States and European Approaches
in the Fight Against Terrorism
by Arthur Jones and Robin Wiseman
policing is the key ...
forward by Bill Murray, LACP
Too often when we think of "community policing" we think
of it as a "program" addressing public safety only, shortchanging
by far the vast impact it will have if understood more completely.
In fact community policing is not a program, nor a set of programs,
but a mind-set ... a philosophy and a way of doing business throughout
And, while it certainly demands a holistic approach to domestic
and international public safety, it also suggests that robust community
participation be sought and indeed encouraged in every aspect of
the work we expect from municipal, state, national and international
If the interrelationship of these groups is not denied, community
policing promises vast improvements in the quality of life across
the globe. All government should be run this way, and all activism.
The basic tenets of the philosophy of community policing embrace
things like inclusivity, participation, transparency, partnership,
responsibility and a shared interest in ongoing communications.
This open and continuous dialogue is what's important, and ALL parties
need to commit to this. It's design and flow should engage every
community resident with every government official and all service
To me there's an implied obligation that all be invited to this
transparent partnership ... that all are needed to accomplish real
change for the sake of a vibrant world-class city, a secure nation
and a healthy international, global community.
Dr. Arthur Jones and Dr. Robin Wiseman, local residents of Los Angeles
and frequent contributors to LA Community Policing, offer us the
following ... an extensive treatise that specifically examines how
the US and European approaches to combating terrorism differ. It
suggests that a philosophy of REAL community policing is the platform
that makes all the difference ... in the world.
Arthur A. Jones, J.D., Dr.jur.
Robin Wiseman, J.D., Dr.h.c.
International Human Rights Law and Policy
c/o Los Angeles Community Policing
email to: Arthur@lacp.org
..........Performance Investment Fund
(PIF) Advisory Committee,
..........County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Institute of Justice Project, "Emergency Communications and
The 21st Century Patrol Vehicle.
..........Richard M. Weintraub, Ph.D.,
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON
UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM:
THE ROLE OF POLICING
Divergence of Approach Between the United States and Europe:
Consequences for Efficiency Measurements:
Entering New Territory
B. Finding the Algorithms
C. Examples of Measurement
The U.S. and Europe: A Common Goal, a Different Road Map:
The European Design
B. The American Design
European-American Models for Efficiency Measurements in Community
Italian Grass Roots Poll
2. Post-Incident Analysis Questionnaire
3. Dual Application of Proficiency Scores
4. Measuring Prevention
5. Protecting Human Resources
Divergence of Approaches Between theUnited States and Europe:
Consequences for Efficiency Measurements
favors and practices a composite police response to terrorism, whether
emanating from Al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or other, more loosely
affiliated groups or cells. The United States has implemented a
strong military response coupled with off-shore detention facilities
and specially designed judicial proceedings.
As to domestic
preparedness for and prevention of terrorist strikes, the United
States Government spends more money every month in Iraq than it
does in one year on Homeland Security. The levels of Federal spending
for policing remain much lower than they were before the present
administration took office and cut the budget for COPS (Community
Oriented Policing Services) programs.
It will be
one of our tasks, in the near future, to build efficiency measurement
paradigms that compare and contrast the U.S. and European approaches
in combating terrorism.
we have seen little effort to quantify either the requirements or
the intended results of US efforts. Clearly, the subject matter
is unique, new to the American experience, and difficult to gauge.
Moreover, efficiency measurements may not always be designed with
sufficient breadth to include all support efforts behind the public
face of preparedness. Also, where efficiency measurements potentially
conflict with ideological considerations, the latter are likely
to prevail in the current climate. Several recognized authorities
have recently addressed this problem:
would be difficult to point to major theoretical breakthroughs in
the field of terrorism prevention studies, but even if new terms
appear such as 'asymmetric warfare' or 'networking', these are merely
new names for old and well-known realities. It is by no means clear
what factors are important and what should be counted and compared."
Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First
Century, Continuum Publishing, New York/London, 2004, p.
Nation has never needed to perform a universal vulnerability assessment
before, and there is no algorithm that will tell policy makers where
to spend the money." Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The
Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America,
Random House, 2003, at p. 477.
simple truth is that the [Bush] Administration does not have any
idea how much money is needed for first responders and related state
and local homeland security capability, because it has never tried
to find out. It has never engaged in a requirements process. It
fears that a requirements process will show how it has shortchanged
those defending us." Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies:
Inside America's War on Terrorism, Free Press/Simon and
Schuster, 2004, at p. 261. Although Clarke has been criticized by
some for the alleged political content of his arguments, he is nonetheless
highly regarded in the intelligence and national security establishment.
Indeed, his conclusions are buttressed by the findings of the 9/11
Commission Report :
congressional deadlines, the Transportation Security Administration
(made part of the Department of Homeland Security) has developed
neither an integrated strategic plan for the transportation sector
nor specific plans for the various modes -air, sea, and ground."
choices must be made in allocating limited resources. The U.S.
Government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets
that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending
them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing
so, and then develop a plan, budget and funding to implement
the effort." The 9/11 Commission Report, Authorized
Edition, W.W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp.390-392.
Union anti-terror coordinator Gijs de Vries lamented that Europe
is sometimes viewed as being too weak on terror. In contrast, he
drew attention to the Europe-wide police cooperation and raids that
resulted in the arrests of terrorists involved in the Madrid bombings.
Four further attacks had thus been hindered, he said.
services can't put their secrets in the papers. When you prevent
something, you don't see that something happening. So sometimes
the successes are less easy to spot but they are real," he
said. Bernd Rieger in DW-Welt.de, Deutsche Welle,
September 11, 2004.
Thus, we have
no convenient, tested paradigms available against which to match
our efforts at disaster prevention and preparedness. Let us indeed
strive for clear numbers wherever we can, however, and this brief
paper will suggest several models for gathering and ordering quantitative
data in a manner that will reflect at least some of the intangible
factors inherent in our continuing comparative policing studies.
waters we are now entering demand innovation at all levels. Innovation,
in turn, demands new methods and approaches. First, we should examine
police force efficiency measurements as they are presently used
and effect relationships in crime rates;
and educational impact on operational efficiency;
effects between crime suppression and crime prevention.
All the foregoing
quantification processes combine objective and subjective components.
Cold numbers, e.g., homicide victims in a given year, can often
be made more useful and meaningful when combined with subjective
factors such as public perceptions of society and public safety.
See Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS)
surveys, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004.
example, and one that will figure heavily into our comparative equation,
is the causal connection between Community Policing and crime rates.
As defined by the Department of Justice in the 1994 U.S. Crime Act,
Community Policing is the pragmatic philosophy that brings communities
together with police in a close partnership in fighting and preventing
the conditions that breed crime. It means that all sworn officers,
generalists and specialists alike, will spend much time in the neighborhoods
meeting and talking with citizens, discussing common problems and
devising solutions that involve the community. The process emphasizes
building trust and confidence as a two-way street between police
and citizens, because the preventive effects depend in great part
on the quality and depth of that trust.
It should be
noted here that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department was
a pioneer in the field of Community Policing, and that the many
innovations developed here were adopted and replicated by police
departments throughout the country and abroad. LASD leadership is
still renowned and respected worldwide.
of Community Policing in the present context is that the European
war on terrorism relies on Community Policing as one of its chief
1. The ZHAO
studies: In early 2000, a comprehensive study was published by the
University of Nebraska entitled "A National Evaluation of
the Effect of COPS Grants on Crime from 1994 through 1999",
by Jihon "Solomon" Zhao, Ph.D., and Quint Thurman, Ph.D.
It concluded that the primary reason for continuously declining
crime rates in the U.S. during that period was Community Policing.
The use of Community Policing programs and strategies directly caused
the nationwide reduction in crime.
Zhao study reviewed extrinsic evidence, both statistical
and anecdotal, to establish the fundamental reductions in crime
rates nationwide. Then, it found that the components and timing
of the decrease in crime suggested that the increased numbers of
trained Community Policing officers on U.S. streets during that
period contributed most heavily to that reduction. The study used
statistical evidence to prove that a combination of innovative crime-prevention
strategies, problem-oriented practical solutions, and community
"embedded" police added up to a successful venture.
also found, based on data from all U.S. police forces in cities
of 100,000+ population collected over a six-year period, that each
COPS Grant (i.e., taxpayer) dollar per city resident invested in
innovative Community Policing caused a decline of 12.93 violent
crimes per 100,000 residents. Similarly, each $1.00 per person spent
in cities on innovative programs produces a reduction of 43.85 property
crimes per 100,000 residents.
study used a number of standard econometric techniques to eliminate
or adjust for socio-economic variables frequently associated with
debates over policing methods, such as general economic environment
and income; heterogeneity or ethnicity; income levels; unemployment;
single-parent households; mobility; ratio of young people to population;
home ownership; and social disorganization. See MacKinnon, James,
and Halbert White, 1985, "Some Heteroskedaticity-Consistent
Covariance Matrix Estimates with Impound Sample Properties",
Journal of Econometrics 29:305-25.
Yet less than
six months after the appearance of the Zhao study, a neoconservative
think tank in Washington, D.C., The Heritage Foundation, published
a hastily completed study in which it concluded that Community Policing
had little or nothing to do with the sustained six-year drop in
crime rates. Instead, according to the Heritage Foundation, the
dramatic reduction in violent and property crimes nationwide was
caused by more aggressive law enforcement -suppression only- on
the part of specialized task forces such as SWAT teams. Heritage
cited no statistical evidence or recognized authorities to justify
its conclusions, but made crime rates part of its neoconservative
ideology. Its hard-hitting polemic found swift and enthusiastic
reception among the managers of the Republican presidential campaign.
As a result,
when the Bush Administration took office a half-year later, one
of its first acts was to slash the budget of the COPS Office to
near-zero. No more Community Policing programs were forthcoming,
and no new police were hired. In 2002 alone, New York City lost
more than 4,000 sworn officers. And NYPD was not alone. Crime rates
nationwide levelled off from their steady decline, and are now showing
early signs of increasing once more. See Clarke, op.cit., at p.
2. Other examples
of quantitative measurement of effective policing -both human elements
and technology- will be discussed below, including the Beck
surveys in Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Canada, and portions
of the British Commonwealth; the Niedersachsen surveys and
studies in Germany; and the recent Polizia di Stato statistics
on Italian homeland security and the role of community policing
("polizia di prossimità") published September
20, 2004. We will also review highlights of the Dreiländerpilot
project joining Dutch, Belgian and German police forces in disaster
response rehearsals and simulations including interoperability communications
One of our
chief conclusions, set forth at the end of this paper, is that the
traditional approach to measuring efficiency, i.e., "put something
in numbers wherever you can", is not always a safeguard against
attack from opponents of interdisciplinary thinking. The whole philosophy
of Community Policing was laid lame in the U.S., its birthplace,
by pseudo-scientific verbiage repeated loudly and frequently by
interests who simply wanted to spend the money elsewhere. Even the
events of September 11 did not move those forces an inch on the
subject of police potential for creating a secure homeland. The
best quantitative analysis proved useless in the face of ideological
can best illustrate the relative efficiency of Community Policing
in fighting and preventing acts of terrorism by analyzing the European
The U.S. and Europe:
Common Goal, a Different Road Map
On both sides
of the Atlantic, it is generally accepted that the temptation of
measuring efficiency defined narrowly -quantifying one thing at
a time- should not be allowed to mute, marginalize or discourage
the lively and open discussion and research of broad comparative
studies and Systems Thinking Analysis. Instead, we
propose that this broader, more inclusive principle, albeit more
difficult to track than single-issue statistics, will offer greater
insights when comparing U.S. methods with the European counterparts
in preventing or responding to terrorist-inspired disasters.
We have often
referred, in P.I.F. Committee meetings, to the necessity of viewing
policing practices as a continuum. Even Werner Heisenberg, the quantum
physicist, would have agreed that an extended video, flowing over
several years, will be more enlightening than a collection of unconnected
presents a similar picture. According to several respected authors,
"... [P]revention -or, in this case, The Precautionary Principle
- calls on us to look beyond immediate activity, in isolation, and
toward the whole context in which the activity unfolds." Jeremy
Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future
is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, Tarcher/Penguin
Books, New York, 2004, at p. 334; Chris Rumford, The European
Union: A Political Sociology, Oxford Publ., U.K.; Blackwell,
2003, at p. 68.
of long-term choses in action, including social justice, human rights,
precaution in dealing with the ecosystem, and concerted action in
alleviating the misery that breeds religious radicalism, also is
consistent with the European approach to terrorism. And that, in
a nutshell, is precisely what the 25 member states of the European
Union have adopted, and is what distinguishes their philosophy and
their actions from those of their American cousins.
The European Design
Union, together with non-member neighbor states such as Norway and
Switzerland, views terrorism as mainly a police problem. The U.S.,
by contrast, declared war on terrorism, and sees it as a military
problem. The response to increased terrorism in the EU is to increase
interstate and interagency cooperation. The European strategy is
supported by three main pillars:
1. Closer cooperation
among police forces and harmonization of laws and police agencies
across borders. In this sector, Community Policing plays a major
2. A strong
element of HUMINT, or human intelligence. Here, tireless studies
of the terrorist mind and infiltration of terrorist support cells
is proving invaluable. Once again, Community Policing principles
form the nucleus of the strategy;
of the root causes of terrorism. This firm conviction does not reflect
a Europe "soft on terrorism", as Bush Administration spokespersons
have repeatedly charged. Instead, it shows a willingness to change
social and economic conditions in some of the most remote and poverty-stricken
areas of the world in order to render Islamic radicalism discredited
and unattractive to a new generation. Once again, this sounds remarkably
similar to the basic tenets of Community Policing. It also helps
explain why European Union foreign aid makes up nearly 50 percent
of the world's total, with the U.S. trailing at 36 percent of annual
development and humanitarian aid. Rifkin, op.cit., at p. 305; "European
Union Factsheet: Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid",
European Commission, June 25, 2004.
approach is delivering dividends in the form of successful police
sweeps and arrests in many countries, coupled with increased community
support and truly willing coalitions of cooperative nations, as
to the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, began with the European
Commission issuing an Action Paper calling for the following steps
to be taken: "Better implementation of existing legislative
instruments relevant to the fight against terrorism, and adoption
of draft measures already on the Council table, strengthening the
fight against terrorist financing, and enhanced operational coordination
EU created the position of a European Counterterrorism Coordinator
and promptly filled the post with an experienced Public Safety Minister
from The Netherlands. Then, the EU formed a coordination mechanism
joining law enforcement, judicial authorities, and intelligence
services in an intelligence exchange group.
Next, the Commission
unified the database of all 25 member states regarding traveler
information, to facilitate instant data exchange by airport security,
border patrols, and other law enforcement agencies. Biometric data
programs and mandatory fingerprinting on all passports and ID cards
was then implemented. All EU states are now completing their acquisition
and implementation of interoperable digital communications systems.
The Task Force of EU Police Chiefs is now fully operational, and
is monitoring progress on all fronts while placing new strategies
into effect in the field.
the wake of the Madrid bombings, the European Union adopted a long-debated
Constitution. All in all, the European response was catalyzed by
Madrid and produced new impetus toward close police cooperation
throughout the Union. Erin La Porte, The European Union's
Answers to Post-Madrid Terrorism, August 15, 2004, Le
Monde; Peter J. Cullen, Anti-Terrorist Measures in
the EU: Striking the Right Balance? Europäische Rechtsakademie
Trier, Seminar of 9-10 September 2004.
It is crucial,
in discussing EU-US differences, to recognize that the EU places
greater emphasis on economic security and peace support operations.
This is a basic element of "Soft Power". Not only can
European soft power be used to counter some of the unintended consequences
of American hard, i.e., military power --- rising anger and antipathy
in Muslim nations, increased recruitment into terrorist organizations
--- but it can also be a source of assistance and reinforcement
for America's own soft power and increase the likelihood of the
United States' achieving at least part of its objectives.
of democracy and human rights forms a powerful argument against
terrorist involvement. Because the distribution of wealth in Europe
is less disproportionate (or less inequitable) than in the U.S.,
the EU's efforts cannot as easily be dismissed as hypocrisy. Pre-tax
income inequality is higher in the United States than in Europe.
Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in
the US and Europe: A World of Difference, Gius. Laterza
& Figli, Milano, and Oxford University Press, 2004, at pp. 186-216,
"The Ideology of Redistribution".
Also, the EU
is the world's largest trading bloc and is now insisting on anti-terrorist
cooperation with all its trade partners worldwide as a condition
of doing business. Prof. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., former Chairman of
the National Intelligence Council, Soft Power: The Means to
Succeed in World Politics, Public Affairs/Perseus Books
Group, 2004, at p. 81.
Well and good,
but is the European approach efficient? First, a few cold numbers.
While up to ten bombs exploded in Madrid trains on March 11, Spanish
police found four more bombs and defused them in time, thus preventing
four more attacks. A few days later, police traced the central cell
of train bombers and surrounded them. In an ensuing fire fight,
nearly all the terrorists in the apartment were killed or committed
suicide. The remaining ones were arrested.
11 and September 15, 2004, Spanish police arrested 55 persons in
connection with the train bombings. In addition, French police arrested
35 suspected terrorists in the same time period while Italian police,
concentrating on logistical support cells, arrested 17 persons in
June and 10 more in August, 2004. BORR Centre de noticies
per á la difusié de les Ciències Criminológiques,
Barcelona, September 15, 2004.
and Italy, a coordinated international strike resulted in the arrests
of 17 terror suspects, including train bomb specialists and a mastermind
of several attacks in Europe and the Middle East. In so doing, police
destroyed various terrorist planning, bomb manufacturing, communications
and logistical support cells in Milan, Antwerp and Brussels. Agence
France Presse/Reuters, September 9, 2004.
Then, on October
18 and 19, 2004, Spanish police conducted a sweep in five major
cities that netted a total of eight terrorist cell members. They
are suspected of having participated in the Madrid train bombing
attack preparations, and the evidence found at their living quarters
indicated that, at the time of their arrest, they were actively
engaged in preparing a truck bomb attack on the Spanish Supreme
Court and Criminal Appellate Court buildings in Madrid. The bombs
would have been aimed at killing over 300 employees including the
investigating magistrates in charge of gathering evidence in the
Madrid train bombing. The truck bombs would also have destroyed
crucial evidence concerning terrorist support cells, their locations,
members' identities and connections. Martine Silber in Le
Monde, Paris, France, Oct. 20, 2004.
day, in Bern, Switzerland, Swiss police acting in concert with French
and Spanish police arrested Mohammed Ashra, a high-ranking Al Qaeda
member who had recently left Spain. Ashra is suspected of being
a top recruiter, and evidence shows that he managed much of the
March 11 Madrid attacks. His more recent activities included sending
money to the United States and maintaining ties with various logistical
cells in the U.S. Spiegel Online, October 20, 2004;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zurich, Switzerland (daily),
October 20, 2004.
is now achieving noticeable progress using its new anti-terrorist
structures such as intensified police cooperation and human intelligence
gathering. Javier Solana, formerly Secretary-General of NATO and
now Secretary-General of the European Union, divides this visionary
task into two interwoven categories: "network threats"
by terrorist organizations and "transition challenges"
to countries and regions striving for pluralistic modernity. Both
must be addressed successfully: "The best way to advance the
cause of political and economic freedom in the next century is multilateralism
with muscle." Javier Solana, Rules with Teeth,
in Foreign Policy, the Carnegie Endowment, Publ., Washington, D.C.,
September-October 2004, at pp. 74-75.
The American Design
experts disdain the Soft Power approach, preferring to define their
anti-terror ideas in terms of military might. The internationally
respected military and security consultant, Robert Hunter, further
insists that Europe beef up its own military power quickly to permit
the EU to join the American coalition. Hunter and others such as
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz believe that EU efforts
in counter-terrorism should be measured in military capability,
a situation in which the U.S. would define the terms of cooperation
and would dictate the course of that strategy. Hunter, Robert, and
Rob de Wijk, "European Military Reform for a Global Partnership",
Washington Quarterly, 27 No. 1, Winter 2003-2004,
The EU, however,
is absolutely committed to its combined approach of Community Policing,
Human Intelligence, and Soft Power. According to Gijs de Vries,
EU Anti-Terrorist Coordinator, "The US would get a lot farther
in its own war on terrorism if it spent less money on tanks and
more on police." Cited in Christoph Keese, Welt am Sonntag,
September 5, 2004.
estimates are that, by or before the end of 2005, one or several
terrorist attacks on American rail transportation will be inevitable.
There is a great possibility that the attack(s) will utilize one
or another weapon of mass destruction. Peter G. Peterson, Chairman
of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Secretary of Commerce,
Riding for a Fall, in Foreign Affairs, September/October
2004, Vol. 83, No. 5, at p114.
concern is not without cause. As we have already noted, the terrorist
suspect arrested in Switzerland on October 20, 2004, Mohammed Ashra,
played a key role in the Madrid train bombings and had recently
been sending money and information to cells in the United States.
See Silber, Le Monde, op.cit.supra.
Peterson's nationwide studies, the U.S. needs to spend more time,
attention, and money on stateside first responders in preparation
for these realistic attack scenarios and predictions. At the moment,
only one-tenth of all fire departments currently have the capacity
to respond to a building collapse; only a third of all firefighters
on any given shift are equipped with breathing apparatuses, and
only half possess radios. Urban rescue is uneven and spotty, and
most emergency communications are still not interoperable. Id.,
estimates, together with many of his colleagues, that short-term
preparations for domestic security of rail, ports and airports will
require an additional $ 62 billion to be allocated and spent between
November 2004 and December 2005. He also notes that there is no
objective assessment of need nationwide, nor is one likely to be
requested anytime soon. Id., at p. 117.
other sources, very little money has been expended so far to make
train travel safe. Only $ 65 million was appropriated to railroad
security in 2003, and less in 2004. Most of it was spent on physical
barriers, video surveillance and chemical and radiological detection
equipment and training. Transit officials surveyed nationwide say
that $ 6 billion per year are needed at the very least. Editorial
commentary in Sacramento Bee, March 26, 2004.
authors were told by the General Counsel for a major railway headquartered
in a mid-Atlantic state, who preferred to remain anonymous:
"No mass transit system can be made completely secure from
a determined terrorist bent on murder. But that's no reason to do
less than is possible to reduce the risk."
of objective requirement evaluations and assessments will apparently
fall to the first responders themselves, as that task is perceived
by the Bush Administration as running a distant second to the Government's
policy of fighting terrorism abroad rather than at home. See Steven
Flynn, The Vulnerable Home Front, in Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2004, Vol. 83, No. 5, at p. 20. He adds that,
in fiscal year 2005, Congress will give the Pentagon $ 7.6 billion
to improve security at military bases, while the Department of Homeland
Security will receive just $ 2.6 billion to protect all the vital
systems throughout the country that sustain a modern society. Id.,
at p. 23.
But the effort
on the home front suffers, in large part, from traditional rivalries
between military solutions and police solutions. William E. Odom,
former Director, National Security Agency, draws a firm line between
military counterintelligence and police work:
enforcement techniques that work against criminals do not work
against spies or terrorists. Except in corporate crime, criminals
tend to be neither well educated nor highly intelligent. For
example, the FBI relies on three methods: phone taps, informers,
and heavy-handed interrogations. These tactics do not work against
terrorists." Gen. William E. Odom, former director of the
National Security Agency and assistant chief of staff for intelligence,
U.S. Army, Fixing Intelligence: for a More Secure America,
Yale University, 2004, at pp. 177-179.
Gen. Odom is
not alone in his disdain for police work in fighting terrorism.
One top American intelligence official -albeit one with a military
background-states that the counterintelligence work involved is
too sophisticated, and requires too much education and realism to
leave to mere cops. In his book, Imperial Hubris,
"Anonymous" (later disclosed as Michael Scheuer, former
counterintelligence advisor to Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill
Clinton) also tells us that intelligence officers specialize in
lying to Congress about their interagency capabilities. Police,
he feels, have too much "legal romanticism" (read: ethics)
to pull it off convincingly. Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why
the West is Losing the War on Terror, Brassey's Inc., Publishers,
2004, at pp. 185-190.
authorities who are most knowledgeable about the defensive, i.e.,
homeland and preventive aspects of anti-terrorist efforts, still
think in terms of neo-colonial secret agents gleaning information
from a Persian bazaar or Moroccan Souk. As a result, the role of
Community Policing as a form of preventive medicine is light years
from their mental process.
Even John Keegan,
the respected British military historian, automatically assigns
police a lesser position in the pantheon of intelligence:
masters of the new (terrorist) counter-intelligence will not
resemble the academics and chess champions of the Enigma epic
in any way at all. They will not be intellectuals."
Yet Keegan then
proceeds to recognize the new and crucial role of human intelligence
gathering in the trusted methodology of police officers: infiltration.
the contrary, their work will resemble that of undercover police
agents who attempt to become trusted members of criminal gangs,
with all the dangers and moral compromises that such a life
requires." John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge
of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda, Alfred A. Knopf,
Publ., 2003, at pp. 316,317.
the aforesaid authorities nor the Bush Administration envisage the
role for U.S. police that Europe has designed for its law enforcement
in the fight against terrorism. The U.S. Army values police only
for their files and records, which may be useful if the military
needs to loot them in their search for terrorists. The U.S.
Army Counter-Intelligence Handbook, Department of the Army,
2004, at pp. A-I-2, A-I-3.
as a first responder is left with the task of preparing discrete
efficiency models in the face of woeful underfunding. The continuing
need is to develop police capacities for spotting, observing, infiltrating,
and eliminating terrorist support cells, while at the same time
planning for the defense of our trains, buildings, ports, airports,
and general infrastructure. Aside from the obvious goal of putting
the limited money where it will counter the highest probability
of attacks, how can we legitimately quantify the success of the
Efficiency Measurements in Community Policing
several examples of projects measuring effectiveness of police in
securing homelands from terrorism. Please remember that these are
oversimplifications, and that the surveys and studies described
were all much more complex in their choice of method and the implementation
of the process than we have described.
Grass Roots Poll:
2004, the Italian Polizia di Stato (Italy's largest police force,
operating nationwide) published the results of a weekly survey it
had conducted for eighteen months in cooperation with a respected
non-profit polling organization, Cirm. This poll, which actually
questioned a total of 48 million separate persons (Italy's population
is just over 58 million) over the period in question, produced the
percent of all persons polled have confidence in the ability
of Italian police to protect them and to prevent acts of terrorism;
percent feel safe at work, and 77 % feel safe in their homes;
percent are satisfied with the increase in force of Italian
Community Police over the past 18 months;
current state of vigilance is considered "more than sufficient"
by 51 percent;
percent are satisfied with present protection of trains and
percent feel that Italian police were right to implement more
prevention and less suppression in the fight against terrorism;
percent "highly appreciate" the new Italian neighborhood
mobile police stations and mini-stations in camper buses;
percent "wholeheartedly approve" of the application
of Community Policing as the chief bulwark against terrorism;
percent "strongly disapprove" of the U.S. militaristic
approach to stopping terrorism.
Polizia di Stato,
Fiducia un Trend in Aumento, summary by Caterina
Carannante, September 20, 2004. www.poliziadistato.it
some validity to this survey is the fact that Italy for years has
provided sanctuary to Muslim refugees, and is therefore aware that
Al Qaeda has many logistical cells in Europe. Italy leads the EU
in density of clusters of terrorist cells, including sleeper cells.
The cumulative experience with various terrorists, their roots and
personalities, has helped Italy knock out large numbers of cells
and deport or try hundreds of terrorist leaders, recruiters, and
religious figures serving as agents provocateurs. Andrea Morigi,
Legno Storto, Libreria del Ponte, Milan, Publ., September
2004, at pp. 14-20.
Below is a
segment of a questionnaire developed by the CIA, in cooperation
with other intelligence organizations, to serve as a guideline for
field operatives and as a debriefing aid to gauge effectiveness
of training and of individual performance.
It is reprinted
here because it is closely similar to the police/first responder
questionnaires given out to participants in the Dreiländerpilot
(Three Country Pilot Project) program in Europe that joins
police in Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands in cross-border cooperation
to perfect communications interoperability, XML mapping, and joint
questions may guide an inquiry into an act of terrorism. Collect
data through the following basic questions:
this a conventional weapon or a weapon of mass destruction attack?
this a WMD attack made to look like a conventional attack?
this the primary incident or a diversionary attack?
this incident a potential trap for first responders?
would a secondary trap be located?
there a perimeter set to screen people departing?
all visitors within visual range been removed and corralled?
Remember: INTEL cell members may be in a nearby crowd!
there was a terrorist security team or driver, which avenues
of exit would they take?
direction was the fastest way out to a major avenue of escape
-subway, highway, rail, airport?
people running away without regard to the incident (suspicious
people escaping versus running for their lives?)
people seen running away with weapons or equipment?
are the descriptions of people running or "moving with
purpose" before the attack occurred?
we have descriptions of escape vehicles (or vehicles moving
without regard to the incident) and its [sic] occupants?
was the direction of travel of escaping people or vehicles?
we calculate an escape radius?
witnesses observe anyone making rapid vehicle changes within
five to ten miles of the target site?
you visually inspect alleyways, balconies and homes/businesses
within visual distance plus two miles of the incident site for
a possible command and control cell?
EMS or an emergency room seen unusual victims (flash burns on
hands and face, shrapnel only in back)?
any audio or video footage available?
have no information regarding CIA efficiency ratings or measurement
procedures using these questionnaires.
relevant data is available from Europe. As we presented in earlier
papers (e.g., August 12, 2003), the DreiländerPilot (Three
Country Pilot Project) disaster simulations measured performance
on similar post-incident questionnaires as a function of police
training. The training took two main forms:
communication interoperability and individual proficiency; and
to psyschological, anti-stress training.
first test (May 2003) and the second (September 2003), communication
and equipment use proficiency improved by a mean of over 50 percent
(260 participants). Scores on incident memory and decision-making
improved by a mean of 30 percent. The Dreiländerpilot
project is continuing, has recently added helicopter communications
interoperability to the field units in cross-border areas, and is
preparing for more scenario rehearsals throughout 2005.
See Dreiländerpilot, Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS),
Federal German Border Police, Swisttal, Germany, Dipl.-Ing. (FH)
Franz-Josef Theisen, Managing Director.
As to efficiency
testing, the continuing dual theme of the Three Country Pilot comprises:
of functional efficiency of networked mobile digital wireless
communications units employing TETRA technology in a technically
and functionally realistic test environment; and
determination of the extent to which cross-border communications,
using the technology set forth in (a) foregoing, is sufficiently
supported and justified from an operational standpoint and suggests
technical feasibility. (Translations by authors).
At least in
field exercises, there is no evidence that police achieve lower
performance scores than intelligence agents. The European trust
and confidence in police in the fight against terrorism, it is suggested,
may not be misplaced.
3. Dual Application
of Proficiency Scores:
learned much about terrorism from the four decades of home-grown
violent radicalism that rocked Britain, Germany, France, Spain and
Italy. The US must not, insh'alla, find it necessary to replicate
that tragedy in our own learning curve.
For that reason,
we would suggest that much of the data resulting from upcoming disaster
scenario rehearsals can be put to use ---and measured--- in other,
more common policing incidents. For example, the post-terrorist
attack responses used in blocking escape routes, identifying vehicles,
routing more incoming emergency vehicles more efficiently, etc.,
can also apply to police pursuit training: to use XML technology,
GPS routing, and digital communications interoperability to stop
or shorten car chases. Certainly, these are response incidents that
lend themselves more readily to measurement. Coordinated preventive
action can shorten or reduce the number of automobile police pursuits
undertaken, hence reduce the numbers of collisions, injuries and
fatalities associated with them. (See various studies by Prof. Jeffrey
Alpert, University of South Carolina).
comparison between pursuits taking place over the past six months
could be placed in contrast with pursuits undertaken with the digital
equipment and new training techniques over a similar, subsequent
six-month period, and a descending risk ratio calculated. The data
would be based on the overall number of pursuits undertaken; the
mean time elapsed in each; average distances traveled; number of
persons injured (if any); average number of patrol cars involved
in each pursuit; number of pursuits resulting in a collision, and
correlations among all the aforesaid variables scheduled for measurement
and comparison. See, e.g., Mark Vernoy and Judith Vernoy, Behavioral
Statistics in Action, Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1997,
at pp. 160 et seq.
As we have
already noted, it is not feasible to construct an experimental design
for efficiency of policing methods in preventing terrorist attacks.
First, we cannot master the data necessary to determine whether
our hypotheses are verifiable or falsifiable (pace Karl Popper).
Nor can we make a complete listing of all levels inherent in the
independent variables, as we cannot predict them or their numbers.
tests could be constructed and carried out by LASD psychologists
and the psychological training sub-committee of PIF to determine
to what extent trainees in anti-terrorism procedures perform better
than deputies trained in the traditional manner. Moreover, correlation
coefficients could be used to compare the control groups more clearly.
These techniques were used in most of the Beck Studies
of Professional Commitment in Police Forces that were undertaken
in Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and New Zealand between 1992
and the present. They showed a close relationship between training
methods and morale; between length of service and ethical responses;
and established the measurability of distinctions between operational
stress and organizational stress. See, e.g., Karen Beck, Ph.D.,
Improving Organisational Commitment: The Police Officer's
Perspective, 1996, National Police Research Unit, Payneham,
South Australia, ISBN: 0 7308 0134 9; also, K. Beck and C. Wilson,
The Organisational Commitment Project: Intervention and the
Impact of Experience, 1999, National Police Research Unit,
Payneham, So. Australia; and Yvonne Brunetto, Ph.D., and Assoc.
Prof. Rod Farr-Wharton, The Organisational Commitment of Early
Career Police Officers, University of Queensland, Australia,
(unpublished manuscript), 2002; see, especially, sections on methodology,
measurement, and regression analysis of organisational commitment
independent variables can more easily be isolated and controlled
in normal application of Community Policing than would be the case
in counter-terrorism. Example: LASD programs for rehabilitation
of prisoners and detainees through transitioning programs (health,
mental health, education, job training, GED courses, housing resources
for post-release support, etc.). Here, the success of the program
can be shown by a lowered recidivism rate.
In the case
of gang intervention and prevention programs, available data can
be mined to show the relationship between crime rates by juveniles
with intervention programs in place, and the rates by offending
juveniles without intervention programs.
It would be
interesting to explore in more detail just how we can adapt these
methods to police use in the fight against terrorism.
We refer here
to a recent, seminal work entitled Krise als akute Belastungsstörung:
Neuroendokrine Auffälligkeiten bei PTBS (Prof. Dr.
J. Rauch et al., University of Braunschweig, Germany, July 2004;
Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin), translated
Acute Traumatic Stress: Neuroendocrine Anomalies from Post-Traumatic
study combined psychiatric and counseling treatment of police officers
who showed signs of advanced post-traumatic stress disorder after
responding to various disasters (kidnappings, train wrecks, plane
crashes, bus wrecks, floods, fires, etc.), and featured behavioral
observations matched up with brain scans and neurohormonal measurements.
The Rauch studies
showed that 29 percent of first responders suffered from class III
and class IV PTSD before treatment. By comparison, 55 percent of
rape victims and 36 percent of gunshot wound victims suffer similarly
found that psychological intervention featuring frequent discussion
of any and all stressors occurring in the patients' lives, if conducted
within six months after the traumatic occurrence, resulted in a
30 percent reduction in permanent symptoms or associations.
training combined the foregoing therapy/counseling with preparatory
rehearsals and simulations of disaster responses in a university
partnership with police forces, the reduction of PTSD symptoms nearly
doubled to 58 percent.
the Rauch studies, the Police Force of the State of Lower
Saxony, Germany (Polizei des Landes Niedersachsen)
began measuring human factors in policing in 1991, and is still
continuing the studies, steadily expanding them and creating numerous
useful studies and reports over the years. Niedersachsen
succeeded in matching up crisis elements in a changing society with
stress reactions and performance in officers. The methodology of
those studies alone is well worth a visit. The empirical analysis
of their broad-based and continuing sample has recently become a
valuable guide in training officers and preparing for possible terrorist
attacks. See Prof. Dr. Thomas Ohlemacher, Project Director, Christiane
Bosold, M.A., Psychology, and Anja Mensching, M.A. Criminology,
Associate Professor for Social Work, Polizei im Wandel: Eine
Empirische Analyse zur Arbeitssituation von Polizeibeamten und -beamtinnen
in Niedersachsen, Innenministerium des Landes Niedersachsen
is obviously impossible for us to judge whether the Rauch
and Niedersachsen studies provided efficiency at acceptable
levels, it is evident that both the police training and therapy
could be extremely valuable in protecting our most precious human
resource, the health of our officers.
There is no
speed limit on change in the world of emergency communications and
information technology, any more than there is a limit on the determination
of terrorists to spread death, destruction and horror among civilian
paper has focused on the emerging role of policing in the fight
against terrorism, and has attempted to illustrate the need to apply
empirical analysis to these new and expanding tasks while we still
have the opportunity. Because there is no single set of criteria
for determining whether, where and when terrorists are likely to
strike next in the United States, we are well advised to apply precautionary
principles in all cases of doubt. All of us, police, military or
civilian, would prefer to believe that fighting terrorists abroad
will mean that we will not need to fight them at home. At the same
time, we must adequately prepare for the eventuality that the military
solution is neither infallible nor permanent. Complacency is never
a defensible position.
We must provide
the best protection we can possibly develop locally. Indeed, because
police in all democracies are pledged to protect households and
persons along with institutions -- governments, constitutions, civil
rights, and judicial integrity -- international cooperation among
police forces may help us maintain the moral high ground, and ultimately
be a deciding factor in extinguishing the flames of brutal passion
essential to terrorism.
It is precisely
that moral high ground that terrorism seeks to destroy, by ripping
into what the ancient Romans called civitas: the fabric of civil
society. Military actions can defend lives, but armies do not address
the question of preserving and advancing the quality and intricacy
of rights in a republic. Police, however, do precisely that, and
they succeed through their steadfast application of integrity and
values embodied in the republic.
This, in part,
is why Europe has chosen to expand and educate their Community Policing
forces to fight terrorism. Community Policing robs terrorism of
its allure, its romance, and its appearance of legitimacy to its
peers. Invasions of foreign soldiers do not have that effect.
Thus we are
faced with the necessity of protecting people, institutions, infrastructure
and transportation, but with an innovative energy unique in our
history. At the same time, we must test our plans and our hypotheses
rigorously. We must apply constant empirical analysis to our technology
and its uses, and equally to the complex human aspects involved
in the sum total of our protective and preventive efforts. Finally,
we must accomplish all those tasks swiftly, accurately, and with
Arthur A. Jones,
J.D., Dr.jur. Robin Wiseman, J.D., Dr.h.c.
© 2004 Arthur A. Jones and Robin Wiseman. All international
Arthur A. Jones and Robin Wiseman are international human rights
lawyers with legal educations in the United States and Europe. They
are consultants and authors on international policing, social policy
and human rights, and regular contributors to the forum here at
LA Community Policing.
For more of their work, please see the Think
additional information or a complete list of references, contact: