreno, "and commend the efforts of the agency members of the HTRA for the investigative efforts to rescue the victims in this case and apprehend their oppressors."

Maria Rojas, aka "Nancy," 46, a co-owner of the La Costeñita Bar and El Club Restaurante, located at 8403 and 8037 Clinton Drive, respectively, in Houston and her brother, Jose Luis Rojas, 38, who operated the La Costeñita as well as the locations adjacent to the bar located at 8303 Clinton Drive where the prostitution allegedly took place, are charged with conspiring to hold persons in conditions of peonage and recruiting, holding, transporting, and providing and obtaining persons for sexual services.

"The crimes alleged in this indictment are unconscionable," said FBI Special Agent in Charge Richard C. Powers. "While we can't erase the harm done by these horrible acts, the FBI and other members of the Human Trafficking Rescue Alliance will continue to ensure the victims of these crimes are protected and their traffickers are brought to justice."

Specifically, the indictment alleges these defendants were involved in the recruitment of Mexican women and girls to travel to the United States with the false expectation of legitimate jobs in bars and restaurants beginning in 1999 and using force, fraud, and coercion to compel their service as prostitutes in their bar and restaurant. It is further alleged that in 2003 through 2011, the conspirators changed their tactics and relied upon on the services of pimps to supply minor females and young women for use as prostitutes and to maintain control and prevent escape of the minor females and young women. The Rojas' allegedly derived their substantial profits initially by doubling the amount of the smuggling fee charged by smugglers ($2,000 fee became $4,000) which was taken from the earnings of the women. Later when the operation changed to use pimps, profits were derived through the collection of $15 going to La Costeñita and $50 to the young women and minors which ultimately went to the pimp. This conspiracy charge carries a statutory penalty of a minimum of no less than 10 years' imprisonment and maximum term of up to life imprisonment and a $250,000 fine upon conviction.

"Human and sex trafficking is modern-day slavery and it's happening right here in our own back yard," said Sheriff Garcia. "These indictments prove that we will not tolerate it and that we will pursue the individuals involved in this kind of crime to the furthest extent of the law. These arrests, while they're just the tip of the iceberg, are an example of the results that working together diligently with local and federal agencies can produce."

The remaining eight defendants, Javier Guevara Belmontes, 46, who also owned, controlled and operated La Costeñita Bar and El Club Restaurante; Maday Martinez, 34, aka "Yvonne" (full name Maday Martinez Lindero), and Evelin Carloine Aguera, 37, alleged managers at La Costeñita Bar and the adjacent property; Claudia LNU (real name: Claudia Perez Ramirez), 27, Silvano Santos, aka "Chivas," 33, Francisco LNU, aka "Pancho" (real name: Francisco Midardi Maradiaga Jimenez), 33, and Olvan LNU (real name: Olvan Renieri Ramirez Caceres), 25, all of whom allegedly worked at La Costeñita Bar and at the adjacent property as "lookouts" alerting of police presence; and Aleyda LNU (real name: Aleyda Maria Juares), 27, who allegedly charged the young women and minors for condom and use of the rooms at a residence adjacent to the bar are charged along with Maria and Jose Luis Rojas conspiring to harbor illegal aliens for commercial advantage and private financial gain. A conviction for this felony offense carries a maximum statutory penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

Maria Rojas is also charged in the third and last count of the indictment with illegal re-entry into the United States after deportation which carries a maximum statutory penalty of two years' imprisonment and a $250,000 fine upon conviction.

Maria and Jose Luis Rojas, Maday Martinez Lindero, Silvano Santos, and Claudia Perez Ramirez are Mexican nationals. Four others, Evelin Carolina Aguero, Olvan Renieri Ramirez Caceres, Aleyda Maria Juares, and Francisco Maradiaga Jimenez, are Honduran nationals. The l0th defendant, Javier Guevara Belmontes is a legal permanent resident originally from Mexico.

"Today's arrests reflect a coordinated state and federal law enforcement effort to crack down on human trafficking," Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott said. "The defendants are charged with illegally trafficking their victims into this country and coercing them into forced prostitution. The Texas Attorney General's Office will continue working with state and local authorities to prevent this horrific crime."

Also included in the indictment is notice of intent to forfeit money constituting the proceeds of the illegal activity, the businesses (bar and restaurant) and several residential properties—including the bar and restaurant and adjacent property and Maria Rojas' home—which the United States alleges were used to facilitate or were obtained with ill-gotten gains from the alleged crimes

The case was investigated by the FBI, ICE, Harris Co. Sheriff's Office, The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, the Texas Attorney General's Office; the Department of State - Diplomatic Security Service, Texas Department of Public Safety, and the Houston Police Department.

The HTRA formed in August 2004 in the SDTX is one of the original 32 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance grantees. It is a collaboration of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies working together with area social service organizations to identify and assist the victims of human trafficking and to effectively identify, apprehend, and prosecute those engaged in both domestic and international human trafficking offenses. The United States Attorney's Office for the SDTX coordinates all trafficking investigations. Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward Gallagher, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division's Major Crimes Section, serves as coordinator of the HTRA; Assistant United States Attorney Ruben R. Perez, Chief of the Civil Rights/Trafficking Unit (CRTU), who is prosecuting this case with the assistance of Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Magliolo and Special Assistant United States Attorney Kimani Eason, members of the CRTU, serves as deputy coordinator of the HTRA.

http://houston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel11/ho021711.htm

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Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

Valerie Caproni General Counsel Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C.

February 17, 2011

Good morning, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about how new technology and a rapidly changing communications landscape are eroding the ability of the government to conduct court ordered intercepts of wire and electronic communications.

Introduction

In order to enforce the law and protect our citizens from threats to public safety, it is critically important that we have the ability to intercept electronic communications with court approval. In the ever-changing world of modern communications technologies, however, the FBI and other government agencies are facing a potentially widening gap between our legal authority to intercept electronic communications pursuant to court order and our practical ability to actually intercept those communications. We confront, with increasing frequency, service providers who do not fully comply with court orders in a timely and efficient manner. Some providers cannot comply with court orders right away but are able to do so after considerable effort and expense by the provider and the government. Other providers are never able to comply with the orders fully.

The problem has multiple layers. As discussed below, some providers are currently obligated by law to have technical solutions in place prior to receiving a court order to intercept electronic communications, but do not maintain those solutions in a manner consistent with their legal mandate. Other providers have no such existing mandate and simply develop capabilities upon receipt of a court order. In our experience, some providers actively work with the government to develop intercept solutions, while others do not have the technical expertise or resources to do so. As a result, on a regular basis, the government is unable to obtain communications and related data, even when authorized by a court to do so.

We call this capabilities gap the “Going Dark” problem. As the gap between authority and capability widens, the government is increasingly unable to collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation and pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking to terrorism and espionage—evidence that a court has authorized the government to collect. This gap poses a growing threat to public safety.

Two examples illustrate the Going Dark problem:

Over a two-year period ending in late 2009, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigated the leader of a major international criminal organization that was smuggling multi-ton shipments of cocaine between South America, the United States, Canada, and Europe, and was trafficking arms to criminal organizations in Africa. A confidential source informed the DEA that the leader of the organization was a former law enforcement officer who went to great lengths to utilize communications services that lacked intercept solutions. Through the hard work of the agents and with the assistance of a confidential human source, DEA managed to dismantle the drug trafficking portion of the organization. Unfortunately, it was unable to prosecute the arms trafficking portion of the organization, which operated beyond the reach of law enforcement's investigative tools. In that case, the communications provider lacked intercept capabilities for the target's electronic communications, and the government's other investigative techniques were ineffective in gathering the necessary evidence. As a result, elements of this organization continue to traffic weapons today.

In another example, in 2009, the FBI investigated a child prostitution case involving a pimp who was trafficking in underage girls and producing child pornography. The target used a social networking site to identify victims and entice them into prostitution. The provider of the social networking site did not have a technical intercept solution. Although the agents had sufficient evidence to seek court authorization to conduct electronic surveillance, they did not do so because the service provider did not have the necessary technological capability to intercept the electronic communications. In this case, the FBI was able to build a case against the target and secure his conviction using other investigative techniques, but our inability to intercept certain electronic communications resulted in a weaker case and a lighter sentence than might otherwise have occurred. It also impeded the agents' ability to identify additional potential victims and co-conspirators.

While these examples illustrate the nature of the Going Dark problem, it is important to emphasize a few relevant points.

• The Going Dark problem is not about the government having inadequate legal authority—the legal authorities we have for intercepting electronic communications are adequate. Rather, the Going Dark problem is about the government's practical difficulties in intercepting the communications and related data that courts have authorized it to collect.
  
  
• Going Dark has been used to refer to law enforcement's ability to different types of investigative data. As we discuss the Going Dark problem today, we are not focusing on access to stored data. Rather, we are focusing on the interception of electronic communications and related data in real or near-real time. Without the ability to collect these communications in real or near-real time, investigators will remain several steps behind and left unable to act quickly to disrupt threats to public safety or gather key evidence that will allow us to dismantle criminal networks.
  
  
• Addressing the Going Dark problem does not require a broadly applicable solution to every impediment that exists to the government's ability to execute a court order for electronic surveillance. There will always be very sophisticated criminals who use communications modalities that are virtually impossible to intercept through traditional means. The government understands that it must develop individually tailored solutions for those sorts of targets. However, individually tailored solutions have to be the exception and not the rule.
  
  
• Addressing the Going Dark problem does not require fundamental changes in encryption technology. We understand that there are situations in which encryption will require law enforcement to develop individualized solutions.
  
  
• Finally, addressing the Going Dark problem does not require the Internet to be re-designed or re-architected for the benefit of the government. Within the current architecture of the Internet, most of our interception challenges could be solved using existing technologies that can be deployed without re-designing the Internet and without exposing the provider's system to outside malicious activity.

Any solution to the Going Dark problem should ensure that when the government has satisfied a court that it has met the legal requirements to obtain an order to intercept the communications of a criminal, terrorist, or spy, the government is technologically able to execute that court order in a timely fashion that is isolated to the individual subject to the order. At the same time, efforts to address this problem must be done in a way that strikes a fair balance between the needs of law enforcement and other important interests and values, such as cybersecurity, civil liberties, innovation, and U.S. global competitiveness

Legal Framework

The government conducts court-ordered electronic surveillance of the content of communications pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended. Title III authorizes the government to obtain a court order to conduct surveillance of wire, oral, or electronic communications when it is investigating certain serious, enumerated crimes. FISA similarly relies upon judicial authorization, through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to approve similar surveillance directed at foreign intelligence and international terrorism threats. The government obtains court authorization to install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices pursuant to chapter 206 of Title 18, United States Code, and FISA. Such devices reveal dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information but not the substance, purport, or meaning of communications.

These authorities address privacy and civil liberties interests, commercial interests, and the government's interest in intercepting communications necessary to protect public safety. Indeed, Title III and FISA orders are among the most difficult investigative authorities to obtain and use. Focusing on intercepting phone calls in a criminal case, the investigator must establish, to the satisfaction of a federal district court judge, that there is probable cause to believe the person whose communications are targeted for interception is committing, has committed, or is about to commit one of the specific enumerated felonies; that alternative investigative procedures have failed, are unlikely to succeed, or are too dangerous; and that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of the specified felony will be obtained through the surveillance. The application can only be submitted to the court with the approval of a high-ranking official of the Department of Justice. After obtaining an intercept order, the investigator is required to minimize the interception of non-pertinent and privileged communications, and to provide the court with regular progress updates. The court order expires after 30 days. If the government wishes to extend the period of surveillance, it must submit a new application with a fresh showing of probable cause. In short, Title III imposes a rigorous set of requirements designed to ensure that this investigative tool is used only against the most serious criminals and only when other, less intrusive techniques will not be effective to protect the public safety.

From the outset, the government has required some assistance from communications service providers to implement court orders for electronic surveillance. Both Title III and FISA include provisions mandating technical assistance so that the government will be able to carry out activities authorized by the court. For example, Title III specifies that a “service provider, landlord…or other person shall furnish [the government]…forthwith all…technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception.” As the communications environment has grown in volume and complexity, technical assistance has proven to be essential for interception to occur. These provisions alone, however, have not been sufficient to enable the government to conduct surveillance in a timely and effective manner.

In the early 1990s, the telecommunications industry was undergoing a major transformation and the government faced an earlier version of this problem. At that time, law enforcement agencies were experiencing a reduced ability to conduct intercepts of mobile voice communications as digital, switch-based telecommunications services grew in popularity. In response, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994. CALEA requires “telecommunications carriers” to develop and deploy intercept solutions in their networks to ensure that the government is able to intercept electronic communications when lawfully authorized. Specifically, it requires carriers to be able to isolate and deliver particular communications, to the exclusion of other communications, and to be able to deliver information regarding the origination and termination of the communication (also referred to as “pen register information” or “dialing and signaling information”). CALEA regulates the capabilities that covered entities must have and does not affect the process or the legal standards that the government must meet in order to obtain a court order to collect communications or related data.

While CALEA was intended to keep pace with technological changes, its focus was on telecommunications carriers that provided traditional telephony and mobile telephone services, not Internet-based communications services. Over the years, through interpretation of the statute by the Federal Communications Commission, the reach of CALEA has been expanded to include facilities-based broadband Internet access and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services that are fully interconnected with the public switched telephone network. Although that expansion of coverage has been extremely helpful, CALEA does not cover popular Internet-based communications modalities such as webmail, social networking sites, or peer-to-peer services.

At the time CALEA was enacted, the focus on traditional telecommunications services made sense because Internet-based and wireless communications were in a fairly nascent stage of development and digital telephony represented the greatest challenge to law enforcement. However, as discussed below, due to the revolutionary expansion of communications technology in recent years, the government finds that it is rapidly losing ground in its ability to execute court orders with respect to Internet-based communications that are not covered by CALEA. Also, experience with CALEA has shown that certain aspects of that law sometimes make it difficult for the government to execute orders even for providers that are covered by CALEA

Challenges Associated with New Technologies

From a time when there were a handful of large companies that serviced the vast majority of telephone users in the country using fairly standard technology (the situation that existed when CALEA was enacted in 1994), the environment in which court-authorized surveillance now occurs is exponentially more complex and difficult. Since 1994, there has been a dramatic increase in the volume of communications, the types of services that are offered, and the number of service providers. It is no longer the case that the technology involved in communications services is largely standard. Now, communications occur through a wide variety of means, including cable, wireline, and wireless broadband; peer-to-peer and VoIP services; and third party applications and providers—all of which have their own technology challenges. Today's providers offer more sophisticated communications services than ever before, and an increasing number of the most popular communications modalities are not covered by CALEA.

Methods of accessing communications networks have similarly grown in variety and complexity. Recent innovations in hand-held devices have changed the ways in which consumers access networks and network-based services. One result of this change is a transformation of communications services from a straight-forward relationship between a customer and a single CALEA-covered provider ( e.g . customer to telephone company) to a complex environment in which a customer may use several access methods to maintain simultaneous interactions with multiple providers, some of whom may be based overseas or are otherwise outside the scope of CALEA.

As a result, although the government may obtain a court order authorizing the collection of certain communications, it often serves that order on a provider who does not have an obligation under CALEA to be prepared to execute it. Such providers may not have intercept capabilities in place at the time that they receive the order. Even if they begin actively attempting to engineer a solution immediately upon receipt of the order and work diligently with government engineers, months and sometimes years can pass before they are able to develop a solution that complies with the applicable court order. Some providers never manage to comply with the orders fully.

Even providers that are covered by CALEA do not always maintain the required capabilities and can be slow at providing assistance. Indeed, as with non-CALEA providers, for some CALEA-covered entities, months can elapse between the time the government obtains a court order and surveillance begins. In the interim period, potentially critical information is lost even though a court has explicitly authorized the surveillance.

This failure of some CALEA-covered providers to be able to comply fully with court orders is due in part to the process in CALEA for establishing standards for intercept capabilities that law enforcement agencies have found to be ineffective in practice. CALEA accords industry “safe harbor” from a CALEA enforcement action when they build their solution consistent with published industry standards, regardless of whether or not the standards satisfy CALEA's technical capability requirements or meet the needs of law enforcement. That reality can result in providers developing and maintaining intercept capabilities that do not achieve the goal of actually providing the government the information it is lawfully authorized to collect.

To compound matters, CALEA's enforcement requirements make it very difficult for the government to bring an enforcement action in court against a covered provider. CALEA's enforcement provisions are written in a manner that leaves the government with the choice of pursuing a CALEA enforcement action against a provider or developing the solution that provides us the ability to collect the evidence we need to further our investigation. Placing the mission first, we invariably develop the intercept capability ourselves. Once a solution is developed, we cannot satisfy CALEA's standards for enforcement.

The enforcement mechanisms in Title III and FISA are also difficult to use as an effective lever to encourage providers to develop and maintain lawful intercept solutions. With respect to both providers that are covered by CALEA and providers that are not, the judicial remedy for non-compliance with the technical assistance requirements in Title III and FISA is contempt. A contempt action is practically and legally difficult to pursue and is unlikely to succeed absent a total refusal of cooperation.

Challenges Facing State and Local Law Enforcement

State and local law enforcement agencies also face a serious intercept capabilities gap. For the most part, our state and local counterparts do not enjoy the resources, facilities, experience, technical expertise, and relationships with industry that federal agencies utilize to effectuate electronic surveillance. With a few exceptions, they are largely unable to conduct electronic surveillance of any internet-based communications services.

The challenge facing our state and local counterparts is exacerbated by the fact that there is currently no systematic way to make existing federally developed electronic intercept solutions widely available across the law enforcement community. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have varying degrees of technical expertise regarding electronic surveillance and lack an effective mechanism for sharing information about existing intercept capabilities. This leads to the inefficient use of scarce technical resources and missed opportunities to capitalize on existing solutions. In addition, there are significant communication gaps between law enforcement and the communications industry: law enforcement often lacks information about new communications services offered by providers, while providers often lack understanding of the needs of law enforcement. The absence of effective coordination and information sharing impedes the development of timely, cost-effective intercept capabilities that are broadly available to law enforcement across the country.

To help address these issues, the president's fiscal year 2012 budget requests $15 million to establish a Domestic Communications Assistance Center (DCAC). The DCAC will leverage the research and development efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement with respect to electronic surveillance capabilities, facilitate the sharing of technology between law enforcement agencies, advance initiatives to implement solutions complying with CALEA, and seek to build more effective relations with the communications industry. Due to the immediacy of these issues, DOJ is identifying space and building out the facility now.

Conclusion

The government's consideration of its electronic surveillance challenges must account for the complexity and variety of today's emerging communications services and technologies. This complexity and variety creates a range of opportunities and challenges for law enforcement. On the one hand, increased communications affords law enforcement potential access to more information relevant to preventing and solving crime. On the other hand, the pace of technological change means that law enforcement must update or develop new electronic surveillance techniques on a far more frequent basis, as existing tools will become obsolete quicker than ever before. In this setting, federal law enforcement faces new challenges on an ongoing basis. At the same time, state and local law enforcement agencies, which traditionally have fewer technical resources necessary to perform lawful electronic surveillance, increasingly need to rely upon the federal government to serve as a central source of expertise.

At this time, the administration does not have a formal position on whether any legislative changes are necessary. However, it is examining a variety of potential solutions that would address various aspects of the Going Dark problem. We look forward to working with Congress to find a solution that restores and maintains the ability of law enforcement agencies to intercept communications and collect related data pursuant to court orders in a manner that protects public safety, promotes innovation, and safeguards civil liberties. Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address this subcommittee. I look forward to answering your questions.

http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-face-of-new-technologies

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From the DEA

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DEA Seizes Six Gallons of PCP in Detroit Michigan

Largest seizure of PCP ever recorded by DEA in Michigan

FEB 16 - DETROIT – United States Attorney Barbara L. McQuade and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent in Charge Robert L. Corso announced today that on February 13, 2011, Eric Mitchell, a resident of Carson, California, was arrested for his role in a large phencyclidine (PCP) distribution ring in southeast Michigan. This ongoing investigation resulted in the seizure of more than six gallons of PCP in Detroit on February 13, 2011. This is the largest seizure of PCP ever recorded by the DEA in Michigan.

“This drug is infamous for causing users to act irrationally or violently, and is most often used in conjunction with marijuana,” said DEA Special Agent in Charge Corso. “Equally as important is that it is such a volatile substance that it has the potential to ignite, explode or emit dangerous fumes (hydrogen cyanide) even when left unattended, making it dangerous not only to the user, but also to anyone in the vicinity of the drug. A seizure of this size puts a significant dent in the availability of a very dangerous drug throughout Metro Detroit.”

On February 14, 2011, Mitchell appeared on a criminal complaint before District Court Magistrate Judge R. Stephen Whalen and was released on a $150,000 bond secured by real property in California. A criminal complaint is only a charging document and is not evidence of guilt. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial at which it will be the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell faces a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and up to life imprisonment, if convicted.

This case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Carl Gilmer-Hill.

http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/2011/detroit021611.html

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