Terrorism and Beyond: The Role of Policing in Fighting Terrorism
in the USA compared with Europe
EDITOR'S NOTE: We are seeking reactions and input for this work
in progress, a draft synopsis of Chapter XII of the book in preparation
Terrorism and Beyond: The Role of Policing in Fighting Terrorism
in the USA compared with Europe, by Arthur A. Jones and Robin
Doctor Jones and Doctor Wiseman are international human rights lawyers
with legal educations in the United States and Europe. They are
consultants and authors on international policing, social policy
and human rights, and regular contributors to the forum here at
LA Community Policing. (For more of their work, please see the Think
What follows is an incomplete chapter of their book, still in
the process of being prepared for future publication. Input is being
requested of the Community Policing community. You are respectfully
asked to send your comments, criticisms and thoughts by email to
the address below:
May 24, 2005
by Arthur A. Jones and Robin Wiseman
email to: Arthur@lacp.org
XII: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
IN THE U.S.
WAR ON TERROR: HOMELAND SECURITY
as the American approach is a "war on terror" emphasizing
the use of military means, the same philosophy or bundle of motives
has also attached to the fight against terrorism at home. This chapter
discusses the organizational structure that has been set up pursuant
to the Patriot Act, and more specifically the National Response
Plan (NRP) released by the Department of Homeland Security in January
The DHS materials
have been updated to include major "maiden" speeches given
by Michael Chertoff, the newly-installed Secretary of Homeland Security,
on April 26, 2005, at the International Center for Enterprise Preparedness,
New York, and at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, on April 29, 2005.
Both of those talks address the subject matter of this chapter.
We analyze the
Bush Administration's action plan for a national response in the
event of a future terrorist strike in light of its inherent structure
and likely consequences. The main areas of concern with the NRP
and with Secretary Chertoff's views of "public-private partnership"
in that endeavor are:
they reflect a consistent pressure by the Bush Administration to
reduce and to marginalize the role of state and local policing in
the entire anti-terrorist matrix. As we have noted in other chapters,
the current government has drastically cut the budget of the C.O.P.S.
office, and has nearly eliminated funding to police forces for equipment,
technology, interoperability, cross-training, education and salaries
for officers. At the same time, state and local taxation has been
operating on a severely reduced base.
The result is
a near-universal scramble for scarce local police financing nationwide,
coupled with significant cutbacks and the loss of the central "think
tank" and clearing house (C.O.P.S. and its research/training
institutes) at national level. The applied philosophy of Community
Policing, as it is presently practiced in the U.S., will be in danger
of withering if it continues to be unable to develop and disseminate
new Community Policing programs as they evolve.
gathering and first responder responsibilities of state and local
police under DHS authority have been intentionally downplayed and
neglected. In fact, in a DHS paper released April 1, 2005, a vague
"future goal" of Secretary Chertoff is to "expand
regional collaboration among first responders." It was immediately
denounced as "such an anemic little list of goals for our first
responders" by Richard Clarke, former chief of antiterrorism
under Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush.
Clarke and many other experts, if the Bush administration were seriously
planning an expanded role for community policing, it would presumably
be making preparations or overtures similar to those Secretary Chertoff
is swiftly making to the private security and manufacturing sectors.
will document the falling star of US Community Policing while contrasting
it with the rising star of European Community Policing.
There is growing concern over the lack of accountability inherent
in public-private partnerships that are vaguely defined yet grant
a paramilitary status (or, more precisely, a police replacement
status) to privately owned and operated security businesses. The
track record is abysmal. Private contractors are almost never brought
to justice for wrongs committed in the course of anti-terror activities.
On the other
hand, municipal police forces are subject to a highly evolved legal
structure of oversight and liability. It is an area of voluminous
judicial decisions at all levels, federal and state. In this Chapter,
we will demonstrate the broad civilian control over Community Policing
and contrast it with the narrow military hierarchy -much power concentrated
in few hands-and private security companies that offer even less
civilian control or accountability. The comparative picture will
then be augmented by the diligent research conducted by European
governments and police forces that led, inter alia, to their
adoption of Community Policing, in its present and future forms,
as the linchpin of antiterrorism.
Private security forces are not held to uniformly high standards
across the country. There are no well-established training curricula;
no history of public service; no ethos requirement. They
are, in fact, mercenaries.
There are no
Federal laws setting minimum standards for training or education
of private security forces in the U.S. Even state laws are spotty
on this issue. Thirty states have no training requirements at all.
California, one of the four most "rigorous" states, requires
a minimum of 40 hours (e.g., five eight-hour days) of training.
No state requires even the scantest introduction to government,
civics, or constitutional studies for private security operations.
As this book
will demonstrate, European governments and citizens, EU members
and non-members alike, are making an informed, judicious choice
in avoiding the path the U.S. is taking:
service may embrace other goals, such as social justice and being
representative of social diversity. The lesson is that the decision
to outsource [homeland security] would be taken purely for financial
reasons, while social, economic or environmental factors would be
left out of the decision. Values that are promoted by the public
[policing] service will be jeopardized." Schreier and Caparini,
"Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private
Military and Security Companies; Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), No. 6, Geneva, Switzerland, March
The track record to date of private industry in the war on terror,
both at home and abroad, is abysmal. The U.S. has, in fact, sent
dubious "private armies" into a legal vacuum. Not surprisingly,
the amateurism of the more than 20,000 private soldiers sent into
Afghanistan and Iraq has met with worldwide dismay and disgust.
lawsuits are mounting daily. Among the civil defendants are Custer
Battles, Inc., CACI International, Titan Corp., Blackwater USA,
Northrop-Grumman, Halliburton, Kellogg-Brown-Root, L-3 Communications,
DynCorp, CSC, MPRI, Kroll Associates, and a growing number of others,
all U.S. Government contractors in a "public-private partnership."
of those contractors enjoy a virtual immunity from prosecution for
acts committed abroad. They are not subject to military justice
and are almost never tried in the U.S. for crimes, including murder
and torture, they commit abroad. Much legal effort, and taxpayers'
money, is expended in perfecting the avoidance of accountability.
be no surprise to Americans. Private security employees are loyal
only to their employers. They answer to nobody but the shareholders.
The nation as a whole has no legal means to impose or enforce even
the most minimal standards of decency on them.
To quote P.W.
Singer, a noted authority on public-private security questions,
"Our democratic principles of public safety and security were
formulated by leaders who did not, nor could they, anticipate the
consequences if the security and public safety system became commingled
with very real market forces, with all their dynamic shifts, uncertainties
and extrinsic purposes."
police forces are privatized, or private policing acts at odds with
the civic mission of police, a new agent of action parallel to the
state is created: ruled by money alone.
are governed by a consensus of their citizens, openly arrived at,
that they share a civic unity of spirit. It can be successfully
policed and maintained only if the police themselves are a delivery
instrument of civil and of human rights. They must be well-trained,
and carry a thorough working understanding of the constitutional,
human and civic structure they protect.
The state and
municipal police of the Twenty-first Century are, increasingly,
recruited and educated precisely with all those aims in mind. They
represent one of the greatest achievements of the struggles of the
20th Century for ethics and accountability in government. The educational
Renaissance of American police came with Community Policing as an
applied philosophy supported by federal programs. The march toward
an open civil society and the even-handed protection of human and
civil rights is still unfinished. It is a work in progress.
One of its chief
goals is to ensure the local community's ownership of its government
infrastructure. Diluting that guarantee with a partnership between
federal cabinet officers and private security corporations will
result in the elimination of local governance in security planning.
It will stop all local ownership of the communities. It will circumvent
the few existing requirements of accountability.
is clear that DHS intends to partner, closely and permanently, with
private security manpower and technology. To Secretary Chertoff,
it is a matter of risk management. And, according to him, risk management
is a matter for corporations: "That is why we must and do count
heavily on partnerships with many of you [private businesses]. And
this is especially important given the private sector owns about
85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure." (Chertoff,
speech to US Chamber of Commerce, April 29, 2005).
Chertoff offers private businesses a resource that the Bush Administration
just recently stripped away from police forces: money. "We
can do many things on the federal level to help our private sector
we can provide you information and intelligence
we can provide some level of funding." (Ibid.).
As to accountability,
will it increase under Secretary Chertoff's National Response Plan?
[W]e have to be candid in recognizing that fear
of the transaction costs of litigation has inhibited full deployment
of our private ingenuity. That is why [we] provide limited liability
protection to companies and manufacturers that develop qualified
homeland security technology and processes." And more clearly,
"We will provide some protections in the event that you are
sued in connection with a terrorist attack."
It has never
yet been demonstrated that fighting private lawsuits has harmed
the security industry. In fact, PSCs are currently in unparalleled
boom times, and the prospects are even brighter. They are getting
Billions of dollars in no-bid contracts, and a large number of top
executives from DHS are now leaving to become lobbyists for private
security companies. (See U.S. News and World Report, May
The legal vacuum
in which private security firms have been operating abroad will
now be accorded to them at home in the U.S. The program, as outlined
by Chertoff, aims to insert private business into the public trust
and to diminish the role of police in public safety. It strips police
budgets, while offering both money and legal immunity to private
security and technology firms.
for implementing that program is largely set forth in the 426-page
National Response Plan. Briefly, in the event of a "significant
terrorist strike", an all-powerful vertical hierarchy of newly-created
councils and committees will go into action. Many of them consist
of the FBI and three major partners:
2. The National Guard and other military units; and
3. Local police.
- or policy-making representation - of FBI, private security industry,
National Guard (or Department of Defense) and (lastly) local police,
will take effect in the following bodies, among others:
Center (JOC); responsible for policy-making decisions;
Joint Operations Center, Intelligence Unit (JOCIU); joint
public-private decisions on intelligence security and usage;
Joint Field Office (JFO); awards and dispenses money for
public-private partnership action.
firms such as Kroll Associates, or Halliburton, and many others,
will wield great influence in the awarding of DHS contracts. Municipal
police will evidently have to compete with them, and with the National
Guard, for funds.
There are no
special provisions in the National Response Plan for the protection
and preservation of civic government or of accountability to civilian
has addressed the plan for cooperation with private commerce in
great detail. He has likewise begun putting together the plan for
National Guard participation. "If we were to have a critical
event here, we would look to the National Guard as a critical part
of our response, in terms of the ability to manage an emergency.
I want to thank the business community for working with the Guard
As of this writing,
Chertoff has not mentioned specific roles for state and local police
apart from the vague phrase "information sharing" as set
forth in the National Response Plan. He has not publicly recognized
the importance of policing, community or otherwise, in preserving
the nature of America's democracy. He has not addressed the issue
of police funding.
then, that European observers emphasize the lack of regulation,
accountability, and civic content in the U.S. approach. To Europeans,
it appears from the record that the U.S. intends to pursue terrorism
within its own borders in much the same way it now does in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Many now predict that, upon US forces departure
from Iraq, more of the considerable rage and resentment of the radical
factions of Islamism will be directed against the US homeland. Thus,
DHS Secretary Chertoff's planning in substituting military forces
(National Guards) and paramilitary firms (private security companies)
for community policing may constitute part of a self-fulfilling
The second part
of Chapter XII will compare and contrast European anti-terrorist
structures and organizations, together with the role, present and
projected, of Community Police at three levels: National, International,
(A), National, will discuss European 21st Century Community
Policing and its primary role in antiterrorism, on a country-by-country
basis. It will include intelligence gathering; first responder and
terrorist sweep training; interoperability of communications; officer
education in human rights, civic structure and democratic societies.
(B), International, will refer to bilateral and multilateral
treaties and working agreements between and among separate countries
respecting protection of multiple homelands, and the international
provisions for regulation and accountability of antiterrorist forces,
both public and, where applicable, private security organizations.
(C), Supranational, will review the antiterrorist measures
recently taken by the European Union, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other bodies. In an ever-growing
contrast with the policies of the US, they stress civilian (police)
responses and planning; preservation of civil and of human rights;
openness and transparency of processes; large investments in police
training and education at all levels; and interdisciplinary or "cross-cutting"
approaches to fighting terrorism that will create a broad basis
of political and intellectual innovation.
(C) will also review the roles of the Council of European Chiefs
of Police, of the European Parliament and courts, the European Attorney
General, and Europol in fighting terrorism and making the needed
adaptations in society and economies to prevent its recurrence.
It will explain the EU insistence upon avoiding a military response
while preserving its acquis communautaire, the cumulative
total body of laws, citizens' rights, achievements and progress
in the EU to date.
In the words
of the Chief of one of Europe's foremost national police forces,
"Subverting one's own institutions for the declared purpose
of fighting an open-ended war on terror is like surrendering to
gain a ceasefire. There is no way to estimate the costs."
--- Arthur A. Jones and Robin Wiseman are international human
rights lawyers with legal educations in the United States and Europe.
They are consultants and authors on international policing, social
policy and human rights, and regular contributors to the forum here
at LA Community Policing.
For more of their work, please see the Think
additional information or a complete list of references, contact: