Wellford W. Wilms
Professor, and Chair of the Faculty
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies
Faculty Director, Educational Leadership Program
University of California, Los Angeles 90095-1521

310 / 825-8385
email: wilms@ucla.edu

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"To Protect and To Serve
… and To Listen"
Adding a new dimension to policing Los Angeles

Executive Summary

Click here to read the complete 150 page LAPD Research Report

A Report Issued to:

Mr. Rick Caruso, Chair, and Members,
Los Angeles Police Commission

And

Mr. William J. Bratton, Chief
Los Angeles Police Department

by:

Wellford W. Wilms, Professor
Departments of Education and Policy Studies
University of California, Los Angeles

Warren H. Schmidt, Professor Emeritus
School of Policy, Planning and Development
University of Southern California

Alex J. Norman, Professor Emeritus
School of Public Policy & Social Research
University of California, Los Angeles

November 19, 2002

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In 1994, researchers from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and the University of Southern California (USC) began an action research project with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The study was designed to create feedback loops up and down the chain of command to transmit information about employees' changing perceptions about the external world and work-life and reforms that were being implemented. Especially at a time of such rapid change, this kind of information would hopefully enable LAPD executives to take corrective actions when needed. This final report is intended for use by the Los Angeles Police Commission, the new Chief of Police, and other Los Angeles policy leaders and citizens.

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Since we began this research in 1994, the Department has been under enormous pressure for change. The 1991 Rodney King beating and the ensuing riots, and the subsequent report of the Christopher Commission, intensified public demands for accountability and reform. Later, the Department's high and negative profile in the first OJ Simpson trial, the Margaret Mitchell shooting and the Rampart scandal of 1998, and the recent federal consent decree together have created a public mandate for change. During this same time, the Department has suffered from a lack of consistent leadership. Neither Chief Willie Williams (1992-1997) nor Chief Bernard Parks (1997-2002) was able to articulate a coherent vision and rally the Department behind it. The new Chief, William J. Bratton takes over a Department that has significant strengths but has been seriously demoralized.

The Study

The disturbing events of the 1990s presented an unusual opportunity to observe the Department under stress and learn how it operates. Between 1994 and 1996 we conducted more than 100 ride-alongs, observed police stations, and conducted numerous interviews with officers up and down the chain of command while taking copious notes. Between 1996 and 2000 we conducted three employee surveys with response rates ranging from 82-90 percent. We tabulated the results of each survey and reported them to area captains, and worked with supervisors to convert the results into annual work plans. We also reported results of each survey to LAPD officers in large meetings. After each survey, we aggregated the data and presented reports to the Chief of Police.

This report provides a detailed picture of rank-and-file police officers' and supervisors' reflections on external events, on themselves as police officers, and on work life in the LAPD between 1996 and 2000. In late 2000 we made an abbreviated preliminary report public. This report presents the study in its entirety - a description of the research methods, and the complete set of data. It includes a summary of findings, recommendations and a concluding note.

Summary of Findings

We have framed the findings using industrial psychologist Kurt Lewin's concept of "force field" analysis. Lewin thought of organizations' performance as being driven by some forces and restrained by others. Where these "driving" and "restraining" forces met he called the "force field". It is a useful concept because the LAPD's high levels of performance in some areas and low levels in others are products of significant driving and restraining forces. And the impact of these forces can be managed to produce higher levels of organizational performance.

Driving Forces (factors that influence better performance)

Police Officers' Altruism and Mission

Throughout the course of this study, it became clear that most officers are guided by altruistic values. Most say they are in police work to make the community safer and to help people by fighting crime. Most believe that proactive police work (arresting people and putting criminals in jail) is a means to this altruistic end. Until recently, most officers also viewed police work as a good career (though the percent has declined since 1998).

Quality of Worklife - Teamwork and Job Satisfaction

The quality of work life at the area (division) level is another driving force, though it has declined since 1998. When we began our surveys in 1996, the vast majority of the officers gave high marks to their captains' leadership, although these ratings declined as Chief Parks exerted increasing management control. Relationships between officers and their immediate supervisors remained favorable and stable across all three surveys.

Most officers also reported being treated with dignity and respect in their areas (a critical ingredient of a positive work environment). Also, most rated their areas as outstanding places to work and said they feel part of a team, but these figures have also eroded since 1998.

Inclusiveness

Most LAPD officers described their areas as inclusive places to work where people from many different backgrounds are welcome. Most agreed that their areas have a good mix of employees - with men and women of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Despite a public perception of the LAPD as being racist and sexist, we found very little evidence to support this view. While some said that diversifying the Department had produced a lower quality workforce, this does not seem to be a "hot button" item for most employees. Rather, there appears to be an acceptance of the steps being taken to bring more women and officers of color into the Department.

Support for Community Policing

Most LAPD officers embrace the principles of community policing. The overwhelming majority understand and agree with the concept as partnering with the community, understanding citizens' priorities and concerns, and taking responsibility for a specific territory. And most agreed that community policing offers distinct benefits - effective police service and reducing the potential for violence and that the Department should continue to implement it.

Restraining Forces (factors that reduce performance)

Just as the driving forces increase performance, five key restraining forces work in opposition - restricting the LAPD's performance.

Feelings of Abandonment

Most officers say that support from politicians, the media, and members of the community, is weak and declining. Officers complain bitterly that radio, TV and the newspapers sensationalize and distort high profile cases and elected officials are overly concerned with being "politically correct" to protect their own careers. They also complain about the unwillingness of the district attorney to prosecute and a judiciary that fails to keep criminals off the street.

Leadership

Most officers gave extremely low ratings to Chief Bernard Parks' leadership (we were not allowed to ask about Chief Willie Williams's leadership). Parks seemed unperturbed by the results, explaining them as a natural reaction to his many new orders and initiatives. Our surveys and interviews reflected a stiffening resistance throughout the organization.

Though Parks claimed that captains had a great deal of autonomy, most officers believed that he had undermined their authority by adding so much to their workload. Relationships between officers and captains had seriously eroded between 1996 and 2000 - with officers' rankings of their captains' leadership falling 25 percentage points. Similarly, the supervisors' increased workload and the removal of their discretion in handling complaints also began to erode working relationships between officers and their supervisors.

Discipline and the "1.28" Complaint System

A second restraining force is the officers' increasing fear of unfair or capricious discipline. The introduction of a new complaint system in early 1998 known as the "1.28" added to officers' lack of confidence in getting fair treatment.

The "1.28" system, recommended by the Christopher Commission but never implemented until 1998, requires a thorough investigation of every complaint lodged against officers and removes the discretion once used by supervisors and captains on how to handle complaints at a lower level. The "1.28" is hated by the vast majority of officers, whose anger spilled over to Parks who implemented it. Most officers think the system is unfair and gives undue power to citizens who can make unfounded complaints without penalty. Most officers are convinced that unfounded complaints cannot be stopped once they are in the system and that unresolved complaints will damage their careers.

Fear of Punishment

The cumulative impact of officers' feeling a lack of support from citizens, politicians and the media, a lack of leadership from the Chief to their captains, and an unfair disciplinary system all but paralyzed the Department in making needed changes. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly that in the fact that 80 percent of all officers say they fear being punished for making an honest mistake. Most officers say that the "1.28" discourages pro-active policing because officers mistrust the system and fear the consequences.

Eroding Morale and Job Satisfaction

Until 1998, high levels of officer morale and job satisfaction served as a driving force. It then began to plummet and became a force that restrained change in the Department. Since 1998, job satisfaction, teamwork and on-the-job initiative declined markedly. Not surprisingly, an alarmingly high percent of officers reported being burned out with their jobs and were ready to leave the Department if they had the chance.

Conclusions

1. The LAPD as an open system

Though many think of the LAPD as being autonomous, it is not. It is much more of an "open system" - existing in a constant exchange with its environment and depending on many other agencies for resources and policies necessary to provide police services. It is a dynamic system that is always undergoing change.

At the heart of this system is a continuing struggle among a wide variety of stakeholders over budgetary and policy control. Authority for budgetary and Department policy is widely dispersed among a wide variety of actors - the Mayor, 15 City Council members, and members of the Police Commission. In addition, special interest groups like the Police Protective League, the American Civil Liberties Union, and lawyers who specialize in representing clients with lawsuits against LAPD. Each attempts to influence policies that affect the Department and manipulate the media to promote its viewpoint.

As pressures to make the Department more accountable have mounted, politics have influenced decisions formerly reserved for the Chief, who until Willie Williams, was insulated by Civil Service. In 1991, Los Angeles voters passed "Proposition F", stripping the Chief of this protection, making the office directly accountable to the Police Commission (whose members serve at the pleasure of the Mayor).

A powerful Department culture that has developed over the past half century has produced a set of beliefs and values that restrain change. Most officers have a strong sense of duty to the community and the desire to be regarded and valued as professionals. But they also resist external political pressures on the Department out of the conviction that politics and policing do not mix.

2. Using Control to Manage

As the environment has become more turbulent, it has become extremely difficult for any single executive to manage this large bureaucracy alone. Most recently, Bernard Parks believed that he could manage the Department largely through the use of his authority exercised through the chain of command and through discipline.

Control is trained into LAPD officers because citizens want their police officers to know how to use reasonable force to maintain civic order. Its use is reinforced daily on-the-job and it pervades the Department. Top-down management control is the norm for the organization. Except for a brief and unsuccessful period when Willie Williams was Chief, every chief in recent memory has managed the Department with varying degrees of coercive authority. Orders are given from above and carried out below. Control is also exercised through the Department's disciplinary system. Chiefs aggressively guard their prerogative for exclusive control over discipline.

This study shows that relying exclusively on control to manage employees seriously reduces their opportunities to exercise their own initiative and to participate in decision making. Worse, it turns employees against their managers, restraining the Department's ability to change and improve.

3. Control and the Interaction with Citizens

Because control is so deeply embedded in police behavior, officers instinctively interact with citizens in a manner that may seem imperious or dictatorial. The effect is to fuel stereotypes on both sides, missing the opportunity to establish mutual understanding and trust.

The LAPD's aggressive policing, begun a half century ago and measured in terms of efficiency, almost guaranteed that many arrests would be for minor infractions, that physical force would be used frequently, and that few productive relationships would be formed between the police and the community. It also insured the likelihood that citizens would become alienated from, and skeptical of, the police. In time, these beliefs became the underpinnings of a "new" LAPD culture, which is still visible today. The Christopher Commission noted:

In view of Los Angeles' changing racial composition where its "minorities" have become a "majority." it is easy to see how mistrust and tension between the police and the community have developed. The effect has been for the Department to behave more as a "closed" than an "open" system. Once conflict breaks out between the Department and external agencies like the Mayor, City Council, or special interests like the American Civil Liberties Union or community groups, the differences quickly lead to polarization and more conflict. The natural behavior for the Department, like any other organism that is threatened, is to turn inward and close off communication.

4. A Time for Leadership

The vast majority of LAPD officers have chosen police work for altruistic reasons and they support the principles of community policing. When asked about their own values, most reflect the Department motto, "To Protect and Serve." Findings make it clear that most officers take their greatest pleasure from helping people and serving communities by fighting crime. And, according to the most recent survey, the overwhelming majority of officers would report serious misconduct of fellow officers, and that Department policy needs to be followed when apprehending criminals.

Federal court orders mandating racial and gender goals in the Department are supported by most officers. Most embrace the diversified direction in which the Department is headed. Officers of all backgrounds appear to accept one another (of the thousands of comments provided by officers about problems they experience on-the-job, only a very small number mentioned race or gender discrimination).

Despite sliding morale and job satisfaction over the past five years, most officers take pride in working for the Department and they, like Los Angeles citizens are ready for new leadership.

Recommendations

Each of the following recommendations aims to reduce forces that restrain the Department from higher levels of performance and in their place create new driving forces that build on the LAPD's strengths.

1. Lead changes from the top, middle and bottom of the organization

Leadership to set the vision and the organization's goals must come from the top of the Los Angeles Police Department - the Police Commission, the Chief of Police, and the command staff. Demands of Los Angeles political leaders are also focused at the apex of the Department where they must be sorted out and interpreted if the organization is to function effectively. At the same time, the captains who command the 18 geographic areas must feel part of, and share in, the organization's vision and goals. Being close to the day-to-day problems presented by crime, the captains have much to contribute to formulating the Department's goals. And, to the extent that their knowledge is valued, they will become committed to the Department's goals. The captains are a critical link in the chain of command because they, and lieutenants and sergeants, deploy most of the Department's resources to achieve its goals. And, rank-and-file officers must also feel part of the organization's vision and embrace its goals so that resources are aligned up and down the chain of command.

Finally, the union can be an important ally and a constructive force for change if it is brought into the decision making process (the union has never been considered a potential ally by the LAPD). To the extent that the union is considered at all, or included in decisions, it has been included only after the fact. Excluding the union from issues affecting employees misses an opportunity to make use of union leaders' knowledge and to build commitment within the organization for necessary changes. And, excluding the union invariably leads to needless conflict.

2. Redesign the LAPD's work systems to include community policing activities as the means of producing cultural changes.

Much has been written about changing the LAPD's "command and control" culture, one that has proven remarkably resistant to change. But to change an organization's culture, its underlying work systems that govern employees' daily routines must first be changed. An organization's daily work routines exert enormous power in shaping and maintaining its culture.

The elements of community policing still exist in the LAPD's organization - the Basic Car plan, the senior lead officers, and the 18 Community Police Advisory Boards. What is clear is that if community policing is to be developed and sustained, it must be systematically built into the core work processes of the Department and reflected in the day-to-day routines of police officers. Evidence of processes that engage citizens and police in productive crime reduction exchanges (leads about criminal activity emanating from citizens, incidents of problem-solving, etc.) must be identified, measured and reported, along with tradition measures like arrests and use of force.

While implementing community policing has been far more difficult than imagined, it holds great promise for the future of the city and for legitimizing the use of the LAPD's coercive police power. Embracing the concept may enable the Department to break down generations of hostility among the poorer parts of the city by rebuilding relationships horizontally with citizens.

3. Rebuild confidence in disciplinary system by redesigning the citizen complaint process.

Even before the introduction of the new "1.28" complaint system, the vast majority of officers mistrusted the Department's disciplinary system, especially when cases went beyond the divisional level. When we began surveying officers in 1996, most said they trusted that their supervisors would support them if they made an honest mistake. And most regarded their captains as good leaders with integrity.

However, the current complaint system, recommended by the Christopher Commission, and implemented by order of the Police Commission by Chief Bernard Parks, is truly hated by most officers. It requires that every complaint (save the blatantly frivolous) be investigated, resolved, and reviewed by the Chief of Police. Officers know that the system has stripped supervisors and captains of authority to resolve complaints at the divisional level, leaving them vulnerable to what they perceive as arbitrary and capricious decisions by the bureaus, Internal Affairs, and the top command staff. While complaints are under investigation (a process that takes from 9-12 months) officers with complaints against them cannot transfer or be promoted. And, although officers have been told that unsubstantiated complaints will not count against them, these complaints are filed in permanent personnel records.

Experience with the complaint system over the past four years has shown it to be a step in the right direction, but one that needs to be modified to insure that officers feel it is fair and that they will not be singled out for punishment. The Police Commission and the new Chief of Police have just announced intentions to redesign the complaint process so that judgements can be made at lower levels about the disposition of some complaints that can be better handled swiftly and more effectively through mediation.

Click here to read the complete 150 page LAPD Research Report